Carrozza v. Voccola, C.A. No. 2002-0603 (R.I. Super. 8/4/2006)

• Decision Date: 04 August 2006
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2002-0603
• Parties: FREDERICK CARROZZA, SR.; PHILIP CARROZZA; FREIDA CARROZZA; and LAURIE CARROZZA-CONN v. MICHAEL VOCCOLA, in his capacity as Executor for the Estate of FREDERICK CARROZZA, JR.; ANGELA GIGUERE; and CHRISTINE GIGUERE-CARROZZA.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

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FREDERICK CARROZZA, SR.; PHILIP CARROZZA; FREIDA CARROZZA; and LAURIE CARROZZA-CONN v. MICHAEL VOCCOLA, in his capacity as Executor for the Estate of FREDERICK CARROZZA, JR.; ANGELA GIGUERE; and CHRISTINE GIGUERE-CARROZZA.

C.A. No. 2002-0603

State of Rhode Island, Superior Court

Newport, S.C.

Filed: August 4, 2006

DECISION

NUGENT, J.

Before this Court for decision is the motion for summary judgment of defendants Michael Voccola, in his capacity as Executor for the Estate of Frederick Carrozza, Jr., Angela Giguere, and Christine Giguere-Carrozza. This Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to G. L. 1956 § 82-14.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

This case involves a familial dispute and several properties. The plaintiffs seek to impose a resulting trust on certain properties owned by the late Frederick Carrozza, Jr. (Fred Jr. or decedent). Alternatively, the plaintiffs seek a declaration that a partnership existed between plaintiffs and decedent. The essential allegation of the plaintiffs' complaint is that the decedent's father, Frederick Carrozza, Sr. (Fred Sr.), purchased the subject four properties and titled them in the name of the decedent to hold in trust for the benefit of the Carrozza family. A quarrel ensued between the decedent and his father over the decedent's sale of property on Broadway in Newport, Rhode Island to pay decedent's debts which resulted in an estranged relationship. Without reconciling Frederick Carrozza, Jr. died leaving his estate—including the four subject properties¹—to his wife, defendant Angela Giguere, and his adopted daughter, defendant Christine Giguere-Carrozza.

Although there is no "paper trail" of the monies allegedly contributed by Frederick Carrozza Sr., Fred Sr. testified that he provided the money for the purchase of each property at issue. Fred Sr. claims to have furnished $25,000 toward the purchase of the Post Road property and that the remainder of the purchase price was financed. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 17.) The condominium at River Farm was acquired after Fred Sr. advanced the developer some funds. Allegedly, the developer went "belly up" and as repayment to Fred Sr. for the "loans," the developer conveyed a condominium unit to Fred Jr. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 20-21.) However, Fred Sr. admitted in his deposition that Fred Jr., the decedent, had purchased the Prospect Hill property with his own money.² (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 24.) With respect to the Bellevue Avenue property, Fred Sr. claims that he provided a $60,000 check and that the remainder of the purchase price was financed. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 15.) Fred Sr. later testified that his sister Doris loaned the money to Fred Jr. for the purchase of the Bellevue Avenue Property. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 56.) Philip Carrozza, Fred Sr.'s other son, also testified that Doris had provided the purchase money for the Bellevue Avenue Property. (Dep. of Philip Carrozza at 27.)

According to Fred Sr., the properties were titled in Fred Jr.'s name so that in the event of Fred Sr.'s death, the family would be cared for. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 27.) However, because Fred Sr. "didn't want to tell everybody what [he] had," the parties did not memorialize their arrangement in the form of a trust—this decision was made against the advice of legal counsel. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 27.) Thus, Fred Sr. trusted Fred Jr. to hold title to the properties for the benefit of the family—Fred Sr., his four children, and Fred Jr.'s mother. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 28.)

Unfortunately, the relationship that existed between Fred Sr. and Fred Jr. soured. In 1997, Fred Jr. invested substantial monies in the stock market in a company named Oxford Health. The stock suffered a steep decline which caused Fred Jr. to suffer a substantial loss on a margin call. In response, Fred Jr. sold property on Broadway in Newport which was titled in his name without the knowledge or permission of his father. (Dep. of Fred Sr. 45-49.) At some point during the same time period, Fred Sr. had quitclaim deeds drafted for the properties because he "wanted [the properties] back." (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 29-30.) Fred Jr. refused to execute the quitclaim deeds. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 31.) After the initial refusal, Fred Sr. "never could catch up with [Fred Jr.]." (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 31.) The father and son became estranged and did not speak for several years and did not reconcile before Fred Jr.'s death in 2002. In the meantime, Fred Jr. married and adopted his wife's daughter, both of whom inherited the properties at issue. This action ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment is a proceeding in which the proponent must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, pleadings and other documentary matter . . . that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Palmisciano v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (R.I. 1992) (citations omitted); Super. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c). When the moving party sustains its burden, "[t]he opposing parties will not be allowed to rely upon mere allegations or denials in their pleadings. Rather, by affidavits or otherwise, they have an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I. 1998) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Russo Bros., Inc., 641 A.2d 1297, 1299 (R.I. 1994)).

