Carter v. Volunteer Apparel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1992
• Citation: 833 S.W.2d 492
• Parties: Betty Jean CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VOLUNTEER APPAREL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 492

833 S.W.2d 492

Betty Jean CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VOLUNTEER APPAREL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville.

April 20, 1992.

Shannon D. Faulkner, III, Milligan and Gilbert, Knoxville, for plaintiff-appellant.

David E. Smith, Hodges, Doughty & Carson, Knoxville, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

DROWOTA, Justice.

The primary issue in this workers' compensation appeal is whether an injury, sustained by Plaintiff-employee on her employer's premises prior to the time work began, is compensable. Plaintiff's injury occurred in the break area of Defendant's plant and the Chancellor found that her injury was not compensable because it did not occur within a reasonable time prior to work. Plaintiff appeals.

THE FACTS

Plaintiff-Appellant, Betty Jean Carter, is 52 years of age and all her adult work life has been spent operating sewing machines in apparel plants. In 1986 she began working for the Defendant, Volunteer Apparel, Inc. Plaintiff testified that on the day of the accident, December 15, 1988, as was her usual custom, she parked in the rear of the Defendant's premises, came through the back of the building, and walked through the sewing work area to the break area. The sewing area was in a large room which also contained the break area. In the break area, there were coffee machines, juice machines, and coke machines. From the break area, Plaintiff could see the time clock and the sewing machine where she worked. The time of Plaintiff's arrival this particular morning is in dispute. Plaintiff testified that she arrived at the designated break area at 7:10 a.m. and that she was to clock in and begin work at 7:30. Plaintiff testified that it was an everyday occurrence for employees to be in the break area prior to clocking in and beginning work. When Plaintiff arrived at the break area, she had with her a crocheted doll which she was bringing to a co-employee. As she was walking to a table in the break area to lay the doll down, she slipped and fell. Plaintiff thinks that coffee on the floor caused her to fall. She testified that she went completely to the floor, twisted her back, and had immediate pain in her leg and back. A supervisor picked her up and another employee took her to the hospital emergency room.

Defendant presented witnesses who testified that Plaintiff's fall occurred between 6:30 and 6:40 a.m. The plant manager, who arrived at work at 6:15 a.m., testified that Plaintiff had fallen at 6:30 a.m. The supervisor, who filled out the accident report, testified that her report showed that the accident occurred at 6:40 a.m.

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

The Chancellor found that in order to begin work at 7:30 a.m., an employee would necessarily arrive sometime prior to that time and that it was Plaintiff's custom to arrive early and drink coffee and smoke a cigarette with fellow employees. This practice was known to and permitted by the Company. Supervisory employees would normally come in around 6:15 to 6:30 a.m. The Chancellor noted that the time of Plaintiff's fall was in dispute, Plaintiff testifying that the fall occurred after 7 a.m., and defense witnesses testifying that the fall occurred about 6:30 a.m. The Chancellor accepted a report by a supervisor that showed the time of the accident being 6:40 a.m.

Before addressing the critical issue of liability, the Chancellor found that, assuming liability on the part of the employer, Plaintiff would be entitled to medical expenses of $3,111.00, to temporary total benefits up to March 1, 1989, and to 40 percent permanent disability to the body as a whole.

The Chancellor, referring to Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn.1989), stated that the issue is "whether or not the employee's injury occurred during a reasonable time on the employer's premises." As mentioned earlier, the Chancellor observed that in order to begin work at 7:30 a.m., it would be necessary to arrive prior to that time. The Chancellor noted that some employees came to work early and waited in the break area, perhaps having coffee and a cigarette, until work started. The court, however, found that the evidence did not establish that Plaintiff was on her employer's premises a reasonable time prior to work and he accordingly found no liability and dismissed Plaintiff's suit.

OUR CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

The standard of review by this Court of the findings of the trial judge is de novo, accompanied by a presumption of correctness for those findings, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. T.C.A. § 50-6-225(e). "This standard of review differs from that previously provided and requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of trial judges in workers' compensation cases." Humphrey v. Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn.1987).

In Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra, at 150, we cited with approval a statement from Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 506, 734 P.2d 743, 746 (1987):

... by adoption of the premises rule, we simply recognize that the "course of employment" includes not only the time for which the employee is actually paid but also a reasonable time during which the employee is necessarily on the employer's premises while passing to or from the place where the work is actually done. (Emphasis added.)

We are of the opinion that injuries occurring on the premises at a reasonable time before work begins are "in the course of employment" even though this period is technically outside the regular hours of employment. Professor Larson lists four situations in which the course of employment goes beyond an employee's fixed hours of work: the time spent going and coming on the premises; an interval before working hours while waiting to begin or making preparations, and a similar interval after hours; regular unpaid rest periods taken on the premises; and unpaid lunch hours on the premises. 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21.21(a) (1990). It is obvious that "in the course of employment" for employees having a fixed time and place to work, embraces a reasonable interval before and after official working hours while the employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts. Id. at § 21.60(a).

In the case before us the employer had acquiesced in the custom of what we will refer to as pre-work breaks. What constitutes a reasonable interval depends not only on the length of time involved but also on the circumstances occasioning the interval and the nature of the employee's activity. For examples of pre-work cases in other jurisdictions defining reasonable activities and periods of time, see the cases collected below. ¹

In this era of 8 to 12 hour work days, an employee's recovery is not limited to the time spent at one's work station. Professor Larson states that employees who, within the time and space limits of their employment, engage in acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the course of employment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon the job temporarily may be inferred or unless the method chosen is so unusual and unreasonable that the conduct cannot be considered an incident of the employment. 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 21 (1990). Activities termed by Larson as "personal comfort activities" are generally regarded as necessities in the work place. These include such incidental acts as eating, drinking, smoking, seeking toilet facilities, ² and seeking fresh air, coolness or warmth. Id. at § 21.10-21.50 (1990). These activities are generally found to be sufficiently related to employment to be in the course of employment.

The Defendant avers that Plaintiff was doing nothing to benefit her employer and that the break area was being provided by the Company for the Plaintiff's own personal convenience. We think it significant that the employer did provide a break area for its employees and the employer acquiesced in and created the custom ³ of pre-work breaks. Our Workers' Compensation Act does not expressly state that the employee must, at the time of the injury, have been benefiting his or her employer; it merely states that the injury must be one "arising out of and in the course of employment." T.C.A. § 50-6-102(a)(5) (1991). Therefore, if Plaintiff's activity, beneficial or not, was a part of her employment, either because of its general nature or because of the particular customs or practices in Defendant's plant, the statute is satisfied. Accord 1A Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law, § 20.20 (1990).

We conclude that "in the course of employment," for plant employees having a fixed time to clock in, embraces a reasonable interval before and after actual working hours while the employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts. Volunteer Apparel had knowledge of its employees' arriving early and acquiesced in their before work coffee/social breaks. The issue thus...