Carter v. State

• Decision Date: 04 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-4354,95-4354
• Citation: 697 So.2d 529
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1403 Rondale Voncha CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 529

697 So.2d 529

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1403

Rondale Voncha CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 95-4354.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

June 4, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 5, 1997.

Spiro T. Kypreos, Pensacola, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

MICKLE, Judge.

In this direct appeal, Rondale Voncha Carter challenges his conviction for the first-degree murder of Phuc Cong Tran (hereafter referred to as "Tran") with a firearm. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain opinion testimony of a defense psychologist relating to the appellant's mental capacity to understand his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), during a custodial interrogation, we are constrained to reverse the conviction and to remand for a new trial.

In its indictment, the State charged the 17-year-old appellant with the premeditated first-degree murder of Tran (Count One), conspiracy to deliver cocaine (Count Two), and possession of a firearm in the commission of a conspiracy (Count Three). At the end of all testimony, a motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts Two and Three was granted. According to the appellant's statements and testimony, the events leading to the death of Tran began when the appellant, "Little Jack" Carter (the appellant's uncle), and several other individuals (including the decedent, whom the appellant had not previously met) visited a "crack house," where they smoked "crack" and drank alcohol. Later, the appellant drove his uncle and Tran to a motel, into which the decedent went and then returned to the vehicle. While the appellant drove them around, the uncle and the decedent began arguing. After the vehicle stopped again, Tran got out, and the uncle placed a .38 calibre revolver on the front seat and pursued Tran. The uncle and Tran proceeded to "tussle" and "throw blows" outside the vehicle. The appellant initially remained inside the vehicle, but eventually he became concerned for his uncle's safety, grabbed the .38, and fired a shot in an effort to stop the fighting. The appellant heard his uncle say, "He got my product." As the appellant fired another shot to scare him, Tran started running away. According to the appellant's testimony, while following behind Tran he fired several more shots "at an angle" with the intent to scare Tran or to stop him from running away, not to kill him. After the decedent fell to the ground, the appellant observed his uncle going through Tran's pockets, and then the appellant and his uncle drove away. Tran had been hit by multiple shots fired from a .38 revolver. Several months later, the authorities picked up the appellant and took him to the police station for questioning, during which he made some inculpatory remarks.

After recounting the events that led to the August 1994 shooting death of Tran, the appellant testified about the circumstances under which he had made the self-incriminating statements. On December 1, 1994, the police picked him up and took him to a small, windowless interview room where his requests for permission to visit the restroom, to call his mother, and to get something to drink were denied. Although he admitted having signed the waiver of rights form at 8:00 A.M. on the date in question, the appellant testified that he had been scared and "didn't mostly understand" it. He claimed that he was not notified of the Tran murder investigation until after he signed the waiver form, for the apparent basis for taking him into custody had been a warrant for his violation of probation. Initially, trying to cover up the suspected involvement of his uncle in the charged crimes, the appellant claimed that only he and Tran had been present at the crime scene. Alternatively, the appellant indicated that an imaginary third person had been present. Appellant had reasoned that as a juvenile without a prior record, he would be treated better by the authorities than would his adult uncle, who has a criminal record. Appellant testified that although he had asked for an attorney, he did not understand his rights, including the right to remain silent and the consequences of making certain self-incriminating statements to protect his uncle. Although the appellant exercised his right to testify on his own behalf, the defense was not allowed to present all of the available relevant evidence in support of its theory that he had not fully comprehended or understood his Miranda rights.

The defense filed a motion to suppress any statement made by the appellant to authorities on the grounds that it had been coerced and involuntary and had been obtained after he requested assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and the appellant contends that it was error to allow into evidence proof of his recorded self-incriminating statements.

At the March 20, 1995, hearing on the motion to suppress, John Sanderson, an Escambia County deputy sheriff, testified that on December 1, 1994, the appellant had been transported to the sheriff's office for an interview. Prior to questioning, Sanderson read a rights waiver form to the appellant, who signed it and agreed to waive his rights and to give a statement. The appellant expressly acknowledged his understanding of the contents of the waiver. The appellant had indicated having an 11th-grade education as well as the ability to read and write. When Sanderson decided to record some of the appellant's statements at 11:40 A.M., he advised the appellant of his rights. After Sanderson asked him to start at the beginning and to tell him what had happened, the appellant asked, "Can I get a lawyer?" The deputy answered, "Sure. You want one now?" whereupon the appellant answered affirmatively. Immediately, Sanderson announced, "This concludes the recorded statement," and the taping stopped. Officer Terry Lee Kilgore telephoned the Office of the State Attorney. Almost immediately after the tape recorder was turned off, the appellant apparently changed his mind and informed the officers that he now wished to tell them what he had done. According to Sanderson, the appellant "was pretty much pleading with us" to resume the interview. After Kilgore returned to the interview room, the conversation was renewed at 11:55 A.M. As Kilgore recapitulated the events constituting the change of heart, the appellant indicated, "I thought about it." When asked, "Do you want an attorney?" the appellant answered "No." Without being questioned about the alleged criminal activity, the appellant volunteered, "I think I just wanted to say that I did it, but ... it wasn't like I tried to do it." When asked to clarify what he meant, the appellant said, "I didn't mean to kill the man." The taping concluded at 12:05 P.M.

Officer Kilgore testified that when the appellant requested an attorney, the initial interview concluded. However, as the tape was turned off, the appellant said, "No, no, no, wait, I want to get things clear for the record." Kilgore informed him that it was too late for further discussion because the appellant had asked for counsel. After the appellant reiterated his wish to talk to them further, Kilgore and Sanderson stepped outside the room to discuss the matter, and then Kilgore called the Office of the State Attorney. Only after the officers requestioned the appellant about his present wishes in regard to counsel, and he affirmatively and clearly indicated that he no longer wanted a lawyer, was the colloquy renewed. Both officers denied that the appellant was mistreated or subjected to coercive conditions. We conclude that the officers' conduct satisfied the requirements of Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (if a suspect expresses both a desire for counsel and an intent to continue the interview without counsel, any further official inquiry is limited to clarifying the suspect's wishes); State v. Evans, 462 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (defendant may voluntarily change his mind after invoking right to counsel, so long as waiver is knowing and intelligent).

In its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court found 1) that the appellant had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights afforded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); 2) that after requesting an attorney (and thereby suspending the interview), the appellant initiated further conversations with the officers and sought to go forward with the interview; 3) that the officers made every effort to protect the appellant's constitutional rights; 4) that after the appellant sought a renewal of discussions, the officers questioned him solely to ascertain whether he no longer wanted an attorney; and 5) that the appellant then freely and voluntarily made a recorded statement after affirmatively waiving the right to counsel.

The Supreme Court of Florida has held that "[t]he question of the admissibility in evidence of an extra-judicial confession is for the court to decide, based on all the circumstances of the confession." Palmes v. State, 397...