Carson v. St. Joseph Stockyards Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1912
• Parties: CARSON v. ST. JOSEPH STOCKYARDS CO. et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

151 S.W. 752

167 Mo. App. 443

CARSON v. ST. JOSEPH STOCKYARDS CO. et al.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 9, 1912.

EVIDENCE (§ 244) — ADMISSIBILITY — DECLARATIONS OF AGENT.

In an action for false imprisonment, the declarations of defendants' agent, the day after the arrest, that defendant had plaintiff arrested, was incompetent, not being a part of the res gestæ, but merely an account of a past event.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Buchanan County; Wm. D. Rusk, Judge.

Action for false imprisonment by B. F. Carson against the St. Joseph Stockyards Company and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

John E. Dolman, of St. Joseph, for appellants. Charles C. Crow, of St. Joseph, for respondent.

ELLISON, J.

This action is based upon a charge of false imprisonment. There was a judgment for plaintiff in the trial court. There was evidence tending to show that plaintiff was arrested by a policeman and detained for near six hours, charged by the policeman with stealing halters belonging to defendant company. Defendant Slack is the superintendent for defendant company; but there was no evidence that he instigated or caused the arrest, or that he ratified or adopted the act after it became known to him. The demurrer to the evidence, which was offered in his behalf, should have been sustained.

Plaintiff testified that, on the day following his arrest and release, Slack was talking with him about the halters, and stated to him that the defendant company had had him arrested, not that he had had anything to do with it. This was sufficient to support a verdict against the company if competent. Slack was the company's agent. What he said was next day after the arrest, and was therefore not a part of the res gestæ, and was therefore not competent on that ground. Neither was it competent on the ground of Slack being the company's agent, since, being spoken the next day, it was not a part of the res gestæ. It was an account of a past affair, and, being past, his agency, as to it, ceased so far as to disable him to bind his principal by admission, or by an account of the transaction. Adams v. Hannibal & St. Jos. R. R. Co., 74 Mo. 553, 556, 41 Am. Rep. 333; Bergeman v. Railway Co., 104 Mo. 77, 86, 15 S. W. 992; Redmon v. Railway Co., 185 Mo. 1, 12, 84 S. W. 26, 105 Am. St. Rep. 558; Prye v. Railway Co., 200 Mo. 377, 406, 98 S. W. 566, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1069, Roberts v. Railway Co., 153 Mo. App. 638, 644, 134 S. W. 89.

The...