Louisville v. Smith

• Decision Date: 05 November 1889
• Citation: 22 N.E. 775,121 Ind. 353
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Smith et al.

121 Ind. 353

22 N.E. 775

Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co.

v.Smith et al.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 5, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Owen county; A. M. Cuming, Judge.

Action by John W. Smith and another against the Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company to recover for medical services rendered to one of defendant's brakemen. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.

Geo. W. Friedley and E. E. Field, for appellant. Pickens & Pickens, for appellees.

Elliott, C. J.

Jesse Vawter was in the service of the appellant, in the capacity of a brakeman on one of its freight trains; and on the morning of June 11, 1885, while engaged in the discharge of the duties of his service at Stinesville, his leg was broken. Dr. Judah, a competent and skillful surgeon of Stinesville, was called to treat the injured man. He set, dressed, and bandaged the broken limb, and gave the unfortunate man such treatment as his injury required. After the broken limb had been set and bandaged, the conductor caused the appellees, who lived at Gosport, to be summoned by telegraph; and one of them obeyed the summons, and treated the patient, in conjunction with Dr. Judah. The appellant had fully discharged its duty to its injured brakeman when it procured the services of a competent surgeon. The conductor had no authority to employ other surgeons; for his authority was special, not general, and it did not extend beyond the duty created by the emergency which required him to act. With that duty his authority arose, and with it terminated. He had authority to do what the emergency demanded, in order to preserve his injured fellow employe from serious harm; but he had no authority to do more. When the company had procured the services of a competent surgeon, it did all that it was morally or legally bound to do; and the conductor could not impose upon it any greater obligation. We hold that the conductor did have authority to at once employ the surgical aid demanded by the urgency of the occasion; but we hold, also, that his authority did not extend beyond this limit. Railroad Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 107 Ind. 336, 8 N. E. Rep. 218; Railroad Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98, 20 N. E. Rep. 650. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, supra, the distinction is drawn between cases where the conductor may bind the company and cases where he may not; and this case belongs to the latter class. The authority of the conductor was exhausted...