Castillo-Salgado v. State
| Decision Date | 30 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 07-12-00393-CR,07-12-00393-CR |
| Parties | RAMON CASTILLO-SALGADO, A/K/A RAMON CASTILLO, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 69th District Court Moore County, Texas
Trial Court No. 4682, Honorable Ron Enns, Presiding
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant Ramon Castillo-Salgado a/k/a Ramon Castillo appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child1 and resulting prison sentence of fifteen years. Through one issue he complains of trial court rulings pertaining to his attempts to impeach the child's mother as a witness. We will affirm.
Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, we will recite only those background facts necessary for the disposition of the appeal.
Appellant was indicted and tried by jury on the charge of sexually assaulting S.O., a child younger than age fourteen. P.O.C. is the mother of S.O. and the wife of appellant. Appellant is not the father of S.O.
P.O.C. was not the outcry witness, but she was a witness for the State. During trial, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, appellant's counsel asked P.O.C., "were you convicted of an offense in the state of Oklahoma?" She replied, "No, I wasn't." P.O.C., who appeared without counsel, speaks broken English. Her exchange with defense counsel continued. P.O.C. stated,
After some discussion among defense counsel, the prosecutor and the court, defense counsel continued his examination of P.O.C. He asked her if she had obtained a "false birth certificate." At the State's request, the court then admonished P.O.C. of her Fifth Amendment rights. This was done directly and through an interpreter. Defense counsel continued his questioning, asking P.O.C. again about a false birth certificate, then asking her if she had "driver's licenses from more than one state." She denied having either. When counsel asked her if she had "driver's licenses in names other than your own showing your birth date," P.O.C. invoked her Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer. With that, the proceeding recessed for the day.
The next morning, the hearing outside the presence of the jury resumed. Defense counsel put to P.O.C. the question, "[In February or March 2006], were there charges filed against you in Guymon, Oklahoma?" When P.O.C. did not respond directly, defense counsel requested that the court instruct her to answer. The court responded by reminding P.O.C. of its prior admonition that she could refuse to answer a question. She refused to answer.
Continuing the effort to impeach P.O.C., defense counsel sought admission of a printout from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) pertaining to P.O.C. The State objected on hearsay grounds. The court allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof of the substance of the report, and that was dictated into the record. The printout does not appear in the record. The court then sustained the State's objection finding the NCIC report "not admissible before the jury at this time." The jury returned and trial resumed.
Appellant was convicted and sentenced as noted. This appeal followed.
Appellant presents one issue consisting of two subparts. First, he argues P.O.C. has a prior felony conviction and the trial court erred by allowing her to avoid answering questions concerning her conviction by asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Second, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him the opportunity to impeach P.O.C. on her alleged criminal conduct reported in the NCIC printout.
We review the decision of a trial court permitting a witness to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 856 (8th Cir. 2003).
The Fifth Amendment states in part, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Walters v. State, 359 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Fifth Amendment privilege is not limited to the defendant in a criminal trial. A witness is privileged not to answer official questions "in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate [her] in future criminal proceedings." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973)). This privilege covers not only "answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant." Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (2001) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)).
To permit exercise of the privilege "[i]t need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87; see Grayson v. State, 684 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) ().
We cannot agree that the record, closely read, supports appellant's contention the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to question P.O.C. about a previous felony conviction through improperly permitting her to refuse to answer. As we have noted in our recitation of the events at trial, the trial court admonished P.O.C. about her Fifth Amendment rights when appellant began to ask about her possession of a false birth certificate and multiple driver's licenses. Appellant does not deny that P.O.C.'s knowing possession of such items would potentially be incriminating, and thus properly the subjects of Fifth Amendment exercise.2 The only occasion on which appellant sought a ruling from the trial court regarding P.O.C.'s refusal to answer occurred on the morning of the resumption of the hearing outside the jury's presence when, as we have recited, appellant asked the court to instruct P.O.C. to answer his question regarding "charges filed against" her in 2006 in Guymon, Oklahoma. P.O.C. and other courtroom participants may have understood at that time that defense counsel was inquiring about her felony conviction when he asked about "charges filed against" P.O.C., but it is not clear to us that the trial court necessarily would have so understood his question. Counsel's following questions to P.O.C. do inquire about a conviction, but he did not seek the trial court's assistance to require P.O.C. to respond to those questions.Counsel shortly turned to an effort to introduce the NCIC report. Having carefully reviewed the record, we are unable to see an abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of counsel's questioning of P.O.C. regarding a prior felony conviction.3
We review the ruling of a trial court on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). There is no abuse of discretion if the ruling finds reasonable support in the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Id.
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the...
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