Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury

• Decision Date: 24 June 1955
• Citation: 208 Misc. 35,142 N.Y.S.2d 432
• Parties: Application of CASTLE HILL BEACH CLUB, Inc., Petitioner, v. Ward B. ARBURY, Elmer A. Carter, J. Edward Conway, Nicholas H. Pinto and Caroline K. Simon, constituting the Chairman and Members of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 432

142 N.Y.S.2d 432

208 Misc. 35

Application of CASTLE HILL BEACH CLUB, Inc., Petitioner, v. Ward B. ARBURY, Elmer A. Carter, J. Edward Conway, Nicholas H. Pinto and Caroline K. Simon, constituting the Chairman and Members of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County, Part I.

June 24, 1955.

Power & Hopkins, New York City (Walter J. Hopkins, and John T. Power, New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.

Henry Spitz, New York City (Solomon J. Heifetz and Henry Spitz, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

MARTIN M. FRANK, Justice.

From the oral argument, it appears that this is the first cause under the Executive Law of the State, Art. 15, involving discrimination in places of public accommodation to be brought into the courts of this state. (For convenience, Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc., the respondent before the Commission, will be referred to as the 'petitioner.')

Two applications are under consideration, one by the petitioner, moving to review and annul an order of the 'State Commission Against Discrimination,' the other by the Commission, seeking to enforce its order dated December 28, 1954.

The petition of the Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc., submitted in support of its prayer for relief alleges in substance: (1) that it was deprived of a fair hearing; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge and to support the findings made; (3) that it is a 'place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private', § 292, subd. 9, Executive Law, and therefore not subject to a Commission order; (4) that as a membership corporation it is not under the jurisdiction of and is immune from regulation by the Commission.

The proceeding before the Commission was initiated upon a complaint made by Mrs. Annetta Brown, a Negro lady, who charged that on Tuesday, March 31, 1953, when applying for a season locker at the premises operated by the petitioner, she was told that none was available, whereas a white lady making the same request at the same time was accepted and assigned a bathhouse.

Mrs. Brown's complaint was processed in accordance with the provisions of the Executive Law, § 297, and the regulations adopted by the Commission. Commissioner Caroline K. Simon was designated to make the investigation. Upon her finding that probable cause existed, efforts were made by 'conference, conciliation and persuasion' to eliminate the alleged objectionable procedure. These failed.

Thereafter and beginning on December 14, 1953, hearings were held on eight separate days before Commissioners Arbury, Carter and Pinto, sitting in banc. All parties appeared by counsel and full opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses was extended. Although the Commission is not bound by the 'strict rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity', § 297, Exec. Law, adherence to such rules was substantially observed. Proof not clearly admissible under the rules of evidence as applied in our courts was excluded.

After due consideration, a decision was rendered. Two Commissioners (Arbury, Carter) found that the petitioner was guilty of unlawful discriminatory practices in a place of public accommodation. One Commissioner (Pinto) dissented. A 'cease and desist' order was issued, in which the petitioner was directed to comply with detailed provisions for the operation of its premises. Objection is made to the order in toto.

At the outset, it must be noted that the record overwhelmingly establishes that Mrs. Brown was excluded from the premises in question because of her color. The findings in that regard (F. 148, 145, 144) are supported not only by her testimony and that of the Commission investigator, but by admissions made by the officers and representatives of the petitioner (T. pp. 134-6, 444, 460, 787, 790). It is significant, too, that no Negro has ever been permitted to use the facilities of this place in all the years of its existence. No corporate by-law or resolution specifically provides for the exclusion of Negroes. However, the course of conduct of the officers, directors, and permanent members through the several years of the petitioner's existence, justifies the Commission's conclusion that the practice of excluding persons because of color was the act of the petitioner. The corporation cannot disavow a course of conduct or responsibility for it because it was not authorized by formal resolution. In re International Workers Order, Inc., 199 Misc. 941, 106 N.Y.S.2d 953, 975, affirmed 280 App.Div. 517, 113 N.Y.S.2d 755; Id., 305 N.Y. 258, 112 N.E.2d 280, certiorari denied 346 U.S. 857, 74 S.Ct. 68, 98 L.Ed. 371; People v. Hudson Valley Construction Co., 217 N.Y. 172, 111 N.E. 472; Movietime, Inc., v. New York Telephone Co., 277 App.Div. 1057, 101 N.Y.S.2d 71.

