State by Price v. Magoon

• Decision Date: 31 August 1982
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, by its Attorney General, Warren PRICE, III, Plaintiff-Appellant/Appellee, v. John Henry MAGOON, Jr., Trustee under that certain unrecorded Declaration of Trust dated
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 712

858 P.2d 712

75 Haw. 164

STATE of Hawaii, by its Attorney General, Warren PRICE, III, Plaintiff-Appellant/Appellee, v. John Henry MAGOON, Jr., Trustee under that certain

unrecorded Declaration of Trust dated August 31, 1982, made

by John Henry Magoon, Jr., as settlor,

Defendant-Appellant/Appellee, and Richard R. Kelley, Trustee

under unrecorded agreement dated January 20, 1984, known as

"Richard R. Kelley Living Trust," as amended by restatement

dated August 7, 1985, Defendant-Appellant/Appellee, and

Diamond Head Road Development Corp., a Hawaii corporation,

Defendant-Appellant/Appellee.

No. 15277.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 19, 1993.

As Amended Sept. 7, 1993.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 30, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. This court reviews an order of summary judgment under the same standard applied by the circuit court. On appeal, we must determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party clearly demonstrates it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.

3. It is well settled that courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found that will give force to and preserve all words of the statute.

4. Even absent statutory ambiguity, departure from literal construction is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction in the particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.

5. In reviewing a land court decree, an appellate court is not limited to reviewing the decree, but should review the land court's written decision and the entire record to determine the binding effect on the parties in accordance with the mandate of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 501-53.

6. Under the rule of stare decisis, where a legal principle has been passed upon by the court of last resort, it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision, without regard to their view as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment. Stare decisis relates to the effect of legal propositions announced in prior adjudications upon subsequent actions that involve similar questions between strangers to the proceedings in which the adjudications were made.

7. It is elementary that where a party to a suit does not appeal from the decree entered therein, he or she must be held to acquiesce in it.

8. The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and to provide a limit to litigation. It serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. The res judicata doctrine thus furthers the interests of litigants, the judicial system, and society by bringing an end to litigation where matters have already been tried and decided on the merits. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public policy, and private peace.

The doctrine therefore permits every litigant to have an opportunity to try his or her case on the merits; but it also requires that he or she be limited to one such opportunity. Unsatisfied litigants have a remedy: they may appeal through available channels. But they may not, even if the first suit may appear to have been decided wrongly, file new suits.

9. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction (1) is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and (2) precludes the relitigation, not only of the claims that were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense that might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.

10. In deciding whether res judicata applies, three questions must be answered in the affirmative: First, was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? Second, was there a final judgment on the merits? And third, was the party against whom the plea of res judicata is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?

11. It is elementary that an appellant must furnish to the appellate court a sufficient record to show positively the alleged error.

Steven S. Michaels (Dona L. Hanaike and Johnson H. Wong, on the briefs), Deputy Attys. Gen., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant/appellee State of Hawaii.

Clinton R. Ashford, Ashford & Wriston (Robert B. Graham and Charles A. Price, with him on the briefs), Honolulu, for defendant-appellant/appellee John Henry Magoon, Jr., Trustee.

Donald E. Scearce, Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant/appellee Richard R. Kelley, Trustee.

James M. Sattler, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant/appellee 3787 Diamond Head Road Development Corp.

Before MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND RAMIL, JJ., and Circuit Judge YIM, In Place of KLEIN, J., Recused.

MOON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant/appellee State of Hawaii (State) commenced an ejectment action against three landowners--defendants-appellants/appellees John Henry Magoon, Jr. (Magoon), Richard R. Kelley (Kelley), and 3787 Diamond Head Road Development Corporation (DHRDC) (collectively landowners)--alleging ownership of six parcels of real property located along a strip of land in Kaalawai, Oahu, adjacent to the sea below Diamond Head. These parcels, identified as parcel Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 13, to which the landowners also claim ownership and which they have occupied for years, are makai of and abut their respective registered residential lots.

The State and each of the three landowners filed motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment--the State claiming ownership of all of the parcels in issue, Magoon and DHRDC claiming ownership of parcels 2 and 13, respectively, and Kelley claiming ownership of parcels 4, 6, and 8. Kelley also moved the court for an order that he was not precluded from relitigating the ownership of parcel 5. ¹

Pursuant to the circuit court's certification of interlocutory appeals, the State now appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding parcels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 13. Magoon and DHRDC appeal the denial of their motions for partial summary judgment regarding parcels 2 and 13, respectively. Finally, Kelley appeals the circuit court's (a) denial of his summary judgment motion for parcels 4, 6, and 8, (b) grant of the State's summary judgment motion regarding parcel 5, (c) denial of his motion for an order permitting the relitigation of the title to parcel 5, and (d) the judgment vesting title to parcel 5 with the State.

We conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in denying Magoon's, DHRDC's, and Kelley's motions regarding parcels 2, 13, and 4, 6, and 8, respectively. We also conclude that the circuit court correctly (1) denied the State's motion for summary judgment regarding parcels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 13, (2) denied Kelley's motion for an order permitting relitigation of title to parcel 5, and (3) granted the State's summary judgment motion regarding parcel 5.

I. FACTS

A. Historical Background

During the Great Mahele of 1848, King William Charles Lunalilo was granted real property consisting of the Iliaina of Kapahulu, affirmed by Land Commission Award 8559-B, Apana 32. Upon his death, this land was devised to the Trustees of the Lunalilo Estate (Trustees). The Trustees sought to lease the land; however, in 1881, this court interpreted the King's will and determined that the Trustees had no power to do so and ordered its sale. See Matter of Estate of Lunalilo, 4 Haw. 381 (1881).

Prior to the sale, the Trustees subdivided the Lunalilo property into two major units--parcels labeled Lots 1 [75 Haw. 169] through 37, and parcels labeled Lots A through I. Lots A through I make up the original Kaalawai subdivision and are situated near the sea below Diamond Head. Located between Lots A through G and the ocean is a strip of land (the strip) bearing no designation. Parcels 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 13 are part of this strip. (See diagram below.)

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The Trustees sold Lot 36 to the Territory of Hawaii in 1884, but the original Kaalawai subdivision was not included in the sale. The following year, Lots A through I were conveyed to various private purchasers: (1) Lots A and B to W. James Smith; (2) Lots C and D to J.R. Walker; (3) Lot E to Likelike Cleghorn; (4) Lots F and G to Antone Rosa; and (5) Lots H and I to W.A. Widemann. ²

B. Land Court Applications, Decisions, and Decrees

On January 28, 1959, the Trustees filed Land Court Application No. 1767 (Lunalilo Application) to register fee simple absolute title to the strip. Landowners adjoining the strip opposed the Lunalilo Application and asserted ownership to the particular parcels of land abutting their respective Lots A through I based on the 1885 deeds to the original grantees and claims of adverse possession.

The State also opposed the Lunalilo Application and claimed ownership to the disputed area. The State asserted that:

(1) The fee simple ownership of the [strip] was never conveyed to the [Trustees] because the land was not included within the boundaries of the Iliaina of Kapahulu; (2) The fee simple ownership of the [strip] was never conveyed to the Trustees because it was a public road prior to the Land Commission Award to Lunalilo, and an award in name only does not pass title to an existing...