Olson v. Idora Hill Mining Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1916
• Parties: HARRY OLSON et al., Respondents, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant. CLARK G. NORRIS, Respondent, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant. PETER PROBACH, and J. H. SMITH, Respondents, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

155 P. 291

28 Idaho 504

HARRY OLSON et al., Respondents, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.

CLARK G. NORRIS, Respondent, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.

PETER PROBACH, and J. H. SMITH, Respondents, v. IDORA HILL MINING COMPANY, a Corporation Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 5, 1916

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-LABORER'S LIEN ACT-OBJECT OF-MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT.

1. Chapter 170, Sess. Laws 1911, p. 565, which provides for the protection of employees who are discharged from employment without receiving compensation due them from employers, is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and is not an infringement upon the liberty of contract in respect of labor, and does not deprive the employer or the employee of the liberty or right to enter into any contract, nor take property from the employer without due process of law, nor single out any particular class of debtors or individuals and is not unconstitutional as being in contravention of sec 10, art. 1 of the constitution of the United States, or of sec. 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, or of secs. 13 and 16, art. 1, of the constitution of this state.

[As to validity of statutes limiting hours of a day's labor, see note in Ann.Cas. 1912D, 393.]

2. The object of the legislation embodied in chapter 170 of the Session Laws of 1911 is to require employers of labor to pay their employees promptly and in lawful money when the employment ceases, upon the ground that the employee should not be compelled to wait beyond a reasonable time to obtain the compensation to which his contract of service entitles him.

3. Chapter 170 of the Sess. Laws of 1911 must be reasonably construed, and it was not the intention of the legislature in enacting it to penalize the employer for failing to pay an unjust debt, nor for the failure to pay when the discharged laborer, after demanding payment, prevents compliance with the demand by his own conduct, nor to deny or preclude the right of the employer to interpose any valid counterclaim or defense to the claim of such laborer.

4. Held, that the trial court inadvertently entered judgment in favor of one of the respondents for a greater sum than under the evidence he was entitled to receive, and judgment modified in accordance with the proof.

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District in and for Shoshone County. Hon. William W. Woods, Judge.

Action to enforce laborers' liens under the provisions of chapter 170, Sess. Laws 1911. Judgment for plaintiffs. Modified.

Judgment affirmed, with costs in favor of respondents.

C. J. Orland, for Appellant.

Chapter 170, Session Laws of 1911, of the acts of the legislature of Idaho, is not within the police power of a state, and is unconstitutional and void. (Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N.E. 395, 16 L. R. A. 492; Jordon v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 531, 103 S.W. 633, 11 L. R. A., N. S., 603, 14 Ann. Cas. 616; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 99, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 43 Am. St. 670, 59 N.W. 362, 24 L. R. A. 702; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146, 59 P. 340, 47 L. R. A. 369; In re Aubrey, 36 Wash. 308, 104 Am. St. 952, 78 P. 900, 1 Ann. Cas. 927; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 77 Am. St. 765, 55 S.W. 627, 48 L. R. A. 265.)

A statute to compel the payment of indebtedness is not within the police power. (Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666.)

It interferes with the right of contract, deprives persons of their property without due process of law, and deprives them of the equal protection of the law, and prevents the master and servant or employer and employee, in private business enterprises, from entering into contracts of employment, and for the payment of wages or salaries in any medium other than money. (Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 31 Am. St. 533, 28 N.E. 1126, 14 L. R. A. 325; Stimson Mill Co. v. Braun, 136 Cal. 122, 89 Am. St. 116, 68 P. 481, 57 L. R. A. 726; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179, 10 S.E. 285, 6 L. R. A. 623; Exparte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 20 Am. St. 226, 24 P. 737, 9 L. R. A. 482; Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co., 127 Cal. 4, 78 Am. St. 17, 59 P. 304, 47 L. R. A. 338; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 46 Am. St. 315, 40 N.E. 454, 29 L. R. A. 79; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 37 Am. St. 206, 35 N.E. 62, 22 L. R. A. 340; Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550, 36 Am. Rep. 47; Ex parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 803, 32 L. R. A. 664; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666; Tiedeman, Police Power, sec. 178.)

