Carter v. R.L. Jordan Oil Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 1078,1078
• Citation: 365 S.E.2d 324,294 S.C. 435
• Parties: Samuel H. CARTER, Respondent, v. R.L. JORDAN OIL COMPANY, INC., Equipment Maintenance and Repairs, Inc., and Fruehauf, Inc., Defendants, of whom R.L. Jordan Oil Company, Inc., and Equipment Maintenance and Repairs, Inc., are Appellants. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 324

365 S.E.2d 324

294 S.C. 435

Samuel H. CARTER, Respondent, v. R.L. JORDAN OIL COMPANY, INC., Equipment Maintenance and Repairs, Inc., and Fruehauf, Inc., Defendants, of whom

R.L. Jordan Oil Company, Inc., and Equipment Maintenance and

Repairs, Inc., are Appellants.

No. 1078.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 23, 1987.

Decided Jan. 25, 1988.

James W. Hudgens and Michael B.T. Wilkes, both of Ward, Barnes, Long, Hudgens, Adams & Wilkes, and James C. Cothran, Jr., of King, Cothran & Hray, Spartanburg, for appellants.

John B. White, Jr., and Kenneth C. Anthony, Jr., of Knie, White & Anthony, Spartanburg, for respondent.

BELL, Judge:

This is a negligence action. Samuel H. Carter was seriously injured when a wheel separated from a tractor trailer and struck the van he was driving. R.L. Jordan Oil Company, Inc., owned the tractor trailer, which was driven by one of its servants. Equipment Maintenance and Repairs, Inc., performed maintenance and repair work on the trailer under a contract with Jordan. Fruehauf, Inc. manufactured the trailer. Carter sued Jordan for negligent failure to maintain its vehicle in safe operating condition, Equipment Maintenance for negligent repair of the trailer, and Fruehauf for negligent manufacture of the trailer and for an alleged design defect. The trial judge granted Fruehauf a directed verdict on both the negligence and strict liability causes of action. He denied motions by Jordan and Equipment Maintenance for a directed verdict. The jury returned a general verdict against Jordan and Equipment Maintenance for $175,000.00 actual damages. In addition, the jury assessed punitive damages of $40,000.00 and $160,000.00 against Equipment Maintenance and Jordan, respectively. Both Equipment Maintenance and Jordan appeal. We affirm the judgment against Equipment Maintenance. We reverse the judgment against Jordan.

When reviewing a jury verdict, we are limited to determining if there is any evidence to support it. Willis v. Floyd Brace Co., Inc., 279 S.C. 458, 309 S.E.2d 295 (Ct.App.1983). The evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. Buzhardt v. Cromer, 272 S.C. 159, 249 S.E.2d 898 (1978); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bruce, 284 S.C. 227; 325 S.E.2d 77 (Ct.App.1985).

Jordan owns and operates a fleet of tractor trailers which it uses to haul gasoline from its depot in Spartanburg to filling stations throughout Georgia and the Carolinas. Equipment Maintenance, a repair shop located in Spartanburg, performs substantially all of the maintenance and repairs on Jordan's trucks.

On the morning of May 4, 1983, two tractor trailers departed from Jordan's main office near Spartanburg headed for the Jordan depot off Pine Street. The lead truck was driven by Norman Brock, the second truck by Joe Larry Scott. At the intersection of Country Club Road and Pine Street, both drivers made a right hand turn onto Pine Street. As they made their turns, a wheel assembly separated from Brock's trailer, and rolled, out of control, across Pine Street. Carter, traveling north on Pine Street in his van, was stopped at the red light when the wheel came free. The wheel struck Carter's van, causing him injury.

The wheel assembly is held in place by a castellated nut which screws onto the axle. A cotter pin is inserted through a hole in the axle between one of the castellations. It prevents the nut from rotating off the axle while the wheel assembly is in motion. In this case, the cotter pin broke, allowing the nut to rotate off the axle. By the time Brock's trailer reached the intersection of Country Club Road and Pine Street, the nut had come off the axle. With the nut no longer holding the wheel assembly on the axle, the wheel broke free.

In January 1983, almost four months before the accident, Equipment Maintenance repaired the trailer's brakes. Necessarily, its mechanic removed the wheel assembly, including the cotter pin, to perform the repairs. To remove the cotter pin, one must straighten its legs and pull it out. Each time the legs of a cotter pin are bent and restraightened, they become weaker. If they are bent and restraightened a number of times, they will break. Carter's theory at trial was that when the mechanic reaffixed the wheel assembly to the axle, he installed a used cotter pin. Since the legs of the used cotter pin had been bent and restraightened, they were in a weakened condition, causing the cotter pin to break and fall out of the axle.

I.

We first consider Equipment Maintenance's appeal. Based on its view of the evidence, Equipment Maintenance takes exception to several rulings of the trial judge.

A.

Dr. Timothy A. Jur, an expert witness for Carter, testified that the cotter pin was reused. On cross examination, Jur stated he based this opinion in part on his past observations of automotive mechanics working in the field. Equipment Maintenance objected to this testimony, arguing that the basis for Jur's opinion--observation of human nature--is outside his area of expertise. See District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. Thirteen Parcels of Land in Squares 859, 912, 934 and 4068 in the District of Columbia, 534 F.2d 337 (D.C.Cir.1976) (opinion of an expert witness who bases his testimony on improper and incompetent grounds should not be admitted). The trial judge ruled that Jur had presented sufficient evidence within his area of expertise on which to base his opinion. The judge concluded Jur's statements on cross examination went to the weight of his opinion, not to its admissibility. Equipment Maintenance contends the judge erred in refusing to strike Jur's testimony.

The parties stipulated the Federal Rules of Evidence would govern at trial. Accordingly, we review the judge's ruling by applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.

A witness may testify as to his expert opinion on a particular matter if the testimony will aid the trier of fact in understanding evidence or in determining a fact in issue, and he is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education...." FED.R.EVID. 702. An expert is given wide latitude in determining the basis of his testimony. Mannino v. International Manufacturing Company, 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.1981) (interpreting FED.R.EVID 703). The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Bonaparte v. Floyd, 291 S.C. 427, 354 S.E.2d 40 (Ct.App.1987). Unless the trial judge clearly abuses his discretion, his admission of expert testimony will be sustained on appeal. Id.

Jur testified regarding several theories he explored, then explained through use of data why reuse of the cotter pin was the most probable cause for its failure. He explained how he weighed the damaged cotter pin, examined it under a microscope, and reconstructed it, then told why the data led him to conclude the cotter pin was reused. He described the metallurgical test he ran on the damaged cotter pin, which led him to exclude the possibility that the pin failed because of a latent defect. The trial judge reasonably determined from this evidence that Jur's opinion was founded on a logical basis within the scope of his expertise. Looking at Jur's testimony as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion. The isolated statement on cross examination went to the credibility and weight of his opinion, not to its admissibility. See Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 2229, 48 L.Ed.2d 832; Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 722 F.2d 1134 (3d Cir.1983).

B.

At the close of all evidence, Equipment Maintenance made a motion to strike two specifications of negligence from Carter's complaint. The first alleged that Equipment Maintenance negligently failed to follow the operator's manual when making repairs. The second alleged that Equipment Maintenance negligently used improper tools when making repairs. The trial judge denied both motions. Equipment Maintenance asserts this was an abuse of discretion because there was no evidence to support either allegation. A review of the record reveals otherwise.

Carter introduced the operator's manual as evidence of the proper amount of torque to be applied when tightening the axle nut. By Equipment Maintenance's own admission, the torque it applied to the nut did not comply with the manual. This was sufficient evidence to support the allegation of failure to follow the manual.

Robert K. Taylor, an expert witness for Carter, testified as to his inspection of the nut retrieved from the accident scene. He described scarring on the nut. He concluded the nut had been beaten with a hammer and chisel to loosen and tighten it. This, he explained, greatly increased the wear on the threads of the nut, placing a greater strain on the cotter pin. Taylor and the president of Equipment Maintenance both testified that the proper way to tighten or loosen an axle nut was with a torque wrench. Both agreed that beating the nut with a hammer and chisel was not good mechanical practice. Without question, this was evidence of improper tool use and of a causal link between the improper use and the accident.

C.

After the jury returned its verdict, Equipment Maintenance moved to set aside the punitive damages. The trial court denied its motion. Equipment Maintenance asserts this was error because there was no evidence to support a finding of punitive damages.

Evidence of simple negligence alone will not support an award of punitive damages. Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35, 351 S.E.2d 897 (Ct.App.1986).

[T]here must be evidence the defendant's conduct was wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's right's.... Conduct is wilful, wanton, or reckless when it is committed with a deliberate intention under such circumstances that a person of ordinary prudence would be conscious of it as an invasion of...