Case of Collins
Decision Date | 31 January 1986 |
Citation | 488 N.E.2d 46,21 Mass.App.Ct. 557 |
Parties | John E. COLLINS'S CASE. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
John J. Nolan, Boston, for employee.
Richard N. Curtin, Boston, for insurer.
Before BROWN, CUTTER and DREBEN, JJ.
Two issues 1 are presented in this employee's appeal from a judgment affirming the denial and dismissal of his claim for compensation by the reviewing board (board) of the Industrial Accident Board. The employee urges that the single member and the board erroneously ruled that the prima facie effect of G.L. c. 152, § 7A, did not apply and that they also improperly considered opinion evidence of two physicians which was based in part on facts not admitted in evidence. We agree that there was error in the decision of the board and reverse the judgment.
The findings and decision of the single member which were adopted by the board explain that the employee had been employed by the town of Foxborough as a general laborer and that his duties included snowplowing and road building. The employee was taken to a hospital, where the examining physician found slurred speech and paralysis. Although the employee's speech became normal an hour after arrival at the hospital, his condition worsened during the first twenty-four hours of hospitalization and he became totally disabled.
The primary factual issue was whether the employee's injury was causally related to his employment. "Adopting" the medical opinions of the two physicians deposed by the insurer, 2 the single member found that "the Employee has failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence presented that an injury was sustained on March 22, 1973, arising out of and in the course of his employment."
1. Applicability of G.L. c. 152, § 7A. The employee, who in 1980 was under permanent guardianship as a mentally ill person, was physically and mentally unable to testify at the hearings. He sought by means of two separate motions to establish a prima facie case for compensation by reason of G.L. c. 152, § 7A. That statute is set forth in the margin. 3 If applicable, § 7A provides in substance that in the case of an employee unable to testify, "it shall be prima facie evidence that the employee was performing his regular duties on the day of injury" and that the claim is compensable. Unless that prima facie evidence is met and overcome by evidence sufficient to warrant a contrary conclusion, the employee is entitled to benefits. A finding for the employee is warranted "without actual medical evidence of causal relationship." Anderson's Case, 373 Mass. 813, 818, 370 N.E.2d 692 (1977).
The single member denied both motions to have § 7A apply. His explanation for denying the employee's first motion was that the current inability of the employee to testify was not a ground for the application of the statute as "an attorney could or would merely wait until an Employee died, then file a Claim under Section 7A." In the single member's view what is required is "that one must establish immediacy; i.e., an immediate connection between the workplace and the death, injury or disability of the Employee." (Emphasis in original.)
Here, however, there is no dispute that an incident occurred while the employee was working at his place of employment or that he became disabled and unable to testify during the first twenty-four hours of hospitalization following that event. The employee has never regained his mental abilities.
In these circumstances, we conclude that the time elements required by the statute have been met. 4 There is no suggestion in the record that the delay in hearing, reached by agreement, was to obtain the advantage of the statute. For § 7A to be applicable, no additional connection between the workplace and the injury need be shown. Once in effect, the statute establishes "prima facie evidence of causal relationship between the employment and the injury." Anderson's Case, 373 Mass. at 816-817, 370 N.E.2d 692.
The single member in denying the employee's second motion for the application of § 7A expressed concern lest the insurer be denied a "right of constitutional dimension." That concern seems misplaced, as the insurer is entitled to overcome the prima facie evidence of § 7A by introducing other evidence. Moreover, the statute does not affect the admissibility of any admissions of the employee made at a time prior to his disability or made during a lucid interval at the hospital. We hold, therefore, that the single member and the board erred in ruling G.L. c. 152, § 7A, inapplicable. See generally Locke, Workmen's Compensation § 221 (2d ed. 1981).
2. Opinions of physicians. We turn next to the medical evidence of the insurer. Prior to the hearing before the board, the employee sought to strike the opinion evidence of the two physicians (Dr. Sagall and Dr. Winkler) who were witnesses for the insurer on the issue of causal relationship. The motion to strike was based on the claim that the opinions were predicated on facts not in evidence.
The testimony of Dr. Egan, the claimant's physician, indicates that an important issue in determining whether the injury was causally related to the employee's employment, or was just a coincidence, was the extent to which physical effort was exerted by the employee prior to the incident. The only document admitted in evidence bearing on this issue was the employer's first report of injury, dated April 11, 1973. 5 That report stated that "there was tremendous physical exertion used when trying to close [scuttle door] 6 resulting in his collapse."
The direct evidence 7 as to what the employee had been doing came from a fellow employee. He testified that on the day of the incident the employee's work consisted of taking stones from a truck to a trench, that this involved putting a wheelbarrow under a hole in the truck and using a "scuttle mechanism that opens and closes the hole." He testified that moving the scuttle involves "substantial effort," and that Collins had been working for two and one-half to three hours prior to the incident.
Despite the lack of any substantive evidence supporting their recitals, both Dr. Sagall and Dr. Winkler in their opinions specifically referred to a hearsay statement contained in a hospital record, never put in evidence, explaining what the employee was doing at the time of the incident. Dr. Sagall's July 6, 1973, letter included the following: from natural progression of arteriosclerotic disease "and was not causally connected to or proximately precipitated by his work activities." (Emphasis supplied.)
Dr. Winkler, who, unlike Dr. Sagall, had not examined the employee, also based his opinion 8 on hospital and other records not in evidence as well as on two medical reports of Dr. Sagall which contain material the claimant seeks to strike. Dr. Winkler's clinical summary gave the following explanation of the March 22, 1973, incident.
The report of Dr. Egan, the employee's physician, was based on different facts. In his report, he described the employee as having been engaged "in heavy work" 9 and in his deposition stated that the employee was engaged in "extremely heavy work." On cross-examination he indicated that "heavy repetitive work would be a factor [in precipitating the incident], and light duty would probably have nothing to do with it."
It is apparent that the recitation in the hospital record that "the employee had been seated and doing some work ... when he suddenly noted that he did not have the strength to get to his feet" may have influenced the two medical opinions. 10 See Fiander's Case, 293 Mass. 157, 163, 199 N.E. 309 (1936). Even though such history may have been "open to the inspection of the division" (G.L. c. 152, § 20, as amended through St. 1953, c. 314, § 6), where what the employee was doing at the time was an issue of fact before the board, the history may not be regarded by reason of that statute alone to be in evidence and thereby corroborate the findings of the insurer's physicians. Id. at 164, 199 N.E. 309.
Where specific facts are in controversy, "[e]xpert opinion ... must be based on either the expert's direct personal knowledge, on evidence already in the record or which the parties represent will be presented during the course of the trial, or on a combination of these sources." LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 32, 393 N.E.2d 867 (1979). Charron's Case, 331 Mass. 519, 522-523, 120 N.E.2d 754 (1954). Cormier's Case, 337 Mass. 714, 716, 151 N.E.2d 269 (1958). Buck's Case, 342 Mass. 766, 771, 175 N.E.2d 369 (1961). Soares v. Stop & Shop Cos., 16 Mass.App. 979, 979-980, 453 N.E.2d 478 (1983). See Haley's Case, 356 Mass. 678, 680-682, 255 N.E.2d 322 (1970). In ...
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