Castracane v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 05 December 2002 |
| Citation | 300 A.D.2d 704,751 N.Y.S.2d 121 |
| Parties | PAUL J. CASTRACANE, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>MEGHAN M. CAMPBELL et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Plaintiff commenced this negligence action to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when the bicycle he was riding was struck by a vehicle operated by defendant Meghan M. Campbell (hereinafter defendant) and owned by her father, defendant V.P. Campbell Jr. Following a trial where the relevant events were disputed, a jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's subsequent motion to set aside the verdict and judgment was entered. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.
In 1998, plaintiff was romantically involved with defendant's sister, Erin Mislak. At trial, Mislak testified that by May 1998 there were problems in their relationship, that in early July 1998 she told plaintiff she wanted to end the relationship, and that she ultimately did end it sometime in November of that year. According to the trial testimony of Mislak and other witnesses, prior to July 13, 1998, plaintiff had engaged in harassing behavior against Mislak such as repeatedly calling her home, preventing Mislak from leaving by standing in front of or in back of her car or sitting on the hood of her car and, on one occasion, causing a scene by sobbing and yelling in her parents' front yard. Plaintiff denied most of this conduct at trial, as well as the fact that Mislak told plaintiff that she wanted to break off their relationship in early July.
According to defendant, on July 13, 1998, defendant and Mislak were in their father's vehicle on Verner Road in the Town of Colonie, Albany County, proceeding toward Route 9, when she saw plaintiff from approximately 100 feet away riding his bicycle along the side of the road. Defendant testified that, when her car was only 5 to 10 feet away, plaintiff began to cross the road while yelling, "Erin, stop," at which point defendant braked and swerved to miss him, unsure whether the car made any contact with him or the bicycle. In contrast, plaintiff testified that he had started to cross the road when defendant's vehicle was 100 feet away and it struck him and ran over both of his feet without slowing down.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that Supreme Court erred in permitting testimony regarding his prior, harassing conduct, requiring a new trial. "A general rule of evidence, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, is that it is improper to prove that a person did an act on a particular occasion by showing that he [or she] did a similar act on a different, unrelated occasion" (Matter of Brandon, 55 NY2d 206, 210-211 [citation omitted]). "However, evidence of such similar acts committed in the past is relevant to prove, inter alia, intent or the absence of mistake" (Davis v Solondz, 122 AD2d 401, 402 [citation omitted]). Here, the evidence of plaintiff's prior harassing behavior is relevant to support defendants' theory that plaintiff intentionally put himself in harm's way, and was thus admissible to demonstrate his intent and motive (see Dlugosz v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 132 AD2d 903, 904, lv denied 70 NY2d 612; Davis v Solondz, supra). Our review of the record, moreover, indicates that the court carefully balanced the probative value of the evidence of plaintiff's prior conduct as it pertained to the defense position that plaintiff intentionally darted out in front of the vehicle, against the potential prejudice to plaintiff, disallowing certain testimony and appropriately limiting the permitted testimony where necessary. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the...
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...Thus, the factual situation in Carter differs from the one present here. See id . at 1289–90 ; cf. Castracane v. Campbell, 300 A.D.2d 704, 751 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122–24 (2002) (Assumption of the risk instruction was proper where there was evidence that the plaintiff saw the defendant's vehicle a......
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...years before trial. Thus, there could have been no surprise or prejudice warranting the preclusion (see Castracane v. Campbell , 300 A.D.2d 704, 706, 751 N.Y.S.2d 121 [3d Dept. 2002] ; see also Palomo v. 175th St. Realty Corp. , 101 A.D.3d 579, 957 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1st Dept. 2012] ). While the ......
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In re Thompson
... ... evidence of similar acts committed in the past are relevant ... to prove intent or the absence of mistake. (See ... Castracane v Campbell, 300 A.D.2d 704 [3d Dept ... 2002]; and similar acts committed in the past may also ... present evidence of a common scheme or plan ... ...
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Table of cases
...62-25 30th Avenue Realty Co., LLC, 74 A.D.3d 1116, 904 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dept. 2010), §§ 8:10, 10:20, 15:20, 15:110 Castracane v. Castro, 300 A.D.2d 704, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (3d Dept. 2002), § 8:20 Catalan v. Empire Storage Warehouse, Inc., 213 A.D.2d 366, 623 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2d Dept. 1995), § 1......
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Character & habit
...is admissible provided the proof demonstrates a suicient number of instances involving the conduct in question. Castracane v. Castro , 300 A.D.2d 704, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (3d Dept. 2002). In personal injury action, evidence of plaintif ’s prior harassing conduct toward defendant’s sister was ......
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Character & habit
...is admissible provided the proof demonstrates a suicient number of instances involving the conduct in question. Castracane v. Castro , 300 A.D.2d 704, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (3d Dept. 2002). In personal injury action, evidence of plaintif ’s prior harassing conduct toward defendant’s sister was ......
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Character & habit
...is admissible provided the proof demonstrates a sufficient number of instances involving the conduct in question. Castracane v. Castro, 300 A.D.2d 704, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (3d Dept. 2002). In personal injury action, evidence of plaintiff’s prior harassing conduct toward defendant’s sister was......