Carter v. Reese

• Decision Date: 30 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015–0108.,2015–0108.
• Citation: 2016 Ohio 5569,148 Ohio St.3d 226,70 N.E.3d 478
• Parties: CARTER et al., Appellants, v. REESE et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

148 Ohio St.3d 226

70 N.E.3d 478

2016 Ohio 5569

CARTER et al., Appellants,

v.REESE et al., Appellees.

No. 2015–0108.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 5, 2016.

Decided Aug. 30, 2016.

Robert A. Winter Jr. and Stephanie Collins, for appellants.

Markesbery & Richardson Co., L.P.A., Katherine A. Clemons, and Glenn A. Markesbery, Cincinnati, for appellee Larry Reese Jr.

O'Donnell, J.{¶ 1} Dennis Carter and his wife, Mary, appeal from a judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Larry Reese Jr. in connection with an action they filed for injuries Carter sustained when Reese attempted to move a tractor-trailer that had pinned Carter's leg between the trailer and a loading dock.

{¶ 2} Ohio's Good Samaritan statute states:

No person shall be liable in civil damages for administering emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency * * *, for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, unless such acts constitute willful or wanton misconduct.

R.C. 2305.23.

{¶ 3} In this case, Carter told Reese to pull the tractor-trailer forward in order to free his leg, but when Reese attempted to do so, the truck rolled backward, resulting in serious injury to Carter.

{¶ 4} "Administering emergency care" is a broad phrase that includes rendering medical and any other form of assistance to the safety and well-being of another when the result of an unforeseen combination of circumstances calls for immediate action. Therefore, because Reese administered emergency care at the scene of the emergency and because the statute expressly states that no person shall be liable in civil damages for acts performed at the scene of such emergency, and because no allegation of willful or wanton misconduct has been asserted against him, pursuant to Ohio's Good Samaritan statute, Reese is not liable in civil damages, and we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 5} On April 24, 2012, Carter, a truck driver for S & S Transport, Inc., pulled a tractor-trailer into the loading dock at AIC Contracting, Inc., in Fairfield, Ohio, to deliver an empty trailer and to pick up another. After attaching the second trailer, he pulled his truck about four to six inches away from the loading dock, unlocked the trailer brake, and locked the tractor brake so that the tractor wheels could not move. As he pulled himself onto the loading dock to close the trailer door, he slipped, and his leg became wedged between the loading dock and the trailer. Although he felt no physical pain at that time, he could not free himself and began to yell for help and bang on a loading dock door in an effort to get someone to help him.

{¶ 6} About ten minutes later, Reese heard Carter and drove to the AIC Contracting lot. Carter told him to "get in my truck, move it forward about a foot, * * * but whatever you do, don't put it in reverse." Reese responded, "[N]o problem."

{¶ 7} Reese climbed into the cab of the truck and put it in neutral before realizing that he did not know how to operate it. Carter recalled that Reese "revved up" the truck three times before he heard the air brake release, and within five seconds of that happening, the trailer rolled backwards and broke his leg.

{¶ 8} Paramedics arrived four minutes later, and someone moved the truck and freed Carter's leg. Due to the severity of the injuries, however, his right leg had to be amputated above the knee

.

{¶ 9} Carter and his wife sued Reese but did not allege that he had engaged in willful or wanton misconduct. Reese asserted Ohio's Good Samaritan statute as a defense and moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it pursuant to the statute.

{¶ 10} The court of appeals affirmed and held that R.C. 2305.23

applies to any person, health care professional or otherwise, who administers "emergency care," medical or otherwise, at the scene of an emergency and who meets the remaining requirements of the statute, e.g., their acts do not constitute willful or wanton misconduct.

(Emphasis sic.) 2014-Ohio-5395, 25 N.E.3d 1086, ¶ 15. The court explained that an emergency situation exists when a man's leg is pinned between a truck and a loading dock, that Reese's actions in attempting to move the truck constituted emergency care because he was trying to resolve the emergency created by Carter, and further, that Reese did not commit willful or wanton misconduct.

