Krantz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1957
• Citation: 141 N.E.2d 719,335 Mass. 703
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Rita KRANTZ v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

Page 719

141 N.E.2d 719

335 Mass. 703

Rita KRANTZ v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 8, 9, 1957.

Decided April 15, 1957.

Henry N. Silk, Boston (Abraham Wekstein and Morris A. Greenbaum, Boston, with him), for plaintiff.

Jeremiah W. Mahoney, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, ans WHITTEMORE, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

This is an action of contract to recover on two insurance policies issued on the life of the plaintiff's deceased husband. The plaintiff is the beneficiary under each policy and seeks to recover under double idemnity provisions by reason of the death of the insured by drowning on or about April 22, 1952. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 59, as appearing in St.1955 c. 674, § 1, asserting that the issue of law determinative of the right of the plaintiff to recover was whether the plaintiff had furnished "due proof' * * * of the death of the insured as the result of bodily injury caused solely by external, violent and accidental means and that the death of the insured was not caused by self destruction.' The trial judge ruled that the proof was insufficient as matter of law and ordered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff duly claimed an exception to and appealed from this order. We consider the case on the bill of exceptions.

The asserted insufficiency in the proof which the defendant stresses in its brief stems from deletions made by the plaintiff in two attached copies of documents. The letter of the plaintiff accompanying the proof of loss stated the submission therewith of '12. A certified copy of the record of death * * * on April 22, 1952, stating the cause of death as asphxia due to drowning, which certified copy is * * * complete * * * except that there has been deleted therefrom the legend relating to the manner of death. I am informed by my attorneys that under Massachusetts G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 46, § 19, as amended, the opinion appearing on the Certificate of Death relating to the manner of death is inadmissible in evidence in the event of litigation. I intend to adopt and admit only those facts appearing on the record as forwarded herewith. 13. Photostatic copy of report of medical examiner * * * which is a complet copy * * * except that his opinion as to the manner of death has been deleted. I am informed by my attorneys that under the case of Jewett v. Boston Elevated Railway, 1914, 219 Mass. 528 , the opinion of the medical examiner as to the manner of death is inadmissible in evidence in the event of litigation. I intend that the report as submitted shall be evidence of the facts contained therein.'

The certified copy of record of death attached to the proof, under the printed heading 'Disease, or Cause of Death (Primary or Secondary),' showed the following typed entry: 'asphyxia due to drowning [blacked out space] Boston Charles River--Drowning--asphyxia.' ¹

The attached copy of the autopsy report, as printed in the bill of exceptions, stated in part 'Pathological diagnoses: 1. Asphyxia due to drowning. 2. Chronic gastric ulcer. 3. Atherosclerosis generalized, moderate. 4. Bilateral hydrothorax, minimal. 5. Contusion of left forearm, recent. And I further declare it to be my opinion that the said Benjamin Krantz came to his death as the result of asphyxia due to drowning. and that no further inquiry is necessary' (emphasis added).

The plaintiff also crossed out printed matter on the form of 'Proof of Death' supplied by the defendant which provided that 'The undersigned hereby agrees that * * * [she] shall be bound by all declarations contained in' documents of various kinds described in the print.

The affidavits included in the proof stated facts tending to show the following: The insured had a happy home life and had been in good health and spirits and free from financial or other worries prior to an automobile accident on Cambridge Street in Brighton at about 11:30 a. m. on April 21, 1952. The insured lost consciousness in the accident and was taken to a hospital. He said the accident resulted from his vision becoming blurred while driving and complained of injury to his head. After treatment at the hospital the insured went to the police station and to the garage to which his automobile had been towed. Late in the afternoon of April 21, 1952, two boys found on the Cambridge bank of the Charles River between the Boston University Bridge and the Boston and Albany Railroad Bridge, near the place where the insured had been accustomed to go to lie in the sun for relaxation after work, the insured's jacket with automobile keys and wallet. The weather was good on that day, the sun shone, and the temperature in the afternoon reached 67~> F. On the next day the body of the insured was found in the river about twenty-five feet from the Cambridge shore between the two bridges. The configuration of the grass bank at the location where the jacket was found and of the adjacent 'rip rap' sloping rock structure below the grass was so described in an affidavit as to indicate the possibility that one who lost his balance on the bank near the water's edge might accidently fall into the river.

1. The plaintiff could not make due proof of accidental death if she adopted as a part of her proof the opinion or the recital in respect of suicide. See Page v. Commercial Travellers' Eastern Accident Association, 225 Mass. 335, 337, 114 N.E. 430. The course followed by the plaintiff showed emphatically an intention to disclaim and disavow this evidence. Substantively we do not think that the plaintiff by the deletions accomplished any more or any less than would have been the case had the proofs included the unaltered documents with unequivocal disclaimer of the opinion and statement of suicide. But the plaintiff could reasonably have feared that if she included in her proof affirmative evidence of death by suicide she would disqualify the proof, Howe v. National Life Ins. Co., 321 Mass. 283, 287-288, 72 N.E.2d 425, 170 A.L.R. 1254; Cooper v. Prudential Ins. Co., 329 Mass. 301, 304, 107 N.E.2d 805; O'Neil v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 300 Mass. 477, 481, 15 N.E.2d 809, or make admissible at the trial evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible. Nichols v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Accident Association, 221 Mass. 540, 547, 547, 109 N.E. 449. The plaintiff so acted as to have the benefit of avoiding the direct exhibition of the opinion of suicide in the event that it should be held that such formal nondisclosure is significant. In the absence of prejudice to the defendant, and we discover none, this care to preserve her rights is not a basis for voiding the proof. The deletions did not deceive the defendant nor did plaintiff's conduct manifest an intent to obtain for the plaintiff any unfair advantage or operate to give her such. Compare Gechijian v. Richmond Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 487, 11 N.E.2d 478.

A purpose of the requirement to furnish due proof is to enable the defendant 'to form an intelligent estimate as to whether the death came within the terms of the policy.' Howe v. National Life Ins. Co., 321 Mass. 283, 285, 72 N.E.2d 425, 427, 170 A.L.R. 1254. Cooper v. Prudential Ins. Co., 329 Mass. 301, 303, 107 N.E.2d 805. Manzi v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., Mass., 138 N.E.2d 581. That purpose was accomplished here with respect to the possibility of suicide. The proof included such reference to the record of death and autopsy as to enable the defendant to inform itself of the medical examiner's opinion of the secondary cause of death and the existence of a reference thereto in a record admissible in evidence. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 46, § 19. It is not essential that all the facts which the insurer may reasonably deem relevant be included in the proof if the insurer has knowledge that such facts exist and unimpeded access thereto. See Goldman v. Commercial Travellers Eastern Accident Association, 302 Mass. 74, 78-80, 18 N.E.2d 373; Traiser v. Commercial Travelers' Eastern Accident Association, 202 Mass. 292, 295, 88 N.E. 901. The insurer of course had access to the public records and the plaintiff told it in effect that they contained statements which it might deem relevant.

The nub of the issue is whether the plaintiff, for the preliminary requirement of 'due proof,' could make use of the official documents to show death by drowning without carrying into her proof, as an effective adopted part thereof, the disclaimed entries in respect of suicide. We think she could.

It may be that the plaintiff could have submitted a proof which the defendant would have deemed adequate without use of the death certificate to show death and death by drowning. The instructions on the back of the form for proof of loss supplied by the defendant suggest the need of the certificate although they do not apply in terms to this case. ² But even if the defendant could not reasonably have rejected a submission which did not include the death certificate, we do not think it was necessary to proceed by such indirection. If due proof of death by drowning, apart from the official documents, was possible and a compliance with the policy, the defendant lost no technical advantage when the plaintiff used an alternative method of showing these facts. If 'due proof' was not possible, in fact or under the policy, without showing the death certificate, a ruling that its necessary use constituted adoption by the plaintiff of the opinion of suicide would mean that the plaintiff would be barred from litigating the fact of the cause of death, although she had shown probable facts indicative of a case for the jury. We are not disposed to construe the insurance contracts as requiring in effect that the plaintiff accept the opinion of the medical examiner as conclusive of her rights or, alternatively, if the course was open, that she adopt an indirect and uncertain way of...