Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32464

• Decision Date: 11 July 1951
• Docket Number: No. 32464,32464
• Citation: 28 A.L.R.2d 344,156 Ohio St. 104,45 O.O. 103,100 N.E.2d 197
• Parties: , 28 A.L.R.2d 344, 45 O.O. 103 CARSON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 104

156 Ohio St. 104

100 N.E.2d 197, 28 A.L.R.2d 344, 45 O.O. 103

CARSON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 32464.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 11, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Under Section 2855-11, General Code, records of a coroner made by himself or any one acting under his direction or supervision, or transcripts or photostatic copies thereof certified by the coroner, are admissible in evidence as to the facts contained therein.

2. Under Section 1261-66, General Code, certified copies of original certificates of death are prima facie evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.

3. Under Sections 1261-66 and 2855-11, General Code, mere opinions or conclusions do not constitute facts and are not admissible in evidence.

4. The statement in a death certificate or a coroner's record that a decedent committed suicide, where there was no witness to the infliction of the wound from which the decedent died, is a mere opinion and is not admissible in evidence in the trial of a case in which the question of whether the decedent was a suicide is involved.

James R. Carson, hereinafter designated the insured, died on May 6, 1948, survived by members of his family among whom was his wife, Erma E. Carson, appellant, hereinafter designated plaintiff.

The insured held two insurance policies on his life issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, appellee, hereinafter designated defendant.

Plaintiff is named as beneficiary in both policies. One of the policies provides for the payment of a death benefit of $1,000 and the other policy is of the family income type which provides for the payment of a monthly income if the insured dies before the expiration of 20 years from the date of the issuance of the policy until 20 years after that date, and on the twentieth anniversary thereof for the payment of $4,000.

Defendant accepted full responsibility for the payments under the policies and there is no question in the present case regarding the contractual obligations of defendant under the ordinary provisions of its policies.

However, each policy contains provisions with reference to 'accidental means death benefit,' whereby the company promised to pay the beneficiary an additional sum equal to the face amount of the policy, in the event of the death of the insured by accidental means.

The provision with reference to the 'accidental means death benefit' which is pertinent reads in part as follows:

'* * * upon receipt at the home office of due proof of the death of the insured, while this provision is in effect, as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means, and that such death shall not have occurred * * * as the result of self-destruction, whether sane or insane * * *.'

Plaintiff instituted an action against defendant in the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County to recover $5,000 for additional death benefits upon the claim that the death of the insured was such as to be covered by the provision for 'accidental means death benefit.'

Defendant denied that the insured's death was caused in such a manner as to be covered by such provision and alleged upon information and belief that the death resulted from self-destruction.

It appears from the record that the insured and plaintiff were married in 1941 and that at the date of insured's death they were the parents of two children, about 5 and 6 years of age.

The insured operated an automobile service and gasoline station in Cincinnati, known as the Valley Service Station.

The insured had been medically discharged from the army, suffering from a thrombo-phlebitis of the leg which continued until the time of his death. He was in considerable financial difficulty, having given several checks which had been returned because of insufficient funds, having large unpaid bills, and having great difficulty in collecting accounts due himself.

There was testimony, however, that on the morning of May 6, 1948, the day the insured died, he was cheerful when he left his home. He was called to his place of business that morning. When he arrived there some one had to crawl through the window to open the door from the inside. The insured went into his office and when last seen by a witness, who worked for the insured's father-in-law, was opening and reading his mail. At that time there was no one else in the station or anywhere in the building. After the employee stepped three or four steps outside the office door, he heard a shot and immediately returned to the insured's office.

The insured had been shot through the left chest with his own revolver which had been kept in a drawer of his desk. The evidence showed that the bullet had gone practically straight through his chest, coming out the back, going through his swivel chair and striking the wall in a direct line behind him. He never spoke again and died shortly thereafter at the hospital.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant upon which judgment was entered, and plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

R. Edward Tepe and John A. Kiely, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Marble & Vordenberg, Cincinnati, for appellee.

STEWART, Judge.

The issue in the present case is whether the insured died as the direct result, independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means and not as the result of self-destruction.

Plaintiff relies upon three assigned errors as grounds for reversal of the judgment below.

The first assignment of error is directed to the refusal of the trial court to give the following special charge requested by plaintiff:

'Members of the jury: I charge you that if you find from the preponderance of the evidence that James Carson met his death by external and violent means, under circumstances not wholly inconsistent with accident, the law raises a presumption of accidental death, and that presumption remains until overcome by evidence to the contrary.'

We are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in refusing to give this charge to the jury.

Although it is true that in case of a death by external and violent means there is a presumption against suicide, it is misleading to charge the jury that the presumption remains until overcome by evidence to the contrary, for the reason that the jury could be led to believe that the evidence to overcome the presumption must have a greater weight than the presumption itself. The presumption is a rebuttable one and disappears upon the production of evidence to the contrary, which counterbalances it or leaves the case in equipoise. Brunny, Adm'x, v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 151 Ohio St. 86, 84 N.E.2d 504.

Then, too, the requested charge, referring to death by external and violent means as raising a presumption of accidental death, rather that a death by accidental means as required by the terms of the insurance policies, is open to the argument that the charge is merely abstract rather than one applicable to the issue in the present case

The second assignment of error by plaintiff is the giving by the trial court of the following special charge requested by defendant:

'The court instructs the jury that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance, or the greater weight of the evidence, that the death of the insured occurred as the result, directly and indepently of all other causes of accidental means, and that said death did not occur as the result of suicide or self-destruction, while sane or insane, and should you find that plaintiff has failed to sustain that burden by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for the defendant company. The burden never shifts, and although the defendant alleges in its amended answer that the insured's death resulted from self-destruction there is no burden upon it to prove that fact; instead the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that death did not result from self-destruction.'

We are of the opinion that the special charge as given was not erroneous as applied to the facts in the present case.

Plaintiff contends that there was no burden upon her to prove that the insured's death did not result from self-destruction, and that the charge placed a burden upon her which she did not have to carry.

The answer to that claim is the fact that insured's policies, which constitute the contracts giving plaintiff any right of action, provide that she must furnish proof of the death of the insured as the result directly, and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries caused solely by external, violent and accidental means, and that such death did not occur as the result of self-destruction.

It is true that plainti...