Castrillon v. State
| Decision Date | 05 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D01-872.,5D01-872. |
| Parties | Gonzalo CASTRILLON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Marvin F. Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Castrillon appeals his sentence after he was convicted of attempted second degree murder1 and burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery with a weapon.2 He argues that an amended administrative order of the circuit court violates his due process rights with respect to notice, and that the circuit court has no authority to create a Collections Program. We affirm the sentence.
Castrillon was sentenced to two concurrent ten year prison terms, followed by five years probation. His sentence orders him to report to the Clerk of Courts Collections Division for a status hearing within thirty days of his release from prison; to comply with all conditions of the Collections court; to submit blood specimens for DNA analysis; and to have no contact with the victim. Financial obligations were also imposed: he was ordered to pay restitution (to be determined), $278 in costs, $1,244 in prosecution costs, and counsel fees of $1,000. Further, he was ordered to:
[R]eport to the Clerk of Courts Collections Division at 425 N. Orange Ave., Room 460 to be scheduled for a status hearing within thirty days of release.
The Amended Administrative Order (Amended Order), which created the Collection Program was adopted pursuant to section 938.30, entitled "Court-imposed financial obligations, supplementary proceedings." It sets forth methods to recover, by way of supplementary proceedings, financial obligations imposed by courts in criminal cases at sentencing. It applies to "any person who has been ordered to pay any financial obligation in any criminal case." As it applied to Castrillon, it places him in a Collections Program (the Program) because the fines and costs imposed at sentencing could not be paid in full at that time, or within 120 days. This order was amended after an earlier order was found improper because it denied trial judges the discretionary authority provided to them in section 938.30. See Blackiston v. State, 772 So.2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
. The amended order has addressed and cured the Blackiston problem.
Section 938.30(2) contemplates that a defendant will be examined by the court at the time he or she is called upon to pay costs and fees. Section 938.30(3) requires that notice be given prior to a defendant being brought into court for a hearing and provides:
The order requiring the person's appearance shall be served a reasonable time before the date of the examination in the manner provided for service of summons, as provided for service of papers under rules of civil procedure, or by actual notice. (Emphasis added)
"Reasonable time" has not been specifically defined for due process purposes. However, it requires at a minimum that adjudications which affect an individual's life, liberty or property be preceded by notice which: 1) is reasonably calculated to advise the person of the pendency and the nature of the proceedings, and 2) gives the person a meaningful hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Jones v. State, 740 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1999), citing, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).
Section II of the Amended Order provides for the form of the notice. It is entitled "Notice of Fines and Costs, Required Status Hearings and Order Requiring Defendant's Personal Appearance at Collections Court" (the Notice). It is prepared and served at sentencing, signed by the defendant and the judge, and the original is placed in the court file, while the defendant receives a copy. The Amended Order requires that the Notice contain certain advisory information.3 However, the Notice is not required to advise a defendant about status hearings held after release from prison. These hearings are required under the Program for those defendants who are not in compliance with payment obligations imposed on them by their sentence.
We agree with Castrillon that there will be a substantial time lag between imposition of the fines, costs and placement in the Program at sentencing, and his release from prison. However, pursuant to his sentence, Castrillon has been ordered to report to the Clerk of the Courts Collection Division, at a given address, within thirty days of his release from prison, "to be scheduled for a status hearing." Presumably at that time he will be advised whether he is required to attend status hearings, and if so, the date, time and location of those hearings.4 If not, a due process problem may then arise. However on its face, we find that the Amended Order complies with the notice provisions, and that there is no due process violation.
Castrillon also claims that the circuit court does not have the authority to create the Collections Program because it does not meet the legal requirements for establishing a division or subdivision of a court. We find that the Amended Order is an administrative order, not a local rule, and that therefore, the Amended Order is proper.5
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration give chief judges of circuit courts the authority to execute administrative orders and to administer court affairs. Rule 2.020(c) defines an administrative order as a "directive necessary to administer properly the court's affairs but not inconsistent with the constitution or with court rules and administrative orders entered by the supreme court." The Amended Order does not meet the definition of a local rule, as set out in Rule 2.020(b). See also State Dept. of Juvenile Justice v. Soud, 685 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Williams v. State, 596 So.2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); State v. Upchurch, 394 So.2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
An administrative rule which is necessary to properly administer court affairs is valid, even if it creates a "subdivision" of a court. See Mann v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 696 So.2d 1184 (Fla.1997)
; City of Coral Gables; Robertson, 719 So.2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(administrative order...
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Noel v. State
...collections courts, the sentencing judge can refer the defendant debtor to the appropriate program. See, e.g., Castrillon v. State, 821 So.2d 360, 361–62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (describing administrative order relating to a “Collections Program” and the underlying statute authorizing collectio......
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Noel v. State, 4D10-1765
...collections courts, the sentencing judge can refer the defendant debtor to the appropriate program. See, e.g., Castrillon v. State, 821 So. 2d 360, 361-62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (describing administrative order relating to a "Collections Program" and the underlying statute authorizing collecti......
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Noel v. State, 4D10-1765
...collections courts, the sentencing judge can refer the defendant debtor to the appropriate program. See, e.g., Castrillon v. State, 821 So. 2d 360, 361 -62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (describing administrative order relating to a "Collections Program" and the underlying statute authorizing collect......