Carter v. Cain
Decision Date | 25 February 1929 |
Docket Number | 186 |
Citation | 14 S.W.2d 250,179 Ark. 79 |
Parties | CARTER v. CAIN |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Woodruff Chancery Court, Northern District; A. L Hutchins, Chancellor; reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
Ross Mathis, W. J. Dungan and J. F Summers, for appellant.
Roy D. Campbell, for appellee.
The appellants, who are taxpayers and residents of Woodruff County, began this suit in the chancery court against W. R. Gain, county judge, R. B. Keating, W. W. Rainey, Neudy Arnof, A. C. McGregor and Bill Rives, alleging that Cain was county judge and McGregor was the county judge-elect, and would assume the duties on January 1, 1929; that Bill Rives was the county clerk, and Keating, Rainey and Arnof were appointed commissioners and directed to prepare plans and let contract for the erection of a courthouse and jail at McCrory, Arkansas; that on November 30, 1928, said commissioners reported to the court that they had procured a lot and had prepared plans and specifications for a suitable courthouse and jail at McCrory, which plans were approved by the court, and said commissioners were directed to advertise for bids and let contract for the erection of a courthouse and jail; that the commissioners had employed an architect to draw plans, and were proceeding to receive bids and let the contract; that, if not enjoined, they would let the contract and incur further expenses.
Appellants alleged that the authorization of the contract amounted to an illegal exaction from the taxpayers of the county, and that the appropriation for the erection of said courthouse and jail and all the proceedings were void, for the reason that the appropriation of $ 5,000 per annum exceeded the revenue available from all sources after the payment of the necessary governmental expenses of the county, and that it was in violation of Amendment No. 11 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas.
The complaint then shows the revenue and expenditures and probable revenue for the future and necessary expenses for the future, and alleges that they have no adequate remedy at law, and prays for an injunction preventing the issuing of any warrants or the payment of any claims, and to prevent the letting of the contract or the incurring any other expenses.
Constitutional Amendment No. 11 has been before this court several times, but Amendment No. 17, also involved here, was adopted by the people at the general election November 6, 1928, and has never been before this court for interpretation or construction. Amendment No. 17 reads as follows:
Section 4 provides the manner of holding the election and the duty of the election officers, and further provides that, if a majority votes for the improvement, the county court shall make an order showing the total vote for and total vote against such. It also provides that more than one building or improvement may be embodied in the proceedings, but each must be described so as to indicate to the electors what he is voting on, and there must appear on the ballot "For construction" and "Against construction;" and also appear on the ballot "For building tax," and "Against building tax."
Section 5 provides that, if a majority vote for the building and the tax, then the levying court may levy, in addition to all other taxes now authorized by law, a special building tax, not to exceed one- half of one per cent. on the dollar of the assessed valuation of the property, to pay for such improvements, or to provide a sinking fund for such purpose. This section also provides that, when the levy is once made, it shall continue in force from year to year and be extended on the taxbooks and collected until sufficient funds are collected to pay the cost of the improvement, or any bonds, notes, or interest thereon.
Section 6 provides that, when the tax has been voted and the amount levied, the county court may issue and sell interest-bearing negotiable bonds or notes, bearing interest not to exceed five per cent., to mature at such times as may be determined by the court or judge, and sell the same in such manner and upon such condition as the court may by order deem proper for the purpose of raising funds, etc. It also provides that the bonds shall not be sold for less than par or face value, and they are to be secured by the special tax levied for the purpose. After this is done, the amendment, in § 7, provides that the county court or the judge thereof shall proceed with the construction of such improvement.
It will be observed that the amendment was adopted on November 6, 1928, and the proceedings had by the county court and commissioners for the purpose of building a courthouse and jail were all had at a later date. That is, after the amendment was in effect.
There is no dispute about the amendment being in effect at the time the proceedings began, but the appellee contends that, when the building of a courthouse or jail is under consideration, the county court may adopt either one of two methods. It is insisted that, if the revenues of the county will permit, the court can order the improvement made by making appropriations and spreading same over a period of years; but that, if the revenues of the county will not justify this procedure, then an election may be called for the purpose of voting on the improvement and tax. In other words, it is insisted that, since the adoption of Amendment No. 17, a county has two distinct and unrelated methods of building a courthouse; one plan with additional taxes, the other without additional taxes. And it is insisted that there is nothing in Amendment No. 17 that repeals any powers conferred upon a county court or the quorum court by the Constitution before the adoption of this amendment.
The rule by which amendments to the Constitution are to be construed was stated by this court in Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656. The court said in that case, in construing the constitutional amendment known as the initiative and referendum:
The court in the above case also said: "The rules of construction applicable to statutes ordinarily apply with equal force to constitutions or amendments thereof, though some courts hold to even more restricted rules in the construction of provisions of the organic law."
A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical construction is to, be uniform. A...
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