Castro v. Haugh (In re Haugh)

• Decision Date: 24 April 2014
• Docket Number: D063857
• Citation: 225 Cal.App.4th 963,170 Cal.Rptr.3d 683
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Gabriela and Christopher HAUGH. Gabriela Castro, Respondent, v. Christopher Haugh, Respondent; San Diego County Department of Child Support Services, Appellant.

225 Cal.App.4th 963

170 Cal.Rptr.3d 683

IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Gabriela and Christopher HAUGH.Gabriela Castro, Respondent,

v. Christopher Haugh, Respondent;San Diego County Department of Child Support Services, Appellant.

D063857

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed April 24, 2014

See 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Enforcement of Judgment, § 409.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Adam Wertheimer, Commissioner. Reversed and remanded with directions. (Super. Ct. No. D490082)

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng–Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Marina L. Soto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondents.

McDONALD, J.

The San Diego County Department of Child Support Services (Department), as intervenor, appeals the trial court's order granting the request by Christopher Haugh (Father) for modification of a child support order. Father sought to lower child support for the son he had with Gabriela Haugh, now known as Gabriela Castro (Mother). On appeal, Department contends the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction because Father, Mother, and their son resided outside of California at the time of the modification request and therefore, pursuant to Family Code ¹ section 4909, the court did not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the original child support order. Section 4909 is California's enactment of section 205 of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). We conclude the trial court acted in excess of its authority and therefore reverse the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, the trial court ordered Father to pay Mother $700.00 per month in child support for their son. In 2007, Mother moved with their son from California to Texas. In or about 2011, Father moved from California to Nevada.

On January 14, 2013, Father filed a request to modify the amount of his child support payments based on his reduced income. Mother opposed his request for modification, arguing the matter should be heard in the state of their son's residence (i.e., Texas) because none of the parties lived in California.

At the hearing on Father's modification request, Father appeared telephonically and was represented by counsel, Mother appeared telephonically in propria persona, and Department appeared as an intervenor. Department's counsel stated the first issue for the court was whether the court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the case. She argued that because Mother, Father, and their son no longer resided in California, the trial court did not have jurisdiction under section 4909, subdivision (a), to modify the original child support order. She suggested Father could have the original child support order registered in Texas and then seek its modification. However, the trial court, noting the original child support order was a California order, stated it “continues to have jurisdiction, until another state assumes jurisdiction. You don't leave a party without a forum.” It further stated: “It's clear [that] California shouldn't continue to have it. But it does. That is—[it] should be in someone else's jurisdiction. But someone needs to take that affirmative step, whether Mother, Father, or [Department]. [¶] I assume it's the Father, since he's the payor....” The court then proceeded to hear arguments on the merits of Father's request for modification. Based on the evidence, the court issued an order (Order) modifying the original child support order, reducing Father's child support obligation to $508 per month, effective February 1, 2013. Department timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the Order.

DISCUSSION

IUIFSA and Section 4909

This appeal involves the application of section 4909 (California's adoption of § 205 of the UIFSA) to the undisputed facts relevant to this appeal. We begin by reviewing the relevant provisions of section 4909, the UIFSA, and applicable regulations. “The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (9 pt. [I]B West's U. Laws Ann. (1999) U. Interstate Fam. Support Act, § 101 et seq. (UIFSA)), which has been adopted by all [50] states, governs ... the procedures for establishing, enforcing and modifying child support orders in cases in which more than one state is involved. The 1996 version of the UIFSA took effect in California on August 4, 1997. (See Fam.Code, § 4900 et seq.) Together with the Federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA) (28 U.S.C. § 1738B), the UIFSA ensures that in every case only one state exercises jurisdiction over child support at any given time.” (In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 206, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 146, fn. omitted.) ²

The “cornerstone” of the UIFSA is the concept of “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,” codified in California as section 4909. (Stone v. Davis (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 596, 600, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 833.) “UIFSA was designed to ensure that only one state at a time would have jurisdiction to make and modify a child support order. ‘[T]he central jurisdictional feature of UIFSA is the concept of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Under UIFSA, a court that makes a valid child support order retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify the order as long as the requirements for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction remain fulfilled. The court of another state may enforce a child support order registered in that state, but may not modify it unless the decree state has lost its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.’ ” (Knabe v. Brister,supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319, 65 Cal.Rptr.3d 493.)

Regarding “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,” section 4909 provides in pertinent part:

“(a) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order:

“(1) As long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or

“(2) Until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

“(b) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order consistent with the law of this state may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to this chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter....” (Italics added.)

Section 4909 is California's adoption of section 205 of the UIFSA. The drafter's comment to the 1996 version of section 205 of the UIFSA states in pertinent part:

“This section is perhaps the most crucial provision in UIFSA.... [T]he issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order, except in very narrowly defined circumstances. As long as one of the individual parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing state, and as long as the parties do not agree to the contrary, the issuing tribunal has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its order—which in practical terms means that it may modify its order....

“The other side of the coin follows logically. Just as Subsection (a)(1) defines the retention of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, by clear implication the subsection also defines how jurisdiction to modify may be lost. That is, if all the relevant persons—the obligor, the individual obligee, and the child—have permanently left the issuing state, the issuing state no longer has an appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify exercise of jurisdiction to modify. Further, the issuing tribunal has no current information about the factual circumstances of anyone involved, and the taxpayers of that state have no reason to expend public funds on the process....

“According to the logical implication of Subsection (a)(2), the issuing state may also lose its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify if the parties consent in writing for another state to assume jurisdiction to modify (even though one of the parties or the child continues to reside in the issuing state) ....” (9 pt. IB West's U. Laws. Ann., supra, U. Interstate Fam. Support Act, comment to § 205, pp. 340–341, italics added.) ³

IIContinuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction in This Case

Department contends the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by issuing the Order modifying the original 2008 child support order. It argues that because Father, Mother, and their son no longer resided in California at the time of Father's modification request and the court's issuance of the Order, the court did not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under section 4909 and therefore could not modify the original child support order. Father has not filed a respondent's brief opposing Department's position. We decide this appeal based on the appellant's opening brief, the record on appeal, and our independent research regarding applicable law.

Based on our review of section 4909, the UIFSA and comments thereto, other statutes and regulations, and relevant case law, we conclude the trial court acted in excess of its authority under section 4909 by modifying the original child support order. The court did not have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the original child support order after the individual parties and their child moved to other states and did not consent in writing to California's continuing jurisdiction or authority over the case.

Section 4909, subdivision (a), provides that a California court “has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order: [¶] (1) As long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; or [¶] (2) Until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this state for...