Catril v. Union Pacific Railway Company

• Decision Date: 18 March 1889
• Citation: 21 P. 416,2 Idaho 576
• Parties: CATRIL v. UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

21 P. 416

2 Idaho 576

CATRIL v. UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 18, 1889

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.-An act which fixes absolute liability on a corporation to make compensation for injuries done to property in the prosecution of its lawful business without any wrong, fault or neglect on its part, when under the general law of the land no one else is so liable under such circumstances, does not provide the "due process of law" provided for in the constitution of the United States, and is therefore void.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Oneida County.

Reversed.

P. L Williams, for Appellant.

The different killings constitute different torts, and, while they may be united in the same complaint, they must be set forth, as they are, in fact, distinct causes of action. (Rev Stats., sec. 4169; Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Cal. 146; Waston v. Railroad Co., 41 Cal. 17.) Revised Statutes, section 2680, if valid, creates an absolute liability on the part of any railroad company for all domestic animals killed or injured by it in the manner designated, unless the injury occurred through the neglect or fault of the owner. The effect of this statute, if it means what it says, is to take the property of one, while in the exercise of a lawful pursuit, and in a lawful, proper, and careful manner, and transfer it to another. This is not due process of law, is unconstitutional, and void. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 432 et seq.; Zeigler v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 594; Railroad Co. v. Geiger, 29 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 275; Ohio etc. Ry. Co. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55, 20 Am. Rep. 259.)

Smith & Smith, for Respondent.

Everyone must so use his property as to cause the least injury possible to every other person's property, and the state may, by appropriate legislation, enforce this duty, even to imposing suitable penalties for its violation. (Broom's Legal Maxims, 275, 276.) Statutes of the kind under consideration are upheld on two grounds. One is that the owner of the animals, not being in fault, ought to be compensated; and the other and more weighty one is that it is unsafe to passengers and employees to allow cattle to run upon the track, and be killed by the engines. Hence, to prevent the liability of this killing, a penalty is imposed for every killing. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 715; Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 68 Tex. 290, 4 S.W. 492; Railway Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Hopkins v. Railway Co., 18 Kan. 462.)

LOGAN, J. Weir, C. J., and Berry, J., concur.

OPINION

LOGAN, J.

This action was brought by the respondent under the statute of this territory to recover damages for certain horses alleged to have been killed by the locomotive and cars of the appellant. The appellant demurred to the complaint, which demurrer was overruled, whereupon the appellant interposed an answer, admitting the incorporation of the defendant, but placing in issue the remaining facts set out in the complaint. Upon the trial of the issues the plaintiff proved the killing of the horses alleged to have been killed, their value, and rested. At the conclusion of the trial the defendant requested the court to charge the jury as follows "The court charges you that though you may believe that the defendant killed each of the horses sued for by running its engine and cars over against the same, yet, if you further believe by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant, by its agents, in killing any of plaintiff's horses, acted as an ordinarily prudent and reliable person would under similar circumstances, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the horses so killed, and your verdict as to such horses should be for the defendant; that mere proof of killing plaintiff's horses is not sufficient evidence to show that defendant did not act as an ordinarily prudent and reasonable person would act under similar circumstances." The defendant's counsel excepted to the refusal of the court to charge as requested, and this exception raises the only important question of this case, and that is the constitutionality of the statute under which the suit is brought and sought to be maintained; for the refusal to so charge cannot be upheld except upon the statute. The statute (section 2680 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho) provides that "every railroad company operating any line of railroad within this territory, that maims or kills any horse, mare, gelding, filly, jack, jenny, or mule, or any cow, heifer, bull, ox, steer or calf, or any other domestic animal, by running any engine or cars over or against any such animal, is liable to the owner of such animal for the damages sustained by such owner by reason thereof, unless the injury occurred through the neglect or fault of the owner." The plaintiff's counsel concedes that if this section is...