{¶ 11} The Carters appealed and we accepted the following proposition of law for review:

The trial court committed reversible error in granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals committed error in affirming the judgment, because the protection afforded under the Ohio Good Samaritan statute, R.C. 2305.23, is limited in scope and application to health care responders providing emergency medical care or treatment to another individual at the scene of an emergency and who otherwise satisfy the statute.

The Parties to the Appeal

{¶ 12} On appeal to this court, the Carters urge that R.C. 2305.23 provides immunity from civil liability only for health care professionals and trained first responders who voluntarily administer emergency medical care and treatment to injured persons at the scene of an emergency and that it is for the General Assembly to amend R.C. 2305.23 if it intends for the statute to immunize any person who voluntarily administers emergency nonmedical care or treatment. In support of their position, they point to language in the statute excluding coverage for emergency care or treatment that is administered in a hospital, doctor's office, or other place having proper medical equipment or for care rendered with the expectation of remuneration and language regarding law enforcement officers and fire fighters acting as part of their duties. The Carters also note that this court stated in footnote five in Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St.2d 195, 205, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975), that R.C. 2305.23 applies to those who render medical treatment and that appellate courts have followed Primes, and they assert that the General Assembly is presumed to know the decisions of this court, but it has not amended the Good Samaritan statute. They also assert that the lower courts' interpretation of R.C. 2305.23 emasculates the common law rule that Good Samaritans have a duty to exercise reasonable care. They finally contend that Reese did not administer any emergency care or treatment when he attempted to move the truck.

{¶ 13} Reese argues that R.C. 2305.23 applies to any person, regardless of profession, and that the legislature could have used the phrase "health care professionals" if it had intended the statute to protect only those individuals. Reese contends that limiting R.C. 2305.23 to those rendering emergency medical care or treatment would require this court to add the word "medical" to the statute and asserts the appellate court correctly determined he provided emergency care in attempting to free Carter's leg and therefore he is protected by R.C. 2305.23. Notably, Reese does not claim that he provided emergency treatment.

Issues on Appeal

{¶ 14} This case presents our court with two separate questions involving the legislative intent behind Ohio's Good Samaritan statute.

{¶ 15} First, what did the General Assembly intend by using the phrase "no person shall be liable in civil damages"—did it intend to include only health care professionals who administer emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency, or, more broadly, to include any person

who administers emergency care or treatment at the scene of an emergency?

{¶ 16} Second, what did the General Assembly intend by using the phrase "administering emergency care"—did it intend to limit emergency care to only the administration of medical care, or, did it intend to include all forms of care administered at the scene of an emergency?

{¶ 17} Our interpretation of Ohio's Good Samaritan statute and resolution of these questions present matters of first impression in our court. Other jurisdictions, however, have considered similar questions in connection with their respective Good Samaritan statutes, and their decisions are instructive in resolving these questions.

Historical Perspective

Common Law

{¶ 18} The common law in Ohio is that a bystander has no affirmative duty to aid or protect another absent a special relationship justifying the imposition of a duty. Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 293, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1997), citing 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Sections 314 –319, at 116–130 (1965) ; see also Gelbman v. Second Natl. Bank of Warren, 9 Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 458 N.E.2d 1262 (1984). However, one who voluntarily and gratuitously renders services to another for the protection of the other person is liable at common law for injuries resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. See 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 323 (1965) ; Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton & Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts, Section 56, 378 (5th Ed.1984).

Good Samaritan Statutes

{¶ 19} In 1959, California enacted the nation's first Good Samaritan statute, which provided that no physician or podiatrist, "who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency, shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care." Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code 2144, enacted 1959, now codified as Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code 2395. See generally Brandt, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 Akron L.Rev. 303, 305 (1983), fn. 23. Commentators have explained that California's legislature sought to encourage physicians to provide emergency treatment to injured persons in emergency situations without fear of liability for malpractice. See 17 Akron L.Rev. at 306, 332; see also Waisman, Negligence, Responsibility, and the Clumsy Samaritan: Is there a Fairness Rationale...