Carroso v. State
| Decision Date | 18 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D11-1282 |
| Parties | KENNETH MICHAEL CARROSO, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender,
and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Tonja Rene Vickers and
Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorneys
General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Kenneth Michael Carroso appeals his judgment and sentence for workers' compensation fraud involving a "monetary value" between $20,000 and $100,000. See § 440.105(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). Although he has already fully served his fourteen-month prison term for this offense, we reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial. In this case of first impression, the State and the trial court erroneouslyequated the "monetary value" that is an element of this criminal offense with the monetary amount of the noncriminal, administrative sanction available under section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). This overarching error resulted in the admission of irrelevant evidence and an improper jury instruction. These preserved errors entitle Mr. Carroso to a new trial.
Mr. Carroso was employed by Sunwest P.E.O. on July 20, 2005.1 On that day, while in the course and scope of his employment, he was involved in a truck accident. While he was riding as a passenger, Mr. Carroso was teaching another employee how to drive the truck. The trainee oversteered and overbraked going into a corner, and the truck rolled over. It is undisputed that Mr. Carroso was injured in this accident. He sustained a spiral fracture of his left arm. He apparently developed complications in this arm. He had surgery for a torn rotator cuff and complained of lower back pain.
Mr. Carroso received medical treatment authorized by Sunwest's workers' compensation carrier, First Commercial.2 As explained in greater detail later in this opinion, First Commercial also paid him temporary total disability benefits from July 26, 2005, through August 24, 2006.
During the workers' compensation proceedings, Mr. Carroso was deposed on February 14, 2006. In that deposition, Mr. Carroso allegedly made misleading statements or omissions regarding some relatively minor medical or chiropractic treatment he had received years earlier, possibly related to prior off-the-job automobile accidents. After the deposition, First Commercial reported the possible fraud to the State. It should be noted that the evidence in our record does not establish the outcome of the workers' compensation proceeding or whether the judge of compensation claims took any action on the alleged misstatements in this deposition.3
The State charged Mr. Carroso with insurance fraud in the second degree, under sections 440.105(4)(b)(1) and (4)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (2005). Section 440.105(4)(b)(1) states that it shall be "unlawful" for any person: "To knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter." Section 440.105(4)(f) provides the penalties for violating this statute:
2. Is $20,000 or more, but less than $100,000, the offender commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
3. Is $100,000 or more, the offender commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
The "monetary value of any violation of this subsection" is an element of the crime. Cf. Insko v. State, 969 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 2007) ().
Although the issue of intent is not presented in this appeal, it should be observed that this offense is a specific intent crime. See Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 246-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (). Thus, it was not enough for the State to prove that Mr. Carroso misstated facts or omitted facts in his deposition. The State was required to prove that he made misrepresentations "for the purpose of obtaining . . . any benefit or payment under this chapter." § 440.105(4)(b)(1). One would expect that the State in such a case would need to identify, with some degree of particularity, a benefit or payment that the defendant was seeking to obtain when making a misrepresentation that he at least anticipated would be unavailable under the true facts.
The existence of prior medical conditions does not necessarily preclude workers' compensation benefits under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. Anybenefit available under chapter 440 can be payable despite an injured worker's preexisting injuries and conditions. See § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (). For example, an injured worker can be entitled to temporary workers' compensation disability benefits even when he or she is totally disabled from a condition unrelated to the workplace injury, if it is also established that the workplace injury "as a separate entity" would entitle the injured worker to workers' compensation disability benefits. See Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. La Torre, 702 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (). Thus, it is not obvious from this record that any of the information concerning prior medical or chiropractic treatment that Mr. Carroso may have failed to disclose would have had any bearing on the outcome of his workers' compensation claim.
The State's reliance on the noncriminal, administrative sanction in this trial tended to minimize the evidence on this element of intent. At any retrial, proof of this element may prove challenging for the State unless its evidence is substantially different from the evidence in this record.
In this appeal, the focus is on section 440.105(4)(f)'s reference to a "monetary value." That term is not defined in the statute. Because this statute is a criminal offense, the legislature requires this court to strictly construe it in a manner most favorable to the defendant. See § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). We do not attempt any comprehensive definition of "monetary value" in this case. We merely holdthat the trial court's reliance on the noncriminal, administrative sanction as a measure of "monetary value" was incorrect.
Before describing the two preserved issues on appeal, it is helpful to examine the statute that led the trial court astray. Section 440.09(4)(a) provides for a noncriminal, administrative sanction in the event that a claimant knowingly makes any false, fraudulent, or misleading statement for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under the workers' compensation laws. Section 440.09(4)(a) states:
An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s. 440.105 or any criminal act for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits. For purposes of this section, the term "intentional" shall include, but is not limited to, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in criminal matters. This section shall apply to accidents, regardless of the date of the accident. For injuries occurring prior to January 1, 1994, this section shall pertain to the acts of the employee described in s. 440.105 or criminal activities occurring subsequent to January 1, 1994.
This statute is most frequently addressed in the context of an order of a judge of compensation claims granting or denying benefits. See, e.g., Lucas v. ADT Sec. Inc./Sedgwick CMS, 72 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Pavilion Apartments v. Wetherington, 943 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).4
The First District, which has jurisdiction over appeals from workers' compensation proceedings, has held that the administrative forfeiture of benefits under section 440.09(4)(a) does not require any nexus between the false statement and the benefits forfeited. See Rustic Lodge v. Escobar, 729 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (). The First District has interpreted the sanction in section 440.09(4)(a) to result in the cessation of an injured employee's entitlement to any unpaid workers' compensation benefits, but it has not required a return of or restitution for benefits already lawfully paid prior to the claimant's misrepresentation. Thus, the sanction under section 440.09(4)(a) turns off the tap from which workers' compensation benefits flow.5 See Alvarez v. Unicco, 958 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ().
To continue reading
Request your trial