Onilude v. City of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 12 December 2019
• Docket Number: 10540-10540A-10540B,Index 309622/09
• Citation: 115 N.Y.S.3d 272,178 A.D.3d 499
• Parties: Tokunbo ONILUDE, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

178 A.D.3d 499

115 N.Y.S.3d 272

Tokunbo ONILUDE, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Appellants.

10540-10540A-10540B

Index 309622/09

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

ENTERED: DECEMBER 12, 2019

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Diana Lawless of counsel), for appellants.

Sivin & Miller, LLP, New York (Edward Sivin of counsel), for respondent.

Gische J.P., Mazzarelli, Gesmer, Moulton, JJ.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered on or about April 6, 2018, upon a jury verdict, in favor of plaintiff, and judgment, same court and Justice, entered on or about January 14, 2019, awarding plaintiff attorneys' fees, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, the judgments vacated, and the matter remanded for a new trial before a different judge. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered on or about January 9, 2019, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the April 6, 2018 judgment.

The trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding testimony from the witness who identified plaintiff to the police as an individual she had seen fleeing the scene of a crime. Defendants satisfied their discovery obligation by providing the witness's last known address and telephone number during discovery, more than four years before trial. Thus, there could have been no surprise or prejudice warranting the preclusion (see Castracane v. Campbell , 300 A.D.2d 704, 706, 751 N.Y.S.2d 121 [3d Dept. 2002] ; see also Palomo v. 175th St. Realty Corp. , 101 A.D.3d 579, 957 N.Y.S.2d 49 [1st Dept. 2012] ). While the witness subsequently moved, she declined to disclose her new address to any parties to the suit, a factor defendants could not control (see Todres v. W7879, LLC 137 A.D.3d 597, 26 N.Y.S.3d 698 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 910, 2016 WL 7364805 [2016] ). As defendants did not know her new address, they had no obligation under CPLR 3101(h). Nor should defendants have been sanctioned for the fact that the witness did not wish to discuss the case with plaintiff's counsel when counsel called her. Notably, plaintiff's counsel did not attempt to contact the witness until two months before trial and did not attempt to obtain a nonparty deposition of the witness during discovery. Defendant offered to have the witness further confirm these facts, under oath and outside the presence of the jury. Under these circumstances, the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in ordering a hearing at which defendants' trial attorney would be subject to questioning by plaintiff's trial attorney, and precluding the witness's testimony when defense counsel declined to participate in such a hearing. Given that the witness would have offered highly relevant and non-cumulative trial testimony, the error was not harmless (see Cotter v. Mercedes–Benz Manhattan , 108 A.D.2d 173, 179, 488 N.Y.S.2d 390 [1st Dept. 1985] ; Kajoshaj v. Greenspan , 88 A.D.2d 538, 450 N.Y.S.2d 311 [1st Dept. 1982] ).

It was error to include on the special verdict sheet a questions as to a wrongful stop ( Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 [1968] ), because there was no charge given instructing the jury on the legal standard that must be applied in resolving those claims. The jury was never told that a stop is improper if the detaining officer does not have "reasonable suspicion" that the detainee committed a crime, which is less...