It should be noted that the dissent of Commissioner Pinto was based, not upon a lack of proof with respect to the charge that Mrs. Brown was excluded from the premises because of her color, but solely upon the ground that the record fails to establish that the premises were being operated as 'a place of public accommodation.'

Preliminarily it was urged by the petitioner that, unlike the established law in Article 78 proceedings concerning other quasi-judicial administrative agencies, this court may substitute its own findings for those of the Commission, should it reach a different conclusion based upon the record. The petitioner is in error in that regard. The Court of Appeals, Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, at page 44, 119 N.E.2d 581, at page 584, in a review of a proceeding before the State Commission Against Discrimination, held that:

'Judicial review of findings made by an administrative agency such as this commission is, of course, limited to the question whether the findings are, upon the entire record, supported by evidence 'so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably.' Stock Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 273, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255; see, also, McCormack v. National City Bank of New York, 303 N.Y. 5, 9, 99 N.E.2d 887, 888; Humphrey v. State Ins. Fund, 298 N.Y. 327, 332, 83 N.E.2d 539, 541.'

Since the court holds that a full and fair hearing was accorded the petitioner and that the fact of its discriminatory practice was fully established, only two questions remain: first, are the premises occupied by the petitioner a place of public accommodation; second, does the fact that petitioner was organized as a membership corporation exempt it from the provisions of the Civil Rights and Executive Laws?

The premises in question are 16 acres in size. There are 3,780 bathhouses, 2 swimming pools each 200 feet long and 75 feet wide, and a children's swimming pool one acre in area. There are 32 one-wall handball courts, 4 four-wall handball courts, and a basketball court; all of these have stands for spectators. In addition, 10 wall tennis courts, 6 softball courts and 12 ping-pong tables are provided. A section is set aside for beach chairs. A covered picnic area with tables, a large grass-covered lounge space, and a number of sand lots for use by children are included. The premises are equipped with hot and cold showers, and a first aid station with at least one nurse in attendance. The cafeteria accommodates 300 people. There are 2 soda fountains, and a bar 40 feet long where beer and soft drinks are dispensed. Two parking lots are operated in conjunction with the premises.

The petitioner does not dispute that 13,000 holders of seasonal cards can be accommodated. It asserts that this total includes 5,500 children. Furthermore, 10,000 people are admitted annually as guests of the regular patrons.

The foregoing description amply demonstrates that there are provided not one but many of the facilities included in the definition of 'A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement', Civil Rights Law, § 40, against which the State Commission is given the authority to take action in a proper case.

The record discloses that from 1928 through 1950, Castle Hill Estate, Inc., a stock corporation, owned the premises which it operated as a commercial enterprise and as a place of public accommodation, resort and amusement. Concededly, it was not at that time a place of accommodation in its nature strictly private.

From 1928 through 1945, Sayers Brothers were the attorneys for the above-named corporation. During the years 1945 through 1951, William L. Sayers and members of his family owned all the stock of Castle Hill Estate, Inc. and were the controlling officers and directors of the corporation. In 1951, Bronx-City Island Realty Corporation, a new stock corporation, was organized and the title to the property transferred to it by Castle Hill Estate, Inc., with the same group retaining ownership and control. It was admitted, 'they own everything--lock, stock and barrel'. On or about September 28, 1950, a certificate of incorporation for a membership corporation (the petitioner) was prepared by the office of William L. Sayers and submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. About a month later, a lease was executed by the Castle Hill Estate, Inc. (completely controlled by the Sayers family) as landlord, with petitioner as tenant. It provided for alternative methods of rental payments at the option of the landlord. Pursuant to its terms, the landlord received as rent the full amount of the petitioner's receipts less operating expenses and taxes. The landlord had the right to approve all checks, drafts or other orders drawn on the funds of Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. on deposit with any bank. To effectuate this, two of four authorized...