Carter v. Payne
| Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-CV-01023-DPM-JTR |
| Parties | ERIC CARTER ADC #129514 PETITIONER v. DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Division of Corrections RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
ERIC CARTER ADC #129514 PETITIONER
v.
DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Division of Corrections RESPONDENT
No. 4:20-CV-01023-DPM-JTR
United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division
July 27, 2022
RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to Chief United States District Judge D. P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not file objections, Judge Marshall may adopt this Recommendation without independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
I. Introduction
Pending before the Court is a § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Eric Carter (“Carter”), a prisoner in the Arkansas Division of Correction. Doc. 2. In his Petition, Carter challenges his rape conviction in Hot Spring County Circuit Court on the grounds that: (1) his conviction is based on
constitutionally insufficient evidence (Doc. 2-1 at 8-12); and (2) he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Doc. 2-1 at 13-18.
Respondent Dexter Payne, in his Response, argues that all of Carter's habeas claims should be dismissed because they were either procedurally defaulted or reasonably adjudicated in state court. Doc. 15. Carter filed a Reply Brief. Doc. 19.
On March 11, 2022, Carter moved to supplement his Petition with a new argument that his trial counsel committed a McCoy violation which resulted in structural error. Doc. 25. Respondent filed a Response arguing this claim is untimely, procedurally defaulted, and lacks merit. Doc. 26. Carter filed a Reply. Doc. 28. Thus, the issues are now joined and ready for disposition.
II. Background
During a multi-day jury trial in Hot Spring County Circuit Court, evidence established that, around midnight on April 20, 2016, Carter went to T.S.'s home in Malvern, Arkansas. T.S. was a 31-year-old woman with learning disabilities. Carter knew T.S. and had intermittent contact with her prior to April 20, 2016. That night, Carter pinned T.S. down and raped her. During the rape, Carter injured T.S.'s shoulder and left a bite mark on her right breast. Doc. 15-4, at 319-444; Carter v. State, 2019 Ark.App. 57, 2, 568 S.W.3d 788, 791 (2019).
On November 3, 2017, the jury convicted Carter of Rape, and the trial judge sentenced him, later the same day, to forty (40) years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Doc. 15-5 at 380-381, 391-392.
III. Discussion
In a § 2254 habeas action, a state prisoner may only challenge his conviction or sentence in federal court on the ground that it was in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Furthermore, such a habeas petitioner must exhaust all remedies available in the state courts before filing his § 2254 action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
While Carter fully exhausted his claim that his conviction was not supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence, he only fully exhausted portions of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finally, in his supplemental Petition, Carter erroneously alleges that his trial counsel committed a McCoy violation as a way to raise “new claims” that were procedurally defaulted several years ago.
For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends that Carter's habeas Petition be DISMISSED, with prejudice, and all pending motions be DENIED as moot.
A. Constitutionally Sufficient Evidence Supports Carter's Rape Conviction
Much of the direct evidence supporting Carter's conviction for raping T.S. came from her uncorroborated trial testimony. Carter claims that, because T.S. was
mentally challenged, corroborating evidence was required to sustain his conviction. Doc. 2-1 at 8-12.
Carter initially raised this challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. In rejecting the argument, the Arkansas Court of Appeals began by identifying the elements of rape under Arkansas law:
A person commits rape if he or she engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person by forcible compulsion. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(1)(Supp. 2017). “Sexual intercourse” is penetration, however slight, of the labia majora by a penis. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(11). “Deviate sexual activity” is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving (A) the penetration, however slight of the anus or mouth of a person by the penis of another person; or (B) the penetration, however slight, of the labia majora or anus of a person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(1). “Forcible compulsion” means physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(2).
Carter v. State, 2019 Ark.App. 57, 12-13, 568 S.W.3d 788, 796.
Next, the Court summarized T.S.'s testimony describing how Carter raped her:
T.S. testified that [Carter] had refused to leave her home, had bitten her on her right breast, dug his fingernails into her left arm, pinned her over the couch, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers and his penis. T.S. also testified that [Carter] had touched her anus. Moreover, [Carter] threatened her not to tell anyone of the rape, or he would kill her.
Carter, 2019 Ark.App. at 13, 568 S.W.3d at 796.
The Court noted the testimony of T.S.'s mother, who stated that T.S. has a learning disability and the I.Q. of a first grader. Id. at 7. The Court also discussed in
detail the clinical evaluation performed by Regina Weiner, a licensed psychological examiner:
During the interview, Weiner observed that T.S. operated with a high level of anxiety. T.S.'s I.Q. was assessed at 46 for nonverbal, 43 for verbal, and 42 for full scale. A standard I.Q. is between 85 and 100. Regarding T.S.'s ability to describe an event that she experienced, Weiner indicated that T.S. was able to describe it using her own words and to tell you what happened. However, she may tell it out of order or have some problems explaining how many times something had happened. Weiner further testified that T.S. has characteristics of autism spectrum disorder. In terms of whether T.S. could give reliable testimony, Weiner opined that T.S. was able to talk, able to remember things that had happened to her, and not likely to deliberately lie. However, T.S. may have things confused and may not express herself well using her language skills. Therefore, Weiner opined that one may need to additionally corroborate her statements with other testimony and other forms of evidence.
Carter, 2019 Ark.App. at 7-8, 568 S.W.3d at 793-94.
Finally, the Court cited well-established Arkansas case law to support its holding that T.S's testimony did not require corroboration:
A rape victim's uncorroborated testimony describing penetration may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of rape, even when the victim is a child. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5. The rape victim's testimony need not be corroborated, and scientific evidence is not required. Id.
Carter, 2019 Ark.App. at 13, 568 S.W.3d at 796.[1]
Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction whenever, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Where, as here, the state courts have ruled that the trial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, such decisions may not be overturned simply because the federal habeas court disagrees with the decision. Id. at 2062. Instead, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the decision by the final state appellate court (in this case the Arkansas Court of Appeals) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
As Carter himself notes, under federal law, “a rape victim's testimony is, by itself, normally sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Loeblein v. Dormire, 229 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2000); Fields v. Kelley, 2015 WL 2452331 (E.D.Ark. 2015); Doc. 19. Moreover, any corroboration requirement for T.S.'s testimony is “a matter of state law which does not implicate a constitutional right cognizable on habeas review.” Redding v. State of Minn., 881 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing references omitted).
In this case, T.S.'s testimony, parts of which were corroborated and parts of which were not, was accepted and believed by the jury. In Carter's direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected his argument that all of T.S.'s testimony required corroboration. Nothing about that decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or represented an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, it constituted constitutionally sufficient evidence to support Carter's rape conviction. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 n. 21 (1982) (if the jury believed the victim's testimony, the State's presentation was more than sufficient to satisfy the Jackson standard). Accordingly, Carter's insufficient evidence claim is without merit.
B. Carter's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Carter broadly claims...
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