Casa De Valley View Owner's Assn. v. Stevenson

• Citation: 167 Cal.App.3d 1182,213 Cal.Rptr. 790
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 09 May 1985
• Parties: In re CASA DE VALLEY VIEW OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, Huston T. CARLYLE and Grace Carlyle, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Robert W. STEVENSON, Raymond T. Dilbeck, James F. Brewer, Joseph Stitick, Stevenson Dilbeck Development Corporation, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. BOO4259.

Page 790

213 Cal.Rptr. 790

167 Cal.App.3d 1182

In re CASA DE VALLEY VIEW OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,

Huston T. CARLYLE and Grace Carlyle, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Robert W. STEVENSON, Raymond T. Dilbeck, James F. Brewer, Joseph Stitick, Stevenson Dilbeck Development Corporation, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents.

BOO4259.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

May 9, 1985.

Huston T. Carlyle, Glendale, in Pro. Per., for plaintiffs and appellants Carlyle.

Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, and Thomas D. Green, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent Casa de Valley View Owner's Ass'n, Inc.

No appearance by defendants and respondents Robert W. Stevenson, et al.

THOMPSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

This case involves a novel situation in which coplaintiffs in the action below are adversaries on appeal from a judgment enforcing a stipulated settlement. Huston and Grace Carlyle appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to a stipulated settlement following the granting of a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 ¹ by Casa de Valley View Owner's Association (Association). The Carlyles contend that the superior court improperly utilized section 664.6, and lacked jurisdiction. We disagree, and will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The action below arose out of a condominium conversion. The Association is the homeowner's association for the condominium development. The Carlyles are resident owners of a condominium unit and members of the Association. In March 1980, the Association sued the defendant developers in this case (No. NCC 10492 G). At that time, Mr. Carlyle was president of the board of directors (directors) of the Association and had been retained to prosecute the lawsuit. On July 23, 1980, the Association's new directors adopted a resolution terminating Mr. Carlyle's legal services and retaining another law firm to pursue the litigation. But Mr. Carlyle refused to withdraw voluntarily.

In August 1980, the Carlyles moved to file a complaint in intervention, claiming the directors had a conflict of interest and suggesting their collusion with defendants. Both the Association and the defendants filed opposition to the motion. The Association also asked the court to take judicial notice of another case (No. 10633 G) in which Mr. Carlyle was suing two directors (Jacobson and Glenn). Further, the Association filed a cross-motion for the court to compel Mr. Carlyle's withdrawal as attorney of record in the case herein.

On September 5, 1980, the court denied the Carlyles' motion to intervene. The court, however, allowed the Carlyles to join the action as parties plaintiff and to prosecute the action in propria persona. Further, the court granted the Association's motion for an order substituting the law firm in place of Mr. Carlyle as attorney of record for the Association in this case.

On July 16, 1982, a voluntary settlement conference was held before the trial court in which defendants, the Carlyles and the Association participated. Their settlement conference statements pointed out that the defendants' joint settlement offer was conditioned upon acceptance by all plaintiffs; the Association and defendants had agreed on settlement terms, but the Carlyles had not; and the Carlyles had filed two lawsuits against the Association directors. ²

At the conference, all counsel for the parties, including Carlyle, reached the following stipulated settlement on the record with respect to the action below. As the court stated:

"The record will reflect the fact that the defendants and various parties have tendered to plaintiff [Association] a prospective settlement of the claims of said association as reflected in this litigation for the payment of $250,000.00. In addition to the claims of the Association, there exists individual claims on behalf of plaintiffs [Carlyles].... in this litigation ... as well ... as ... in ... Case No. NCC 11892 G, on the records and files of this court.

"As a result of our discussions, it is stipulated that the claims of [the Carlyles], as coplaintiffs in [this] Case No. NCC 10492 G, as well as plaintiffs in Case No. NCC 11892 G, have been settled on the following basis:

"[The Carlyles] will be paid, on behalf of the defendants, within two weeks from this date, the total sum of $20,000.00. In connection with said payment, [the Carlyles] will cause to be executed and delivered to counsel, in due form for filing with the Clerk of this Court, dismissals with prejudice of their individual causes of action and rights of action as to all defendants in Case No. NCC 10492 G, together with duly executed requests for entry of dismissals with prejudice as to all defendants in ... Case No. NCC 11892 G.

"The Carlyles will also deliver concurrently with delivery to them of the funds as indicated, a release executed by them in favor of the [Association], and counsel for [Association].

"There will be delivered to the Carlyles simultaneously with delivery to them of the sum of $20,000.00, a general release in favor of the Carlyles, executed by [Association], as well as a general release in favor of the Carlyles executed by [directors] Jacobson & Glenn."

"....

"As a result of our discussion, Mr. Carlyle has indicated his willingness to release individual members, present or past, of the [Association], from any claimed liability to himself or his wife, as well as releasing the Association itself, with the sole exception of the rights being asserted in Case No. NCC 11173 G [the stockholders' derivative action suit in which Mr. Carlyle remained as counsel of record.]

"....

".... [T]here is going to be a release from [the Carlyles] in favor of the Association as an Association in addition to the individual members, past and present [and] other members of the Association." (Italics added.)

It was further pointed out by the court that, according to the stipulated agreement, it was incumbent upon Carlyle to prepare the dismissals with prejudice that he and his wife would have to sign and the other counsel would prepare the forms of releases. The stipulation was approved by the court and ordered entered in the minutes.

In connection with the settlement, in July 1982, the Carlyles received $20,000 from the defendants. Thereafter, on November 3, 1982, the Carlyles filed a dismissal with prejudice.

On December 24, 1982, the Association moved for entry of judgment on the stipulated settlement pursuant to section 664.6. It contended that the Carlyles had refused to sign releases tendered to them by the Association even though the Carlyles had received the $20,000 payment under the settlement agreement. The Carlyles opposed the motion on the merits, claiming, inter alia, the right to rescind.

The matter was submitted on January 28, 1983, following argument. On February 4, 1983, the trial court granted the Association's 664.6 motion for entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulated settlement. The court directed the Association's counsel to prepare the judgment. Its decision, which was entered in the minutes, provided in pertinent part:

"1. [The Carlyles] are generally releasing the Association, Counsel for the Assn., individual members of the Assn., present and past, and individual board members of the Assn.;

"2. The Assn. and [directors] Jacobson and Glenn are generally releasing [the Carlyles].

"The term 'general release' shall refer only to the obligation or potential obligations arising from the pending lawsuit and be interpreted pursuant to Civil Code Sections 1541 and 1542."

On February 7, 1983, the Association's voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the entire action brought by the Association was filed and entered. On February 14, 1983, the Carlyles filed a noticed motion to reconsider, modify, clarify, and/or vacate the ruling and judgment. In addition, the Carlyles requested a statement of decision.

On February 16, 1983, the trial court gave further directions to Association's counsel that "[t]he form of judgment should set forth the terms of the settlement and articulate, inter alia, the release language as well, in accordance with CCP 664.6." Also, the court denied the Carlyles' request for a statement of decision because it was not required in the proceeding.

On March 11, 1983, the motion for reconsideration, modification and clarification and vacation of judgment was argued and submitted. Later that date, the court denied the motion whereupon it signed and filed the judgment. ³ This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Section 664.6 Authorizes This Procedure

The Carlyles contend that the court improperly entered judgment upon Association's motion under section 664.6. The Carlyles argue, citing Duran v. Duran (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 176, 197 Cal.Rptr. 497, that the Association's "speaking motion" was an inappropriate procedure to compel enforcement of the stipulation because it did not meet the standard for summary judgment. We disagree. Duran is inapposite because the nonstatutory motion considered in that case preceded the enactment of section 664.6.

"The Legislature has now provided that a motion to enter judgment pursuant to such a settlement need not be a motion for summary judgment." (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 991, 203 Cal.Rptr. 356.) Section 664.6, enacted in 1981, explicitly provides statutory authorization for the entry of judgment upon a stipulated settlement by means of a noticed motion. That section provides: "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in writing or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement." (Italics added.)

In a well-reasoned opinion construing section 664.6 the Corkland court explained:

"[W]hat formerly was a nonstatutory 'speaking' motion is now authorized by statute and is applicable not only to judicially supervised...