Carter v. Beckwith

• Decision Date: 06 October 1891
• Citation: 128 N.Y. 312,28 N.E. 582
• Parties: CARTER v. BECKWITH et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

128 N.Y. 312

28 N.E. 582

CARTER

v.BECKWITH et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 6, 1891.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fourth department.

Action by George C. Carter against Emily P. Beckwith and others, administrators of the estate of Richard Beckwith, a lunatic, to recover for services in proceedings instituted to supersede a commission of lunacy. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Modified and affirmed on appeal to the general term. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

O'BRIEN, J., dissenting.

John Lansing, for appellants.

P. C. J. De Angelis, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

The judgment recovered in this action is founded upon a claim for services rendered by the plaintiff, an attorney, upon the request of the intestate in the prosecution of proceedings in the supreme court, instituted in 1871, to supersede a commission of lunacy issued against the intestate in 1855, and to have restored to him the possession and control of his property. The proceedings failed in their object, it having been determined that the lunacy still continued. The lunatic died in 1875, and the plaintiff presented to his administrators a claim for his services, which claim was rejected by them, whereupon this action was brought. The main question in the case is whether, under the circumstances, a liability was created in favor of the plaintiff for the value of the plaintiff's services, enforceable in an action against the estate of the deceased lunatic. It is clear, under the decisions, that the plaintiff cannot maintain the action on the theory of a contract with the lunatic to pay for the services, arising out of an employment by the lunatic. The law is well settled that a lunatic whose lunacy had been judicially determined, and for whom a committee has been appointed, is incapable of entering into any contract, and that any contract which he may assume to make while in that situation is absolutely void. Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, § N. Y. 388; L'Amoureux v. Crosby, 2 Paige, 422;Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. Rep. 446. The court will not inquire whether the lunacy in fact continued and existed when the contract was made. The presumption of its continuance is conclusive as to all dealings after the inquisition until it has been superseded. The court, on the finding of an inquisition establishing lunacy, is vested with jurisdiction over the person of the lunatic, and assumes the custody and control of his estate, which it manages, through the committee appointed in the proceedings, as its bailiff or agent; and, although the title of the lunatic to his property is not divested by the proceedings, he can no longer buy or sell, or enter into any contract or dealing binding him or his estate. People v. Commissioners, etc., 100 N. Y. 215, 3 N. E. Rep. 85; In re Otis, 101 N. Y. 580, 5 N. E. Rep. 571.

The incapacity of a lunatic, whose lunacy has been judicially ascertained in lunacy proceedings, to bind himself does not relieve his estate from debts or liabilities incurred anterior to the lunacy. But he cannot be sued without permission of the court, except at the peril of the party prosecuting, of having his action restrained and of being adjudged in contempt. In re Heller, 3 Paige, 199;In re Hopper, 5 Paige, 490. See, also, Crippen v. Culver, 13 Barb. 424. The court, as incident to its jurisdiction in lunacy, administers the estate of an adjudged lunatic for the protection of creditors, and will apply it to the payment of his debts, the expenses of support and maintenance of the lunatic and his family, and the satisfaction of all obligations, charges, and expenses which legally or equitably ought to be satisfied out of his property. The question as to the allowance of costs in lunacy proceedings has been several times before our courts. It has been the usual practice to allow to the petitioner for a commission the costs and expenses of proceedings in lunacy out of the estate of the lunatic, where they have resulted in the appointment of a committee. Rule 85 of the supreme court authorizes the committee to pay such costs and expenses without the order of the court, where they do not exceed $50; but, if they exceed that sum, payment cannot be made without the special order of the court. It was said by the chancellor in the case, In re Giles, 11 Paige, 638, that, if the petitioner fails to establish the lunacy, he must bear his own costs, but that he will not be charged with costs if he proceeded in good faith and upon probable cause. To the same effect on the last point is the remark of Chancellor KENT in Brower v. Fisher, 4 Johns. Ch. 441. The English rule seems to be less stringent, and costs will be allowed to the petitioner, although the alleged lunatic be found by the inquisition to be of sound mind. Nelson v. Duncombe, 9 Beav. 211. It was held in Re Conklin, 8 Paige, 450, that a solicitor who unsuccessfully opposes a commission of lunacy has no legal claim on ground of contract for his services, but that the court may, in its discretion, allow the solicitor his taxable costs out of the lunatic's estate, where the circumstances are such that the chancellor, if applied to, would have sustained or directed the opposition; and a small allowance was made in that case.

The question here relates to the right of an attorney to recover compensation out of the estate of a lunatic for services rendered in an unsuccessful attempt to procure a supersedeas of a commission, and where the inquiry was expressly sanctioned by the court. The statute provides that, in case any lunatic against whom an inquisition has been found shall be restored to his right mind, and become capable of conducting his affairs, his real and personal estate shall be restored to him. 2 Rev. St. p. 55, § 24. The statute is simply declaratory of the common law. Upon the application of a lunatic to set aside the commission, the court may, in its discretion, deny the application, and will do so where the case is plain, or it may allow the lunatic to traverse the inquisition, or order a feigned issue to try the question of his present sanity. In re McClean, 6 Johns. Ch. 440;In re Tracy, 1 Paige, 580. In the case first cited the court at first denied the application, but subsequently, on the application being renewed, directed a feigned issue. The question whether an allowance should be made to the person prosecuting the traverse, out of the estate of the lunatic, or whether he should be charged with costs in case of an unsuccessful traverse, has been variously ruled, depending upon the special circumstances of the particular case.

In Re Tracy, supra, the case of an habitual drunkard, upon an application made in his behalf, to be permitted to traverse the inquisition, and that a reasonable amount for the expenses of the traverse might be paid out of his estate, an issue was granted; and ‘as the property was large, and the party had not had an opportunity to be heard on the taking of the inquisition,’ an allowance was made out of the estate of the petitioner to defray the necessary expenses on his part. In Folger's Case, 4 Johns. Ch. 169, the costs of an unsuccessful traverse were charged upon a third party at whose instance and for whose benefit the issue was awarded. In Re Van Cott, 1 Paige, 489, the application of a solicitor for an habitual drunkard, who had procured leave to traverse the inquisition, for an allowance of costs of an unsuccessful traverse out of the estate of the party against whom the inquisition was found, was denied for the reason that the solicitor had a personal interest to set aside the proceedings. But the court, in denying the application, affirmed the doctrine that the allowance in such a case was discretionary, saying: ‘It depends on the character of the application and the conduct of the party.’ In Re McClean, supra, the chancellor permitted the lunatic to traverse the inquisition, but decided that it should not be done at the expense of the estate. The estate was small, and necessary for the support of the lunatic and his family, and the application appeared to the chancellor to be groundless. The cases show, we think, that no hard and fast rule has been established in this state, concerning allowance to the defeated party or his attorney of the costs and expenses of an unsuccessful traverse of an inquisition of lunacy. Where the proceeding is clearly groundless or vexatious, and is supported by no probable cause, or where it is instituted in bad faith, or for the benefit of a third party, clearly no costs should be allowed. But as this exercise of the jurisdiction of the court to deprive a person of his liberty and property on the ground of lunacy, however necessary, is nevertheless the exercise of a supreme power, and should be surrounded by all reasonable safeguards to prevent mistake or fraud, so, also, where, upon a case presented after inquisition, there is...