Carson v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 1917 |
| Docket Number | No. 31322.,31322. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Parties | CARSON v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Jackson County; William Theopholis, Judge.
Action to recover for services rendered by plaintiff as a surgeon, in treating an employé of defendant named Watson, and for services of Dr. Armstrong in assisting, and for hospital charges; the latter claims having been assigned to plaintiff. Trial was had to a jury, and on verdict for plaintiff judgment was entered. The defendant appeals. Reversed.
Preston, J., dissenting.Hughes, Sutherland & Taylor, of Cedar Rapids, and F. W. Myatt, of Maquoketa, for appellant.
F. D. Kelsey and A. W. Sokol, both of Maquoketa, for appellee.
One Watson, a colored man, had been employed by defendant on grading or cement work in the vicinity of Brown. The 20th of September, 1913, was rainy, and he, with other colored men, having laid off for the day, had gathered at a house in the village. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon some of them informed Simpson, assistant foreman of defendant, that a man had been cut. Upon entering the house, Simpson found Watson bleeding and his intestines protruding. With the aid of others he loaded him on a passing train to be taken to Preston. At the instance of the company's station agent there, Dr. Armstrong was at the station when the train came in, and directed the wounded man to be taken to his office. Either the foreman, Jones, or his assistant, Simpson, called Haskell, the assistant engineer in charge of the work being done by defendant, and Dr. Armstrong talked with him. Armstrong then replaced the intestines as best he could and took the patient on the 7:15 o'clock train to the Maquoketa hospital, where, in the same evening, with his assistance, the plaintiff performed a successful operation. The patient remained at the hospital two weeks, and in this action the plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for the services rendered by him as surgeon, as well as for those rendered by Armstrong and for the hospital charges. Included also are hospital charges for the care of one Zania. The rendition of the services in the treatment of Watson, as alleged, and that he and Zania were cared for at the hospital, and assignments of the claims to plaintiff, are not questioned. That neither Jones nor Simpson was authorized to engage the services of a physician is conceded.
[1] Was the evidence sufficient to carry to the jury the issue as to whether Haskell was authorized to engage the services of Armstrong to treat Watson, empower Armstrong to engage plaintiff's service, and to incur expenses for the care of these patients? Haskell was shown to have been in charge of the improvements being made along defendant's line of railroad between Green Island and Oxford Junction. Wood, the district engineer, acting for defendant, had employed him, and Wood testified “that the extent of Haskell's authority was to see that the grade work, being performed by contractors, was properly done, and that he was in direct charge of the concrete construction of bridges and culverts, with authority to employ and to discharge the men engaged in such construction.” The witness testified further:
That, as regards his authority as assistant engineer, with reference to the employment of physicians, he had no authority aside from a list of physicians. He was given a list of the company's physicians along the line, and he was to call on them if any of the men were injured or sick while working on the company's work. He was expected to call the company's physician when an employé was injured while engaged in the work of the company, and that was the extent of Mr. Haskell's authority. “I would say the order was to go to the nearest physician in emergency cases. * * * In case Mr. Haskell couldn't find, at the place he desired, a regularly retained physician of the railway company, what would he do in such an emergency? A. I suppose just like any one else would. I say he only had authority to go to the railroad company's physician. He hadn't authority to go to any one else.
By the Court: Q. I take it that there was a number of emergency cases, where parties had been personally injured, under your supervision, and required immediate attention from some doctor. Now, what is the usual custom of the road in cases where the injured party requires immediate attention, and a railroad doctor is not within reach? Do you allow them to die, or do you send them to some doctor that can be reached? A. All such cases are handled by the superintendent. The usual custom was to get them to a doctor as quick as possible. Q. And if the doctor of the company cannot be reached, you will find some doctor; isn't that the case? A. Certainly; yes, sir.”
The witness then explained that the authority to employ physicians was limited to employes who became sick or were injured while in the line of duty or service of the company. Neither plaintiff nor Armstrong had been employed as company's physician; but the evidence tended to show that employés injured while at work were taken to physicians other than the company's when the latter were absent and that the defendant uniformly paid for the services by them rendered. The company's regularly employed surgeon was absent when Armstrong was engaged, and, without reviewing the evidence, we are of opinion that it was sufficient to have warranted the jury in finding that Haskell had authority to engage Armstrong's services, had Watson been injured while in the line of his employment. Surely ratification of his action in repeatedly taking employés to physicians other than those regularly employed by the company, by compensating them for services so rendered, was evidence that he had authority so to do.
In no instance, other than that involved in this action, however, does it appear that he ever directed an employé, injured when not engaged in the company's work, to be taken to a physician, whether regularly employed by the company or not, or that the company ever paid for medical or surgical services, or care at a hospital, in such a case. Though physicians were shown to have aided in the care of those injured in a wreck at Riggs, and Haskell was in charge as representative of the company, there was no showing that he had had anything to do with their employment. That Armstrong was employed by Haskell we have no doubt. When Watson was brought into his office, either Jones or Simpson called Haskill by telephone, and Armstrong talked with him. The latter testified:
[2] We need not stop to ascertain whether this conversation conferred authority on Armstrong to employ plaintiff to perform the operation, but see Smith v. Railway, 104 Iowa, 147, 73 N. W. 581;Bushnell v. Railway, 69 Iowa, 620, 29 N. W. 753;Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Brown, 107 Ind. 336, 8 N. E. 218;Louisville, N. A. & C. I. Co. v. Smith, 121 Ind. 353, 22 N. E. 775, 6 L. R. A. 320;Burke v. Railway, 114 Mich. 685, 72 N. W. 997. It is evident from the facts recited that Haskell was without actual authority to employ Armstrong in behalf of the defendant, or to authorize him to engage the services of plaintiff or procure the care of the patient at the hospital. None such had been expressly conferred on him, nor, as, we think, impliedly by virtue of his position.
[3] The board of directors of a railroad company, strictly speaking, are its agents and representatives; but, in a practical sense, such board in its relations to the public are the corporation itself. Unless conferred by the articles of incorporation, all authority to act for the corporation must emanate from the board of directors, and before it can be bound by contracts of agents, officers, or employés it must be made to appear that power to enter therein has been conferred on such agent, officers, or employés by said articles, or...
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