Castaneda v. Holcomb

• Citation: 170 Cal.Rptr. 875,114 Cal.App.3d 939
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 20 January 1981
• Parties: Robert CASTANEDA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. W. R. "Bob" HOLCOMB, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 23219.

Page 875

170 Cal.Rptr. 875

114 Cal.App.3d 939

Robert CASTANEDA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. W. R. "Bob" HOLCOMB, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 23219.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 20, 1981.

Hearing Denied March 25, 1981.

Taggart & Ziprick and Robert H. Ziprick, Bloomington, for defendant and appellant.

Ralph H. Prince, City Atty., and Robert W. Kelly, Deputy City Atty., for plaintiffs and respondents.

THE COURT. ^*

This is an appeal from a judgment in a declaratory relief action brought to construe a provision in the charter of the City of San Bernardino. Defendant W. R. "Bob" Holcomb contends that the court below did not construe the provision correctly.

At issue is section 31 of the charter, which provides: "No order, resolution or ordinance shall have effect without approval of the Mayor, except when five (5) members of the Common Council concur in its adoption. In case of orders, the approval of the Mayor shall be presumed unless at the same meeting at which the order is passed, the Mayor causes his disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to be spread upon the minutes. All resolutions and ordinances after passage must be submitted to the Mayor who shall, within five (5) days after he has received the same, endorse his approval or disapproval thereon, giving the reasons for his disapproval. Each ordinance or resolution to be valid must be passed by a vote of not less than four (4) councilmen and approval by the Mayor, provided that if the Mayor fails to approve the same it may be passed by a vote of not less than five (5) Councilmen, and shall take effect as if approved by the Mayor."

The dispute arose on March 12, 1979, when a certain resolution number 79-100 was adopted by the vote of five of the seven members of the council, who are the plaintiffs in the present proceeding. ¹ Defendant Holcomb, who was then mayor, disapproved the resolution. He has insisted that under section 31 of the charter the resolution thereby failed unless and until it is reconsidered and again passed by the vote of five members of the council. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that a resolution or ordinance passed initially by the vote of five council members does not require the mayor's approval to become effective and is not defeated by his disapproval.

Plaintiffs introduced evidence in the court below that their interpretation of section 31 is the one which city officials have followed during at least the past 25 years. That evidence included a declaration of the former city clerk stating that while she worked in the office of the city clerk, from July 1954 to September 1978, the city clerk always interpreted section 31 "to mean that an ordinance or resolution originally passed by five or more affirmative votes of the Common Council was not subject to disapproval of the Mayor." A declaration of the city attorney stated that his office had always interpreted section 31 in the same manner during his tenure as city attorney, from May 1959 to the present.

Plaintiffs also relied on an ordinance adopted in August 1978 by the affirmative vote of six members of the council (one member being absent) and approved by defendant in his capacity as mayor. The ordinance, number 3751, provides for "the processing and effective dates of resolutions and ordinances adopted by the legislative body and disapproved or not approved by the mayor pursuant to city charter section 31." Of interest to the present proceeding, the ordinance provides: "In the event the Mayor or the Mayor Pro Tempore disapproves or fails to either approve or disapprove the resolution or ordinance within the five day period, the resolution or ordinance shall be deemed to be validly enacted on the date of its adoption and conclusively presumed to have been approved, provided there were five or more affirmative votes adopting said resolution or ordinance.... At the next meeting of the Mayor and Common Council any resolution or ordinance adopted by only four affirmative votes which has been disapproved or neither approved nor disapproved within the five day period shall be considered by the Common Council for readoption...."

Rules of statutory interpretation are to be applied to charters. (Currieri v. City of Roseville (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 997, 1001, 84 Cal.Rptr. 615.) If the language of the provision is free of ambiguity, it must be given its plain meaning; rules of statutory construction are applied only where there is ambiguity or conflict in the provisions of the charter or statute, or a literal interpretation would lead to absurd consequences. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1858; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014; In re Andrews (1976) 18 Cal.3d 208, 212, 133 Cal.Rptr. 365, 555 P.2d 97; Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 372, 155 Cal.Rptr. 213; Teachers Management & Inv. Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 438, 446, 134 Cal.Rptr. 523.)

Plaintiffs rely heavily on the following sentence in section 31: "No order, resolution or ordinance shall have effect without approval of the Mayor, except when five (5) members of the Common Council concur in its adoption." Viewed in isolation, the provision is very favorable to plaintiffs. It states that a measure not approved by the mayor is effective when adopted by a vote of five. Using the term "adopt" rather than "readopt" and making no reference to reconsideration, the sentence implies that a measure initially passed by a vote of five is effective regardless of the mayor's approval or disapproval.

Defendant relies on the third and fourth sentences of the same paragraph: "All resolutions and ordinances after passage must be submitted to the Mayor (for approval or disapproval). Each ordinance or resolution to be valid must be passed by a vote of not less than four (4) councilmen and approval by the Mayor, provided that if the Mayor fails to approve the same it may be passed by a vote of not less than five (5) Councilmen, and shall take effect as if approved by the Mayor."

Defendant argues that if an ordinance or resolution passed by a vote of five was not subject to the mayor's disapproval, there would be no need to submit such measures to the mayor for approval or disapproval. As section 31 clearly states that all resolutions and ordinances must be submitted to the mayor, this must mean that disapproval is effective even when the measure initially received five votes. Defendant argues that the last sentence describes the procedure for reconsideration of a measure disapproved by the mayor. If, as plaintiffs contend, this procedure applied only to measures passed by a vote of four, defendant argues, the sentence would have indicated this limitation. Instead, the introductory clause refers to all resolutions and ordinances passed by a vote of "not less than four."

Each side, of course, proposes rebuttals to the arguments raised by the other side.

Defendant argues that the first sentence is merely introductory and is clarified by the later provisions, that the first sentence makes no explicit reference to whether the vote of five precedes or follows the mayor's disapproval, and that the sentence is awkward because it tries to summarize in one sentence the rules for orders, on the one hand, and resolutions and ordinances, on the other, which are quite different. Also, it could be argued that the use of the word "adopt" rather than "pass" was deliberate, referring to the final act required to enact a valid measure.

Plaintiffs argue that the mayor's disapproval, supported by a written statement of reasons, serves an important function even when it does not prevent a measure passed by more than four votes from becoming effective. The disapproval may cause the council on its own...