During a summary judgment proceeding "the court does not pass upon the weight or credibility of the evidence but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Palmisciano, 603 A.2d at 320 (citing Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980)). "Thus, the only task of a trial justice in ruling on a summary judgment motion is to determine whether there is a genuine issue concerning any material fact." Capital Props. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1080 (R.I. 1999) (citing Palmisciano, 603 A.2d at 320). "`Summary judgment should be granted only if an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other materials viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion reveals no genuine issue of material fact.'" Stone v. Green Hill Civic Ass'n, Inc., 786 A.2d 387, 389 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Nichola v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 945, 947-48 (R.I. 1984)).

DISCUSSION

The defendants assert that the plaintiffs' claim of a trust is barred by the statute of frauds.³ Further, the defendants contend that because there is no evidence supporting the claim of a partnership, the plaintiffs cannot recover under that theory.

Resulting Trust

While an express trust must be set forth in writing, a resulting trust does not require written proof. Desonoyers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 108 R.I. 100,110, 272 A.2d 683, 689 (1971). A resulting trust arises when an express trust fails either at the outset or subsequently. Id. With regard to property, "when [] purchase money is furnished by one party and the deed taken in the name of another a resulting trust is established in favor of the one who pays the money, the controlling question then being the ownership of the money which can be shown by parol evidence." Cetenich v. Fuvich, 41 R.I. 107, 116, 102 A. 817, 821 (1918). Furthermore, "there must be clear, full and convincing evidence" that the contributor intended to retain a beneficial ownership in the property conveyed. Desonoyers 108 R.I. at 111, 272 A.2d at 689. A rebuttable presumption of a gift arises when, "the consideration moves from a parent or one who stands in loco parentis to the nominal purchaser." Reynolds v. Blaisdell, 23 R.I. 16, 19, 49 A. 42, 42 (1901); see also, Roseman v. Sutter, 735 F. Supp. 461, 465-66 (D.R.I. 1990) (evidence failed to rebut the presumption that parents' contribution of $50,000 down payment was a gift).

Because of the familial relationship between Fred Sr. and Fred Jr., the presumption arises that any money advanced by Fred Sr. was a gift to Fred Jr. Concerning both the Bellevue Avenue and Prospect Hill Properties, Fred Sr.'s testimony does not support the imposition of a resulting trust. Fred Sr. admitted that the Prospect Hill Property was purchased with Fred Jr.'s funds. (Dep. of Fred Sr. at 24.) Furthermore, both Philip Carrozza and Fred Sr. confirmed that "Aunt Doris" loaned Fred Jr. the purchase money for the Bellevue Avenue Property. Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Fred Sr., there is no evidence that Fred Sr. contributed any money to the purchase of either the Prospect Hill Property or the Bellevue Avenue Property. Therefore, Fred Sr.'s claim of a resulting trust as to both properties fails.

"[A] mere general contribution toward the purchase price by itself will not establish [] a resulting trust." Cutroneo v. Cutroneo, 81 R.I. 55, 59, 98 A.2d 921, 923 (1953); Campanella v. Campanella, 76 R.I. 47, 52, 68 A.2d 85, 88 (1949) ("[N]o resulting trust arises where a person furnishes only a part of the purchase price of the property unless his part is contributed in payment of some definite aliquot part thereof.") Applying these principles to the case at bar, as a matter of law, a resulting trust cannot be imposed upon the Post Road Property because Fred Sr. claims to have contributed only $25,000, yet there is no evidence to suggest that at the time of the conveyance Fred Sr., individually, intended to retain a definite fractional interest in the property. Cutroneo, 81 R.I. at 59, 98 A.2d at 923 ("There must be clear, full and convincing evidence that at the time of the conveyance it was the intention and understanding that the contributor was to have the beneficial ownership in the whole or in a definite fractional part."). Fred Sr.'s claim is that Fred Jr. was to hold the properties for the benefit of the Carrozza family which does not satisfy the requirement that a resulting trust exist for the benefit of the settlor individually.

Finally, the...