Caswell v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.

Decision Date30 July 1999
Docket NumberCivil No. 98-40013.
Citation59 F.Supp.2d 684
PartiesRichard CASWELL, Plaintiff, v. AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

David B. Timmis, Vandeveer Garzia, Birmingham, MI, for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GADOLA, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. on June 3, 1999. This is a products liability action, arising out of injuries sustained by plaintiff on September 6, 1996, during the course of his employment with Yale-South Haven, Inc. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was operating a "deflashing tumbler," a machine which utilizes liquid nitrogen and through tumbling action removes excess material from molded rubber parts. The tumbler at issue was manufactured by defendant corporation. On June 24, 1999, plaintiff responded to defendant's motion. A reply brief was filed by defendant on July 7, 1999. In addition, on July 9, 1999, intervening plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company filed a supplemental response to defendant's motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons set forth below, this Court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. Factual Background

On September 6, 1996, plaintiff Richard Caswell was injured while operating a Model 2125 Cryo-Trim deflashing tumbler, a machine manufactured by defendant Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (hereinafter "Air Products"). As mentioned above, the tumbler utilizes liquid nitrogen and through tumbling action removes excess material from molded parts. After the tumbling is completed, a very large and heavy door is lifted up and the parts are removed.

On the day of the accident, plaintiff was removing parts from the machine when the door fell on him. The door pinned plaintiff in the body of the deflasher, head first and up to his hips. Despite his screams for assistance, no one was able to hear him due to the fact that plaintiff was trapped head first within the deflasher.

After a period of time, plaintiff reports that he was able to extricate himself from the machine. Plaintiff sustained back injuries, specifically, a "circumferential bulge of the annulus fibrosis at the L4-5 level and a herniated disc on the left side of the L5-S1 level producing posterior displacement of the exiting nerve root sleeves and obliteration of the left epidural fat plane." Exh. A to plaintiff's brief in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The parties are in dispute regarding the cause of the accident. Plaintiff has proffered expert testimony of Neal Hepner, a mechanical engineer. Hepner testified at his deposition to the effect that the deflashing tumbler was negligently designed due to the faulty nature of the latching mechanism. Exh. C to plaintiff's brief in response, p. 41. The latching mechanism is designed to hold the door in position but in this case allegedly failed to do so. Hepner found that the panel over which the latching mechanism is placed is capable of becoming iced over due to the nature of the operations performed by the tumbler and the failure of the sealing to prevent cold air from escaping. See id., pp. 63-64. In addition, plaintiff's expert opined that the spring on the right side of machine could easily become disengaged because there is insufficient force to hold the latch in the engaged position. See id., p. 46.

Plaintiff testified that there was frost on the latch pin on the date of the accident. See Exh. D to plaintiff's brief in response, p. 70. According to expert witness Hepner, this could have prevented proper engagement of the latch hook. Plaintiff's position is that the allegedly ineffective spring and latch mechanism, as well as the likelihood of frost, "are significant dangerous conditions directly resulting from the design of the machine." Plaintiff's brief in response, p. 4.

Defendant, on the other hand, disputes plaintiff's theory that a design defect caused plaintiff's injuries. Defendant maintains that "there is an equally plausible explanation as to why the accident happened," namely, that plaintiff "simply failed to properly engage the latches by his own action or inaction." Defendant's brief in support of motion for summary judgment, p. 19. Defendant points out that plaintiff testified that he observed both latches fully engaged over the latch pins prior to his accident. See Exh. A to defendant's brief, pp. 70, 76-78 and 103. In addition, defendant argues that plaintiff's expert admitted that he had no evidence that the notch was not fully sealed over the pin just prior to plaintiff's accident. Id., 64-65.

Defendant cites portions of expert witness Hepner's testimony in support of defendant's position that some other factor, besides a manufacturing or design defect, caused plaintiff's injuries. See Exh. G to defendant's brief. Hepner spent 3 to 3½ hours inspecting the machine on February 3, 1997, almost five months after the accident. Id., p. 23. On the date of the inspection, Hepner found that the door of the deflasher held very securely and would not drop down on its own. Id., pp. 68-69. Hepner considered it impossible to recreate the accident. Id., p. 74. The expert witness also observed modifications to the door latching arms, which were not shown in defendant-manufacturer's machine drawings. Id., pp. 37-38. Specifically, Hepner observed that an extension of the bracket on the left side had been welded onto the left side. Id. Plaintiff's expert does not know who made the modification or precisely when it was made, but speculated that it could have been made by plaintiff's employer after the accident occurred on September 6, 1996. See id., pp. 39, 43, 86-87.

Intervening plaintiff Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Liberty Mutual") filed its own response brief on July 9, 1999. In that brief, plaintiff Liberty Mutual recounts the testimony of defendant's named expert, Glenn Stroup, an industry engineer of supporting equipment and equipment process technology. Stroup inspected the deflashing tumbler in question. He stated that "[t]hrough deterioration over the years, [insulation in the interior of the barrel structure] pulverized and was gone." Exh. A to Liberty Mutual's brief, p. 57. Stroup's inspection found no insulation in the annular space between the walls of the tumbler unit. In response to a question as to the possible hazard to an operator which such a condition posed, the expert witness testified as follows:

Hazard in the form of touching cold surfaces with bare skin is the first and most obvious. The second hazard would be [the operator's] failure to be able to properly open and/or close the door and lock it in a given open or closed position and then try to continue to operate that piece of equipment. Those are the two primary drawbacks.

* * * * * * It would create an interference failure that would either not allow the door to even physically move or the latch to properly engage.

Exh. E to Liberty Mutual's brief, p. 75.

Intervening plaintiff Liberty Mutual claims that defendant never provided warnings to plaintiff or his employer regarding the risk of the icing condition. Stroup testified that "there is no written statement" to the effect that lack of insulation may result in an icing condition which could cause an interference condition with the latch pin. See Exh. G to Liberty Mutual's brief, pp. 77-78.

On January 13, 1998, plaintiff initiated the instant action against defendant Air Products. The complaint contains two counts. Count I alleges a state law claim of negligence premised on failure to warn, design defect, manufacturing defect, negligent maintenance, and failure to equip the machine with available modern devices and appurtenances. Count II alleges a state law claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness for intended uses and purposes. Federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

II. Legal Standards

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "A fact is `material' and precludes grant of summary judgment if proof of that fact would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties, and would necessarily affect [the] application of appropriate principle[s] of law to the rights and obligations of the parties." Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (6th Cir.1984).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of all genuine issues of material fact. See Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986). This burden "may be discharged by showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party discharges that burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a genuine triable issue. Fed. R.Civ.Proc. 56(e); Gregg, 801 F.2d at 861. To create a genuine issue of material fact, however, the nonmovant must do more than present some evidence on a disputed issue. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., "[t]...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Klein v. Caterpillar Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 12 Enero 2022
    ...1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) ; Jackson v. Ford Motor Co. , 842 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2016) ; see Caswell v. Air Prod. & Chemicals, Inc. , 59 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688–89 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that Michigan's comparative-negligence statute applies to breach-of-warranty claims rooted in feder......
  • Olson v. Home Depot
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 10 Junio 2004
    ...testimony demonstrating that the product at issue constituted an unreasonable risk to users." Caswell v. Air Prods. and Chems., Inc., 59 F.Supp.2d 684, 689 (E.D.Mich.1999) (Gadola, J.). The Michigan Court of Appeals explains that "[i]n the absence of expert testimony providing standards for......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT