Carroll v. Clifford Twp.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-3603,No. 14-3357,14-3357,14-3603 |
| Parties | DONALD A. CARROLL, Appellant in No. 14-3357 v. CLIFFORD TOWNSHIP; DENNIS KNOWLTON, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chairman/Supervisor; CHRIS MARCHO, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Supervisor Clifford Township, Dennis Knowlton, Chris Marcho, Appellants in No. 14-3603 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 17, 2015
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Donald Carroll sued Appellees/Cross-Appellants Clifford Township and two of its Supervisors, Chris Marcho and Dennis Knowlton, claiming that they had violated (1) his First Amendment freedom of association right when they failed to endorse his application to join the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"), and (2) his First Amendment free-speech right when they disbanded the Township police force after he had brought the civil rights action concerning his FOP application. The District Court granted summary judgment on the free-speech claim, but denied summary judgment on the freedom-of-association claim. A jury found in favor of Carroll on that claim, awarding $1 in nominal damages and punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 against Marcho and $15,000 against Knowlton. In a post-trial ruling, the District Court set aside the punitive damage awards, sustained the liability verdict and nominal damage award, and denied Carroll's applications for an award of attorney's fees and costs. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm all of the District Court's rulings with the exception of its denial of costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
Donald Carroll began working as a part-time police officer for Clifford Township in 2001, and transitioned to full-time employment in 2004. He became Assistant Police Chief in 2006, and Chief of Police in 2007. In 2007, Carroll decided to join the FOP, which required that the Township Supervisors confirm his position and qualifications. Carroll presented his FOP application to the Township Supervisors for their signature, but no Supervisor signed the form.1 In 2011, Carroll presented another copy of the application to Barry Searle, who served both as a Supervisor and as Police Commissioner. Searle apparently lost this application, and requested another copy from Carroll. Carroll submitted a third FOP form to Supervisors Marcho, Knowlton, and Searle at a Township meeting on February 14, 2012. The Township Supervisors referred the question of whether they should sign the form to the Township's attorney.
On March 28, 2012, Carroll filed the instant civil rights action against Clifford Township, Marcho, and Knowlton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a denial of his freedom of association. On May 8, 2012, the Township Supervisors voted to disband the police department, citing budgetary concerns.
As noted at the outset, the District Court granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim arising out of the elimination of the police department, and Carrollproceeded to trial on his freedom-of-association claim, after which the jury returned a verdict of $1 in nominal damages and $15,000 in punitive damages each against Marcho and Knowlton. Thereafter, the District Court: (1) vacated the award of punitive damages, finding insufficient evidence to sustain them, (2) denied Carroll's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), and (3) denied Appellees' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
Carroll filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the District Court's vacatur of punitive damages, denial of attorney's fees and costs, and grant of summary judgment on Count III. Marcho, Knowlton, and Clifford Township filed a cross-appeal from the denial of their post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
First, we must decide whether the District Court erred when it concluded that insufficient evidence supported the jury's punitive damages awards against Marcho and Knowlton. Because the sufficiency of the evidence for a punitive damages award is a question of law, our review is de novo. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Delli Santi v. CNA Ins., 88 F.3d 192, 207 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Punitive damages are appropriate in § 1983 actions when a "'defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.'" Id. at 430-31 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Here, Carroll presented no evidence to support a finding that Marcho or Knowlton intended to or were recklessly indifferent to Carroll's First Amendment freedom of association. Indeed, Carroll only submitted an FOP application to Marcho and Knowlton for signature on one occasion, making this an isolated incident rather than a repeated matter. We agree with the District Court that the conduct of Marcho and Knowlton was not so reprehensible as to support a punitive damages award. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order vacating punitive damages.
We must next decide whether the District Court abused its discretion when denying Carroll's request for attorney's fees. We review the District Court's denial of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion. D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 495, 495 (3d Cir. 2012). A district court abuses its discretion when its "decision 'rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.'" P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In an action under § 1983, a district court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A party who wins nominal damages isconsidered a prevailing party under § 1988. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992). Yet, "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of [a] failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. at 115 (citations omitted). Moreover, when the purpose of a civil rights action is recovery of monetary damages, courts are obligated to give primary consideration to the disparity between the damages awarded and the damages sought. Id. at 114.
Here, although Carroll sought compensatory damages, he received only $1 in nominal damages because he failed to prove "actual, compensable injury." Id. at 115 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-64 (1978)). Those damages, as noted by the District Court, "are a minute fraction of those that were sought[.]" App. at 24. In fact, Carroll "turned down a Rule 68 offer of judgment of $10,000." App. at 24.
We conclude that the District Court applied the correct standard when evaluating Carroll's application for attorney's fees, and did not abuse its discretion. We will therefore affirm the order denying Carroll's application for attorney's fees.
Carroll also contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion for costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). We review a challenge to the District Court's decision on a cost petition for abuse of discretion. Nat'l Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Iola, 700 F.3d 65, 104 (3d Cir. 2012).
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." We have read this rule to create a "strong presumption" that a district court should award costs to the prevailing party, and have held that when denying costs to a prevailing party district courts must give an explanation. Reger v. The Nemours Found., Inc., 599 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2010). The denial of costs to the prevailing party is typically a penalty for "needlessly bringing or prolonging litigation." Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 926 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950)). A party's limited success, taken alone, does not justify denial of costs. Id.
Here, the District Court denied costs to Carroll, the prevailing party, without offering any explanation. We see no evidence that the District Court intended its denial of costs as a penalty for dilatory actions. Although Carroll's limited success may justify denial of attorney's fees, it is insufficient to justify denying him costs. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's order insofar as it denies costs awarded under Rule 54(d), and remand for an award of costs allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Next, we must determine whether the District Court erred in denying Appellees' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). We exercise de novo review and view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 861 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In doing so, we ask whether sufficient evidence exists to allow a jury to enter a verdict for the party against whom the motion is directed. Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1978).
Marcho and Knowlton argue that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, Appellees argue that the verdict was improper because Carroll did not demonstrate that the failure to sign his FOP form violated his right to...
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