Carter v. Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC

• Decision Date: 29 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. A. H-14-2776
• Citation: 175 F.Supp.3d 711
• Parties: Melisa Carter and Chris Smith, Plaintiffs, v. Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC, Asset Campus Housing, Inc., the City of Huntsville, Texas, Officer Stacey Smith-Gallar, and Officer Christopher Myers, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

175 F.Supp.3d 711

Melisa Carter and Chris Smith, Plaintiffs,

v.Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC, Asset Campus Housing, Inc., the City of Huntsville, Texas, Officer Stacey Smith-Gallar, and Officer Christopher Myers, Defendants.

Civ. A. H-14-2776

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Signed March 29, 2016

Filed March 30, 2016

Carlton Bryan Cantrell, Lanny D. Ray, Cantrell Ray & Barcus LLP, Huntsville, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Brian Pascal Cweren, Attorney at Law, Marc A. Sheiness, Sheiness, Glover & Grossman, LLP, Norman Ray Giles, William Scott Helfand, Chamberlain Hrdlicka et al., Houston, TX, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MELINDA HARMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court in the above referenced cause, grounded in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and alleging excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure, in addition to assault and battery and false imprisonment under Texas common law¹ against Defendants/Officers Stacey Smith and Christopher Myers in their individual capacities only, are the following motions: (1) Defendants the City of Hunstville, Texas, Officer Stacey Smith, and Officer Christopher Myers' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (instrument # 32); (2) Defendants City of Huntsville, Officer Stacey Smith, and Officer Christopher Myers' opposed motion to sever claims (# 22); and (3) Defendants Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC d/b/a the Connection at Huntsville and Asset Campus Housing Inc.'s motion to join # 22 (# 24).

As a threshold matter, because Plaintiffs' governing First Amended Complaint (# 31) has dropped their earlier claims against Defendants Diamond URS Huntsville, LLC d/b/a the Connection at Huntsville and Asset Campus Housing Inc., the motion to join (# 24) is MOOT.

I. Defendants' Motion for Severance

The Court addresses the severance issue first.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides, Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.

A. Standard of Review

The district court has broad discretion to sever claims and parties in a lawsuit. Anderson v. Red River Waterway Com'n , 231 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2000). “Severance under Rule 21 creates two separate actions or suits where previously there was but one. Where a single claim is severed out of a suit, it proceeds as a discrete, independent action, and a court may render a final, appealable judgment in either one of the resulting two actions notwithstanding the continued existence of unresolved claims in the other.” United States v. O'Neill , 709 F.2d 361, 368 (5th Cir.1983). The Court should examine Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) to determine if the parties have been misjoined and should therefore be severed. Acevedo v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. , 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir.2010). Rule 20(a) permits individuals to “join in one action as plaintiffs if (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.”

The Fifth Circuit has not adopted a particular test to decide what is “the same transaction or occurrence” under Rule 20(a). Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Intern. Corp. , No. 2:11–cv–90–JRG, 2012 WL 760729, at *2 (E.D.Tex. Mar. 8, 2012). Several of its district courts have used the Eighth Circuit's “logically related” test for the “same transaction” requirement in Mosley v. GMC , 497 F.2d 1330, 1332–33 (8th Cir.1974) (“[A]ll 'logically related' events entitling a person to institute a legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence”; “as used in Rule 20 [the terms] would permit all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be tried in a single proceeding. Absolute identity of all events is unnecessary.”)(citing 7 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653 at 270 (1972) ). Id. The “common question” can be satisfied by the presence of only a single one. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. , 266 F.R.D. 143, 148 (N.D.Tex.2010) (“Texas Rule 40 provides that defendants may be joined together in the same action only if (1) 'there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;' and (2) at least one 'question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.”') (citing inter alia Tex. R. Civ. P. 40(a), and 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1653 (3d ed. 2002) ).

In In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 680 n. 40 (5th Cir.2014), the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that while it has not yet adopted a test for severance, a number of its district courts have applied the five-factor test in Paragon Office Servs., LLC v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. , No. 3:11–CV–2205–D, 2012 WL 4442368, at *1 (N.D. Sept. 26, 2012) : “(1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.” “'[S]everance will be refused if the court believes that it only will result in delay, inconvenience, or added expense.”' Id. quoting Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1689 (3d ed. 2004). “'Under the Rules, the impulse is towards entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.”' Acevedo , 600 F.3d at 521, quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

B. Defendants' Argument

Defendants urge the Court to sever this action into two lawsuits because, as United States Magistrate Judge Frances Stacey observed in her Order (# 19 at pp. 1-2) of March 27, 2015, denying Defendants' motion to disqualify, “This is a civil rights case involving claims that two police officers with the City of Huntsville Police Department (Stacey Smith and Christopher Myers) used excessive force against two unrelated Plaintiffs—Melisa Carter and Chris Smith—in two unrelated incidents.” Defendants maintain that Chris Smith had no involvement or any connection with the arrest of Melisa Carter and vice versa. Furthermore, Chris Smith has not alleged facts and cannot provide any evidence demonstrating that Stacey Smith had any connection with Chris Smith's arrest. Instead, they argue, it is obvious that Chris Smith is suing his estranged wife, Stacey Smith, in order to gain an advantage in their divorce and child custody litigation. Thus, insist Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot assert any right to relief jointly or severally against all the Defendants and their claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. The claims of the two Plaintiffs do not share any common questions of law or fact. Even if there were one common question, the Court has the discretion to sever the claims to avoid prejudice and delay, to ensure judicial economy, and to safeguard principles of fundamental fairness at stake here.

The motion also points out that each Defendant here has asserted a defense of qualified immunity and argues that forcing these officers to a trial that includes unrelated claims from unrelated events would deprive them of protections under their immunity defense. Claims about the bad acts of either defendant would be irrelevant to the objective analysis required for their qualified immunity defense and would unfairly prejudice and deprive them of that defense's protection and inadmissible character evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 608. Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Servs. , 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir.1994) (“in allowing limited discovery on the issue of qualified immunity would deny [party] the benefit of [its] qualified immunity defense, the most relevant being the protection from pretrial discovery”), citing Lion Boulos v. Wilson , 834 F.2d 504, 507–08 (5th Cir.1987) (“'A defendant entitled to claim qualified immunity is shielded not only from liability, but also from 'the costs of trial [and]...the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”'), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

C. Plaintiffs' Response

In response (# 26) Plaintiffs claim that the two officers' continuous course of conduct, i.e., the ongoing use of excessive force and unlawful arrest by Officer Stacey Smith-Gellar (“Officer Stacey Smith”) and Officer Christopher Myers (“Officer Myers” or “Myers”) supports an essential element of their § 1983 claim against the City of Huntsville, i.e., a custom or policy of allowing its officers to violate civil rights.² Thus there is a common question of law and fact here relating to qualified immunity as well as to the training, hiring and retention of these officers, and the grounds for Myers' termination.³ These same two officers used excessive force and performed two illegal arrests within a week of each other, both for personal reasons and by virtue of being officers of the Huntsville Police Department, acting under color of state law. Plaintiffs claim that the two separate but closely related incidents were part of the same “series of transactions.”

D. Court's Decision

The Court finds that the motion to sever should be denied. In their allegations against the three Defendants, Plaintiffs have joined claims against the two officers and the City of Huntsville in part to meet (1) the requirement of a policy or...