Carroll v. Cochran, 31463

Decision Date25 April 1962
Docket NumberNo. 31463,31463
Citation140 So.2d 300
PartiesJames Monroe CARROLL, Petitioner, v. H. G. COCHRAN, Jr., Director, Division of Correction, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James Monroe Carroll, petitioner, in pro. per.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

James Monroe Carroll petitioned this Court to issue its writ of habeas corpus under the contention he was being detained under a sentence which was illegal in that it was excessive. The writ issued and respondent has filed his response in which he concedes that the sentence imposed is excessive.

Petitioner was convicted on May 20, 1958 of the offense of withholding support from his minor children. Under the statute as it existed at that time the maximum imprisonment authorized was one year. Sec. 856.04, Fla.Statutes 1955, F.S.A. The statute was amended subsequently to provide for a maximum imprisonment of two years. Ch. 59-147, Laws of Florida, 1959.

Upon petitioner being convicted the trial court suspended sentence and ordered him to be placed on probation for a period of two years. At the expiration of that period of two years the court extended the probation for a further period of one year, to run from May 20, 1960. The court was authorized to do this by the provisions of Sec. 948.04, F.S.A.

It appears that in December 1960 the petitioner violated some of the conditions of his probation order. This fact was brought to the court's attention and on February 10, 1961 the court issued a warrant for petitioner's arrest.

The warrant was served on petitioner on June 7, 1961. On June 30, 1961 the court entered its order of revocation of probation. It then entered its judgment and sentence, said sentence being confinement in the state prison for a term of two years.

The sentence was excessive. Under Sec. 948.06, F.S.A. the court would have been authorized at that time to impose upon the petitioner 'any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation.' As has already been noted, the maximum sentence so authorized was imprisonment in the state prison for a term of one year.

No issue has been raised by petitioner or the respondent as to the fact the warrant for petitioner's arrest was not served on him and neither the court's order of revocation of probation nor its judgment and sentence was entered until a date subsequent to the termination of petitioner's period of probation. Under Sec. 948.04 F.S.A. it is provided that upon the termination of his period of probation, a probationer 'shall not be liable to sentence for the crime for which probation was allowed.'

It could be argued that because of this provision the court had lost jurisdiction of the petitioner and thus had no authority to sentence him for his offense of withholding support from his minor children.

In State ex...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Jett v. State, 97-2697.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 1998
    ...of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to Section 948.06, F.S. Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla.1962) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957)). See also Rodriguez v......
  • State v. Hall
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • August 18, 1994
    ...of the court have been set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to Section 948.06, F.S. Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla.1962) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957)). See also Rodriguez v......
  • Boyd v. State, 96-2349
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 16, 1997
    ...substantively unchanged. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The supreme court approved the foregoing language from Ard in Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300 (Fla.1962). In Carroll, the court concluded that "the processes of the trial court had been set in motion, for the warrant for petitioner'......
  • Hennig v. Prummell, 2D15–1315.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 24, 2015
    ...of the court [were] set in motion for revocation or modification of the probation pursuant to Section 948.06, F.S.” Carroll v. Cochran, 140 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla.1962) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957) ). In the present case, this p......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT