Case v. Olson
| Decision Date | 06 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | 46482. |
| Citation | 14 N.W.2d 717,234 Iowa 869 |
| Parties | CASE v. OLSON et al. (WRIGHT, Intervener). |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Baron & Bolton and Frank Margolin, both of Sioux City, for plaintiff-appellee.
V O. DeWitt, of Sioux City, for defendant-appellee.
Gill & Gill, of Sioux City, for intervener-appellee.
Ray E. Rieke, of Sioux City, for defendant-appellant.
The civil service commission of the city of Sioux City, on April 7 1941, gave an examination for such policemen as sought promotion to determine their qualifications for the office of captain of the police department. Arville B. Case, plaintiff herein, took the examination and was among those certified by the commission to be eligible. The eligibility list also contained the names of Walter Wright, intervener, and Milton V. Glisar, defendant. On August 6, 1941 Forrest N. Olson Commissioner of Public Safety, appointed Glisar as police captain. Case appealed to the district court, naming Olson and Glisar as defendants. Wright intervened on the ground that he was an honorably discharged soldier and that the appointee, Glisar, was not.
The court held that plaintiff was not entitled to preference by reason of his service in and honorable discharge from a National Guard unit not drafted into federal service, nor by his induction by his draft board, nor his discharge from the draft, following Lamb v. Kroeger, Iowa, 8 N.W.2d 405. The court further held that while the appointee, Glisar, was called by the draft board, he was rejected for physical disability and has no discharge from the Army of the United States or the draft. Wright, intervener, was a member of the Army of the United States from July 3, 1918, the date of his induction into military service, until March 15, 1919, at which time he was honorably discharged, and the court held that he was the only one of the candidates who was entitled to a preference. Defendant Glisar appeals from the findings conclusions of law and judgment and decree of the trial court. Plaintiff does not appeal.
This appeal, therefore, presents only one question. Is the intervener, Wright, within the requirements of section 5697 of [234 Iowa 871] the Code of Iowa 1939 , and thereby entitled to a preference over the appellant, Glisar?
The statute, section 5697, Code of 1939, which in the case of Zanfes v. Olson, Iowa, 7 N.W.2d 901, was held to be controlling in regard to appointments made under the civil service law in cities, reads as follows:
This code provision has been in force ever since its adoption as a part of the civil service law in 1911, unchanged except that the word "chapter" has been substituted for the word "act" in the original enactment.
We are called on to decide whether the statute includes the soldiers in World War I who became such by reason of the draft. Appellant cites various provisions of the federal code, none of which we think apply to the question in hand. The first reference defines the National Forces and next defined are the Volunteer Forces. Appellant then calls attention to the Act of May 18, 1917, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 201 et seq., when the selective service law was adopted, which required all male persons between the ages of 18 and 45 to be subject to registration. Reference is also made to the federal Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 166, which defines the Volunteer Army; and appellant urges that during the time intervener was in military service the law of the United States definitely classified military service into Regular Army, Volunteer Army, Officers Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, National Guard and Selective Service Army under said act. The army at the outbreak of World War I was the Army of the United States.
We can see no reason why a subsequent change of words could affect the meaning of section 5697 at the time it was enacted. The question is one of construction of the statute and the ordinary rules apply. Appellant argues that a law which is not ambiguous needs no construction. Such ambiguity as there may be here arises from a disagreement as to the meaning of the words "regular or volunteer army". Our endeavor must be to ascertain the intent of the legislature at the time of the enactment of the soldiers' preference law as a part of the civil service statute. Appellant cites various rules of construction, all of which are commonly accepted. He cites and quotes 25 R.C.L., Statutes, 215, p. 959, as follows: "The true rule is that statutes are to be constructed as they were intended to be understood when they were passed." He urges that in the interpretation and construction of statutes the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature when enacted and that the intention and meaning of the legislature must be primarily determined from the language of the statute itself and not from conjectures aliunde. It is also argued that the statute should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation.
There are many rules in construing laws which are adopted to ascertain, if possible, the intent of the legislature in passing them. The courts confine themselves to the construction of the law as it is, not to amend or change under the guise of construction. Appellant states that we should endeavor to ascertain the intent of the legislature at the time the law was passed, and with this we agree. What was the purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute? Where the language is of doubtful meaning, or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, to absurdity, or to contradictory provisions, the duty of ascertaining the true meaning devolves upon the court. 59 C. J. p. 957, Par. 569. If the intention of the legislature cannot be discovered it is the duty of the court to give the statute a reasonable construction consistent with the general rules of law. It is also well established that when the language of a statute is ambiguous the court may look not only to the language, but to the subject matter of the act, the object to be accomplished, or the purpose to be subserved, and the law should be construed to give effect to the legislative purpose. See French v. French, 84 Iowa 655, 659, 51 N.W. 145, 15 L.R.A. 300; Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N.W. 314, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 708; State v. Sherman, 46 Iowa 415, 422; Seavert v. Cooper, 187 Iowa 1109, 1113, 175 N.W. 19.
The court should give effect to the spirit of the law rather than the letter, especially so where adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, or injustice, or would lead to contradiction, or would defeat the plain purpose of the act, or where the provision was inserted through inadvertence. 59 C. J. p. 966, Par. 573.
A rule of construction is that in endeavoring to ascertain the intent of the act which is passed, it should be given such construction as will not result in injustice, unreasonableness or absurd consequences. Oliphant v. Hawkinson, 192 Iowa 1259, 1263, 183 N.W. 805, 33 A.L.R. 1433, citing and quoting from Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N.E. 128, L.R.A. 1916E, 329, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1.
Appellant further argues that the meaning of the words used in section 5697 is plain and understandable and it is presumed the lawmakers knew the meaning of the words they used. 25 R.C.L., Statutes, 219, p. 964. Appellant contends the laws then in effect, both state and federal, gave the words "regular or volunteer army" plain and definite meaning, and they did not include any one forced into military service by compulsory draft. He insists that no enactment by the legislature of the State of Iowa or the Congress of the United States effective while intervener was in the military service of the United States in any way changed the law or the meaning of the terms regular army or volunteer army from what they meant when they were embodied in the Iowa law in 1911.
We may accept appellant's statements of the law but we cannot hold that they...
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