Castle v. Irwin

• Citation: 25 Haw. 786
• Decision Date: 25 February 1921
• Docket Number: No. 1303.,1303.
• Parties: WILLIAM R. CASTLE, LORRIN A. THURSTON AND ALFRED L. CASTLE, TRUSTEES UNDER THE WILL OF JAMES B. CASTLE, DECEASED, v. HARRY IRWIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, TITUS M. COAN OF NEW YORK, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND HAROLD K. L. CASTLE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Hawai'i

25 Haw. 786

WILLIAM R. CASTLE, LORRIN A. THURSTON AND ALFRED L. CASTLE, TRUSTEES UNDER THE WILL OF JAMES B. CASTLE, DECEASED,

v.HARRY IRWIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, TITUS M. COAN OF NEW YORK, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND HAROLD K. L. CASTLE.

No. 1303.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued February 9, 10, 12, 1921.

Decided February 25, 1921.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAPPEAL FROM CIRCUIT JUDGE FIRST CIRCUIT. HON. J. J. BANKS, JUDGE.

Syllabus by the Court

It is elementary that where a party to a suit does not appeal from the decree entered therein he must be held to acquiesce in it and cannot be permitted to ride into an appellate court upon the appeal of another party to the suit, except that under certain circumstances not existing in this cause a nonappealing party may be heard in the appellate court on the appeal of another by virtue of Act 45 S. L. 1919.

It is the general rule that executors, administrators and trustees are in their official capacity indifferent persons as between the real parties in interest and they cannot litigate the interest of one of such parties as against the other at the expense of the estate.

A party to a suit cannot appeal from a judgment or decree if he is not thereby affected. While section 2508 R. L. 1915 is extremely broad it requires that the appellant in order to entitle him to prosecute an appeal must be aggrieved by the judgment or decree complained of.

A. Withington and A. L. Castle ( Robertson, Castle & Olson on the brief) for petitioners.

Marguerite K. Ashford for respondent Titus M. Coan.

R. B. Anderson and U. E. Wild ( Frear, Prosser, Anderson & Marx on the brief) for respondent H. K. L. Castle.

COKE, C. J., KEMP AND EDINGS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY COKE, C. J.

James B. Castle, late of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, died intestate at Honolulu in April 1918 leaving an estate of the approximate value of $500,000. His will was thereafter duly admitted to probate. By the terms of the will Julia White Castle, his widow, was provided a substantial annuity and upon her death an annual income of not less than $5000 nor more than $40,000 was to be paid to Harold K. L. Castle, the son of the deceased, and an annuity of $600 was directed to be paid to Titus M. Coan, a resident of New York City. The will provides that after these requirements have been satisfied the income from the estate is to be devoted to establishing and maintaining a coeducational boarding school. The widow waived her rights under the will and elected to take dower and is not now interested in the residue of the estate. The son Harold K. L. Castle has entered into an agreement with the trustees of the estate by which he is to be paid a lump sum of money in lieu of all interest which he may have in the estate. The amount to be paid under this agreement depends upon whether or not the annuity provided for Harold under the will has been accelerated by reason of the election of his mother to take dower. That is to say, if acceleration has taken place, he will receive under the compromise agreement the sum of $183,165.53, and if acceleration has not taken place he will receive $103,235.68.

In order to obtain a judicial approval of this compromise agreement and further to have a construction of certain provisions of the will of Mr. Castle the trustees instituted a suit in equity in the court below, the respondents being Harry Irwin, Esq., attorney general of the Territory, representing the public interests involved in the estate; Titus M. Coan, the annuitant, and Harold K. L. Castle, the son of the decedent. At the conclusion of the hearing a decree was entered by the judge of the circuit court sitting in equity approving the compromise agreement between the trustees and Harold K. L. Castle, and it was by said decree held that Harold K. L. Castle's annuity was accelerated by the election of said Julia White Castle, widow of testator, to take dower in the estate of the testator and that the said trustees should therefore pay to said Harold K. L. Castle the sum of $183,165.53 under said compromise agreement in full settlement of all his rights and interests in said estate. From this decree Titus M. Coan, the annuitant, through his counsel has perfected an appeal to this court. Upon this appeal of the respondent Coan the trustees by their counsel have assumed the right to appear in opposition to the decree appealed from. Counsel for Harold K. L. Castle urged that the decree should be sustained. The attorney general of the Territory has made no appearance except to communicate to the court his approval of the decree entered by the court below. At the argument it was suggested by the court that the trustees not having appealed from the decree below are not entitled to be heard and that as it appears from the record that the interests of Titus M. Coan are not and cannot be jeopardized to any substantial extent by reason of the decree he should not be heard to complain of it.

After argument upon the questions thus presented we conclude that the trustees have no right to be heard. This same question was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 329, where because the executors had taken no appeal from the decree the court said: “We are of the opinion that counsel for the executors had no right to appear and be heard against the decree, no appeal having been taken from it by his clients.” We think it is elementary that where a party to a suit does not appeal from the decree entered therein he must be held to acquiesce in it and cannot be permitted to ride into an appellate court upon the appeal of some other party to the suit, except that under certain circumstances not existing in this cause a nonappealing party may be heard in the appellate court on the appeal of another by virtue of act 45 S. L. 1919.

Counsel for the trustees have moved the court for permission to perfect their appeal and have filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directing the clerk of the court below to transmit here “the appeal and notice of appeal of said petitioners filed in said circuit court November 26th, 1920.” Mr. Withington, of counsel for the trustees, stated at the outset of his argument that the trustees had not appealed from the decree of the court below because their position being neutral they had no appealable interest in the controversy. While not deciding the question we are free to say that there appears to be much force in counsels' position for it is the general rule that executors, administrators and trustees are in their official capacity indifferent persons as between the real parties in interest. The funds which come into their hands are held in custodia legis to be distributed by the court to those who show themselves entitled to them and it is their duty to...