Cash v. Maxwell

• Decision Date: 09 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1548.,10–1548.
• Citation: 565 U.S. 1138,132 S.Ct. 611 (Mem),181 L.Ed.2d 785
• Parties: Brenda CASH, acting warden v. Bobby Joe MAXWELL.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

565 U.S. 1138

132 S.Ct. 611 (Mem)

181 L.Ed.2d 785

Brenda CASH, acting warden

v.Bobby Joe MAXWELL.

No. 10–1548.

Supreme Court of the United States

Jan. 9, 2012.

Statement of Justice SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial of certiorari.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 requires that federal habeas courts extend deference to the factual findings of state courts. But "deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review." Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Congress stated in no uncertain terms that federal habeas relief remains available when a state court's holding is "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). In this case, the state court's denial of relief to respondent Bobby Joe Maxwell was premised on its factual finding that there was "no credible or persuasive evidence Sidney Storch lied at [Maxwell's] trial in 1984." App. to Pet. for Cert. 137. Because the Ninth Circuit meticulously set forth an avalanche of evidence demonstrating that the state court's factual finding was unreasonable, see Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 498–506 (2010), I agree with the Court's decision to deny certiorari.

Sidney Storch was one of the most notorious jailhouse informants in the history of Los Angeles County. During a 4 year period in the mid–1980's, he testified in at least a half-dozen trials, each time claiming that the defendant had confessed to him in prison. See Rohrlich & Stewart, Jailhouse Snitches: Trading Lies for Freedom, L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 1989, p. 30 ("Said inmate Daniel Roach: ‘It seems that half the world just confesses to Sidney Storch’ ").

Throughout this period, however, evidence mounted that Storch repeatedly was fabricating inmates' confessions for personal gain. As even the State acknowledges, Storch's signature method was to fashion inmates' supposed confessions from publicly available information in newspaper articles. 2 Record 262. At Maxwell's postconviction hearing, one former county prosecutor explained that he declined to use Storch in a high-profile 1986 murder case after determining "Storch was not telling the truth about [the defendant's] alleged statements," and had lied about having heard a confession at a time when he was not in the defendant's cell. 9 id., at 1824. Another prosecutor later refused to use Storch in a different case after discovering that his "testimony was similar to the newspaper accounts of the case." 9 id., at 1825. In 1987, sheriff's deputies even confiscated a manual written by Storch instructing other jailhouse snitches how to fabricate confessions. None of this was out of character for Storch, who was discharged from the Army in 1964 because he was a " ‘habitual liar,’ " and was arrested repeatedly for crimes of dishonesty, including forgery, fraud, and false impersonation—including falsely impersonating a Central Intelligence Agency officer. 628 F.3d, at 498.

As the Ninth Circuit explained at length, both before and after Maxwell's trial, various police officers and prosecutors believed Storch to be unreliable, dishonest, and willing to set up defendants for his own ends. At Maxwell's postconviction hearing, one police officer described how Storch sought to "set ... up" someone during a forgery investigation, 6 Record 1118; another detective testified that he would have put Storch on a Los Angeles Police Department list of unreliable informants prior to Maxwell's trial. Not long after Maxwell's trial, prosecutors refused to put Storch on the stand, believing him to have fabricated defendants' confessions. And even the State conceded that Storch lied about a variety of material facts at Maxwell's own trial, including his own criminal record and his motivation for testifying. This powerful evidence supported Maxwell's claim that Storch falsely testified about Maxwell's supposed confession—using precisely the same modus operandi that Storch used time and again to falsely implicate other defendants. See 628 F.3d, at 504–505.

The dissent labels all of this evidence "circumstantial." Post, at 614 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). It insists that it is possible that Storch repeatedly falsely implicated other defendants, and fabricated other material facts at Maxwell's trial, but uncharacteristically told the truth about Maxwell's supposed confession. Of course, that is possible. But it is not reasonable, given the voluminous evidence that Storch was a habitual liar who even the State concedes told other material lies at Maxwell's trial.¹

Here, the Ninth Circuit recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) imposes a "daunting standard—one that will be satisfied in relatively few cases." 628 F.3d, at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court below found that standard met only after describing, in scrupulous detail, the overwhelming evidence supporting the conclusion that Storch falsely testified at Maxwell's trial² —attempting to manipulate the integrity of the judicial system as he did in numerous other cases. I agree with the Ninth Circuit's determination. But even to the extent that the dissent sees error in that determination, the Ninth Circuit conducted precisely the inquiry required by § 2254(d)(2) and our precedents. "The principal purpose of this Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law." Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 902, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Mere disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's highly factbound conclusion is, in my opinion, an insufficient basis for granting certiorari. See this Court's Rule 10.

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice ALITO joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) put an end to federal-district-court readjudication of issues already decided, with full due process of law, in state criminal cases. It provides that a writ of habeas corpus challenging a state criminal conviction shall not be granted with respect to any claim "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings," unless that state adjudication

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

"(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

We have called this a "difficult to meet ... and highly deferential standard" which "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). It forbids federal courts "to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts," Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010).

I believe that in this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unquestionably ignored these commands—thereby invalidating two 26–year–old murder convictions which the intervening loss of witnesses and evidence will likely make it impossible to retry. I dissent from the Court's decision not to grant certiorari and summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment.

I

In the late 1970's, 10 homeless men were murdered in downtown Los Angeles—a series of murders that came to be known as the "Skid Row Stabber" killings. Respondent Bobby Joe Maxwell was charged with all 10 murders, and in 1984 a California jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder and one related count of robbery. Maxwell was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.

In 1995, Maxwell filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, alleging that a prosecution witness, Sidney Storch, had given false testimony at trial. Storch, a former cellmate of Maxwell's, had testified that, after reading the newspaper account of a palm print's being found at the scene of one of the murders, Maxwell stated he was not prone to that type of mistake because he "wore gloves with the fingers cut off so as to keep his hands warm and leave his fingers free." 3 Record 537. The California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause whether Maxwell was entitled to relief based on his allegation of false testimony, returnable to the Superior Court. After conducting an evidentiary hearing that extended over the course of two years and included the testimony of more than 30 witnesses and the introduction of over 50 exhibits, the Superior Court issued a 34–page opinion concluding that Storch had not lied and denying the habeas petition.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 137. In 2001, Maxwell again filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, alleging, inter alia, that the State had violated his right to due process by failing to disclose certain evidence relating to Storch. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The court summarily denied the petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. 105.

Maxwell then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, renewing his claims that his conviction violated his right to due process because (1) it was based on the false testimony of Storch; and (2) the State failed to disclose favorable and material evidence regarding Storch. The District Court dismissed the petition, id ., at 47, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486 (2010).

II

A

First, the Ninth Circuit set aside the state habeas court's determination that Storch had not fabricated his testimony. It based that action on nothing more than circumstantial evidence indicating that Storch was generally an...