Casias v. People
Decision Date | 11 December 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 19950,19950 |
Citation | 367 P.2d 327,148 Colo. 544 |
Parties | Orlando L. CASIAS, Plaintiff in Error, v. PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Orlando L. Casias, pro se.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
On August 28, 1959 Casias was convicted by a jury of mayhem (C.R.S. '53, 40-2-24) and thereafter the same jury also determined that he had suffered two prior felony convictions. Pursuant to the Habitual Criminal Act (C.R.S. '53, 39-13-1 et seq.) the trial court adjudged Casias to be 'guilty of the crime of Mayhem--Habitual Criminal' and sentenced him to twenty-five to thirty years in the state penitentiary.
Subsequently, Casias filed a 'Motion for Re-sentencing' on the grounds that because of his age he had actually suffered only one felony conviction prior to his conviction for mayhem. Specifically, he alleged that in 1950, when he suffered a burglary conviction, he was only 20 years of age and that having theretofore suffered no prior felony conviction under the then existing laws relative to the sentencing of youthful offenders, he could only be sentenced to the state reformatory, and accordingly did not on that occasion suffer a 'felony' conviction. In support thereof Casias attached a certificate of baptism which established that he was born on January 14, 1929.
Acting in accord with Smalley v. People, 134 Colo. 360, 304 P.2d 902, the trial court on January 4, 1961 granted this motion, vacated the twenty-five to thirty year sentence and imposed a sentence of from ten to fifteen years in the state penitentiary.
On April 7, 1961 Casias filed a motion seeking to have the trial court vacate and set aside its sentence of January 4, 1961, contending that the trial court as of that date had no authority to impose a sentence for the mayhem conviction which had theretofore been returned on August 28, 1959. This motion to vacate was denied, as was Casias' subsequent motion for a new trial, and by the present writ of error he seeks reversal of the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment and sentence of ten to fifteen years in the state penitentiary.
Casias' argument runs as follows: (1) he was convicted of mayhem on August 28, 1959 and on that same date was determined to have suffered two prior felony convictions; (2) on August 28, 1959 he was not sentenced for his conviction of mayhem, but for being an 'habitual criminal'; (3) he was not thereafter sentenced on the mayhem charge for some 16 months, and, specifically, not until January 4, 1961 was he...
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...defense. An important consideration is the concept that the Habitual Criminal Act does not create a substantive crime. Casias v. People, 148 Colo. 544, 367 P.2d 327 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 862, 82 S.Ct. 952, 8 L.Ed.2d 20 (1963); Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P.2d 447 (1947). T......
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...consider a defendant's prior convictions in determining whether increased punishment is mandated under the statute. Casias v. People, 148 Colo. 544, 367 P.2d 327 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 862, 82 S.Ct. 952, 8 L.Ed.2d 20 (1962). Increased punishment can be imposed only when prior convic......
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