Carter v. Ameji
| Decision Date | 26 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | 09-2247 |
| Parties | LEANDER CARTER, Plaintiff, v. BASHIR AMEJI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the court is the Defendants, John Myers and Keith Anglin's unopposed motion for summary judgment [85]. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Any discrepancies in the factual record should be evaluated in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"Summary judgment is the 'put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events." Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2000). "If a party . . . fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A party opposing summary judgment bears the burden to respond, notsimply by resting on its own pleading but by "set[ting] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In order to be a "genuine" issue, there must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If [the nonmovant] does not [meet his burden], summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against [the nonmovant]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Further, Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the non-moving party "must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial." Filipovic v. K&R Express Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 390 (7th Cir. 1999). Failure by the non-movant to meet all of the above requirements subjects him to summary judgment on his claims.
Affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and "set out facts that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). Personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions drawn from those facts. Visser v. Packer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991). Visser, 924 F.2d at 659. It is also well settled that "conclusory allegations and self-serving affidavits, if not supported by the record, will not preclude summary judgment. Keri v. Barod of Trustees of Purdue University, 458 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir.2006)(citing Haywood v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir.1997).
During the period of time relevant for purposes of this motion, Plaintiff was housed at Danville Correctional Center. Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he alleged that these Defendants retaliated against him for filing a grievance, in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor. They assert they did not act in retaliation. Further, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot meet his burden because he was not engaged in protected First Amendment activity and he cannot establish that the Defendants acted with a retaliatory motive. Defendants assert they are also protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
1. Defendant Myers is an Internal Affairs Investigator at Danville. (Court doc. 1, ¶ 12; court doc. 41, ¶ 12).
2. Defendant Anglin is the Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO") and Warden of Danville. (Court doc. 1, ¶ 11; court doc. 41, ¶ 11).
3. On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff wrote a grievance alleging the following: "On September 18, 2008, after I revoked my conse[n]t during medical examination, I was assaulted by Physician Bashi Ameji in an examination room located in Danville Healthcare Unit." (Court doc. 1, Exhibit 44; separately attached as Defendants'Exhibit A, Grievance dated October 3, 2008, and related responses).
4. The grievance was denied by the Grievance Officer on December 12, 2008, and one of the CAO's designees concurred with the Grievance Officer's determination on the same date. (Defs' Exhibit A).
5. In the interim, Defendant Anglin asked Defendant Myers to conduct an interview with Plaintiff regarding his allegations of assault against Dr. Ameji. (Defs' Exhibit B, Affidavit of John Myers, ¶ 2). The interview was held on November 20, 2008. (Court doc. 1, Exhibit 59; separately provided as Defs' Exhibit C, Offender Disciplinary report dated November 20, 2008).
6. Defendant Myers noted that Plaintiff threatened to sue Dr. Ameji and stated that "he (Ameji) might win in court but he (Ameji) will be walked out of here in handcuffs." (Defs' Exhibit B, ¶ 3; Defs' Exhibit C).
7. Following the interview, Defendant Myers spoke with Defendant Anglin about the meeting, and relayed Plaintiff's statements to Defendant Anglin. He was instructed to write a disciplinary report based on those statements and he wrote one for a violation of Rule 206: Intimidation or threats. (Defs' Exhibit B, ¶¶ 4-5).
8. At the time of the interview, Defendant Myers was not aware of previous grievances Plaintiff wrote regarding Dr. Ameji. (Defs' Exhibit B, ¶ 7).
9. Plaintiff was escorted to segregation, and the disciplinary report was referred to the Adjustment Committee as a major infraction by the reviewing officer Major Macieiski. (Defs' Exhibit C).
10. On November 24, 2008, the Adjustment Committee conducted a hearing, where Plaintiff disputed the charge but admitted that he would go to court and be a litigator. (Court doc. 1, Exhibit 59; separately provided as Defs' Exhibit D, Adjustment Committee Final Summary Report).
11. The Adjustment Committee found him guilty and recommended the following disciplinary action: (1) 1 month C grade; (2) 1 month segregation; (3) transfer; and (4) 1 month commissary restriction. (Defs' Exhibit D).
12. The CAO's designee "JAW" approved the recommended disciplinary action. (Defs' Exhibit D).
13. The CAO may delegate his responsibilities to another person or persons to perform duties associated with the administration of discipline, Ill. Admin. Code tit, 20, § 504.15(a), and those duties associated with the grievance process, Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.805(a).
14. The Adjustment Committee is charged with determining whether the inmate committed the offenses charged. Ill. Admin. Code tit 20, § 504.80(k).
15. Specifically, the Adjustment Committee may find that the offender did not commit the offense, that further investigation is necessary, or that the offender did commit the offense or a lesser offense for which the elements were included in the original charge. Ill. Admin. Code tit 20, § 504.80(k)(1)-(4).
16. If the Adjustment Committee finds the inmate guilty, it may recommend disciplinary action. Ill. Admin. Code tit 20, § 504.80(k)(4). It may also recommend a transfer pursuant to a finding of guilt of any disciplinary infraction. Ill. Admin. Code tit 20, § 503.140.
Plaintiff was not engaged in protected First Amendment activity. Prisoners have a constitutional right to the courts that includes the right to pursue administrative remedies. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). "To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, [a plaintiff] must ultimately show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future," Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009); and (3) the First Amendment activity was the reason or but-for cause that a defendant decided to act, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009); Waters v. City of Chicago, 580 F.3d 575, 584 (7th Cir. 2009).
The First Amendment is not absolute and prisons can lawfully limit prisoners' First Amendment activity in ways that are more restrictive than the outside world. A prison regulation that impinges on inmates' constitutional rights is valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Legitimate penological objectives include crime deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and internal prison security. Bridges, 557 F.3d at 548; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 82223 (1974). Security concerns allow prison authorities to proscribe language that is foul, vulgar, abusive, threatening, or inappropriate toward other prisoners or employees. Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 1986) ...
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