Carter v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-0606-09.,PD-0606-09. |
| Parties | Carl Allen CARTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
James C. Fling, Shamrock, for Appellant.
Charles Campbell, Asst. State's Atty., Jeffrey L. VanHorn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
This case involves the distinction between "inadvertent" pre-Miranda questioning and "deliberate" two-step questioning to avoid Miranda protections. At trial, the judge admitted appellant's post-Miranda statements to the arresting officer even though the officer had asked three questions before reading appellant his Miranda rights. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge improperly admitted appellant's statements because they were elicited during an illegal two-step interrogation.1 The State contends that the court of appeals erred in substituting its assessment of the facts for that of the trial judge in holding that the officer had engaged in an illegal two-step interrogation technique.2 Because we find that the record supports the trial judge's findings that (1) the trooper did not deliberately employ a two-step interrogation technique calculated to undermine appellant's rights, and (2) appellant's post-warning statements were voluntarily made, we reverse the court of appeals.
On March 31, 2003, DPS Trooper James Henderson stopped a rental car driven by Craig Wills3 for traffic violations. Appellant was in the passenger seat. The stop was captured by the patrol car's onboard video camera. Trooper Henderson requested Wills's driver's license and registration. Wills admitted that he did not have a driver's license, and appellant produced a rental contract showing that he had leased the car. Wills and appellant gave the trooper inconsistent stories as to the origin and nature of their trip.4 Trooper Henderson asked if there were weapons or narcotics in the car. Appellant responded that he didn't think so, but that it was a rental car, so "you never know."
Appellant gave Trooper Henderson consent to search the car. While searching the trunk, Trooper Henderson saw that laundry detergent, which is commonly used to mask the odor of narcotics, had been sprinkled across the trunk's floor. He lifted the back seat and discovered two packages of cocaine hidden underneath. The trooper then arrested both Wills and appellant, and he put appellant in his patrol car.5 On the way to the police station, appellant made incriminating statements about the offense in response to Trooper Henderson's questioning.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda6 rights. Trooper Henderson was the only witness at the suppression hearing. In addition to the above facts, he testified that, once appellant was in his patrol car, appellant was Based on Trooper Henderson's testimony, the trial court denied appellant's motion.
At trial, the State offered the onboard videotape of appellant's arrest into evidence. The videotape showed that appellant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in Trooper Henderson's patrol car where he could see deputies searching the car. Approximately nine minutes later, the trooper returned to the patrol car, and, as he began driving appellant to the police department, he asked the following:
Appellant objected to these statements on the ground that he was in custody and had not yet been Mirandized. After initially overruling the objection, the trial court sustained it and instructed the jury to disregard those statements, but denied appellant's motion for mistrial. Appellant then objected to the admission of any further statements made after he had been given his Miranda warnings, but the judge overruled that objection.7 The prosecutor resumed playing the onboard videotape, which continued with Trooper Henderson's warnings.8 The trooper testified that appellant acknowledged that he understood and waived his rights.9 The videotape confirmed the facts to which Trooper Henderson had testified at the suppression hearing: In response to questioning, appellant admitted that (1) there were eighteen ounces of cocaine; (2) it belonged to both him and Wills; (3) they had picked it up in Phoenix; (4) they had paid $8,000 for it; and (5) they expected to turn a big profit selling it. A Department of Public Safety chemist then testified that the cocaine found in the rental car weighed 491.64 grams with a 67 percent purity. The jury convicted appellant of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.
Appellant raised seven issues on appeal, two of which related to his statements to Trooper Henderson. The key issue was whether the trial judge erred in admitting appellant's post-Miranda statements. The court of appeals abated the case for the trial judge to make findings regarding the voluntariness of appellant's statements.10 The trial court entered numerous findings in support of his ruling, including the following:
On review after remand, the court of appeals concluded that the facts were "uncontroverted;" thus, it reviewed the trial court's ruling de novo.11 Based on its assessment of the facts, the court of appeals held that "Trooper Henderson's two-step approach was a conscious choice, calculated to undermine Appellant's Miranda rights."12 It then noted that the trooper did not administer any curative measures and that the unwarned and warned statements were made "during an undifferentiated single event."13 Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress, and it found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
On discretionary review, the State argues that the historical facts are not "uncontroverted." It contends that, although the videotape was helpful to resolve the factual issues, the trial court had an opportunity to view the witness and was "uniquely qualified" to determine Henderson's demeanor and credibility. That credibility issue, according to the State, is critical to this "question first, warn later" issue.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court explained that the issue of voluntariness "encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice."14 More recently, that Court stated that "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk" that the privilege against self-incrimination will not be observed.15 To minimize that risk, the Miranda Court conditioned the admissibility of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his rights.16 Failure to provide the warnings and obtain a waiver prior to custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of statements obtained.17
But Oregon v. Elstad18 governs the admissibility of post-warning confessions made after inadvertent, minimal Miranda violations. In that case, the Supreme Court explained that "there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary."19 Thus, "a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings."20 In upholding the admission of Elstad's post-Miranda statements, the Court concluded that there were "none of the earmarks of coercion" in that particular factual situation and that the officer's initial failure to warn was merely an "oversight."21
The Supreme Court clarified its approach to "question first, warn later" situations in Missouri v. Seibert.22 In that case, officers were acting under express orders to withhold Miranda warnings from Seibert, who was charged...
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