Penalties should only be enforced for the violation of a positive statute, or in the right of enforcing control over business affected with a public interest. (11 Cyc. 1101; Hocking Valley Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St. 12, 53 Am. St. 622, 41 N.E. 263, 29 L. R. A. 386; Godcharles v. Wegeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 A. 354; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 32 S.Ct. 493, 56 L.Ed. 799, 42 L. R. A. N. S. 102; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 34 S.Ct. 301, 58 L.Ed. 554; San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Wilson (Tex. App.), 19 S.W. 910; Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Outcalt, 2 Colo. App. 395, 31 P. 177; Wilder v. Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co., 70 Mich. 382, 38 N.W. 289; Jolliffe v. Brown, 14 Wash. 155, 53 Am. St. 868, 44 P. 149; Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005, 62 L. R. A. 136.)

The act deprives the employer of property without due process of law, prevents the employer from showing any contract or agreement as to time of payment, upon discharge, or medium in which payment is to be made, and deprives the defendant in an action for wages of any defense against the penalty enacted under this act, and requires the court to enter judgment against an employer for such penalty, upon the proof of facts foreign to such penalty. (Catril v. Union P. R. Co., 2 Idaho 576, 21 P. 416; Jensen v. Union P. Ry. Co., 6 Utah 253, 21 P. 994, 4 L. R. A. 724.)

W. H. Hanson, J. A. Wayne and Franklin Pfirman, for Respondents.

The object of this statute is to require employers of labor to pay their men when they are discharged or quit. It is merely in pursuance of the theory that the laborer is worthy of his hire; that he should not be compelled to sit idly by while waiting for his hard-earned money and suffer privations for the want of it, or eat up in advance of securing what he has earned before going elsewhere to seek employment. It does not interfere with the right of the employer to agree in advance as to what amount of commodity the employee shall receive for his labor, but whatever, it is, in the absence of any lawful agreement to the contrary, he is entitled to it when his labor is finished. (Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 28 S.Ct. 28, 52 L.Ed. 108; Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 34 S.Ct. 761, 58 L.Ed. 1155, 51 L. R. A., N. S., 1097; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 29 S.Ct. 206, 53 L.Ed. 315; Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 226, 34 S.Ct. 856, 58 L.Ed. 1288; Leep v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 58 Ark. 407, 41 Am. St. 109, 25 S.W. 75, 23 L. R. A. 264; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 19 S.Ct. 419, 43 L.Ed. 746; Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge & D. Co., 45 Wash. 290, 122 Am. St. 899, 88 P. 212; Wynne v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 96 S.C. 1, 79 S.E. 521; Opinion of the Justices (In re House Bill No. 1230), 163 Mass. 589, 40 N.E. 713, 28 L. R. A. 344; Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 160 Ind. 379, 66 N.E. 1005, 62 L. R. A. 136; Seelyville Coal & Mining Co. v. McGlosson, 166 Ind. 561, 117 Am. St. 396, 77 N.E. 1044, 9 Ann. Cas. 234; Commonwealth v. Hillside Coal Co., 109 Ky. 47, 58 S.W. 441; Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal Min. Co., 117 Ky. 885, 79 S.W. 287; Commonwealth v. Dunn, 170 Mass. 140, 49 N.E. 110; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Baker, 4 Ind.App. 66, 30 N.E. 431.)

BUDGE, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Morgan, J., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

Appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of Washington and owning and heretofore operating a group of mining claims in Beaver Mining District, Shoshone County, known as the Idora Mine. Respondents were employed by appellant as laborers in connection with said operations prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

Respondents were discharged from time to time by appellant, their wages being due at the time of the discharge, but they were not paid the respective amounts due them. Promises of settlement were made to respondents by one of the officials of the appellant corporation, and at his request, and relying upon his promises, respondents remained in Wallace for a period of more than forty days waiting for their money.

On April 29, 1914, the liens embodied in the case of Harry Olson et. al., were filed and on May 1, 1914, action was commenced to foreclose them. On April 14, 1914, respondent Clark. G. Norris filed his claim of lien and entered suit to foreclose the same on May 16, 1914. On May 21 and 24, 1914, respectively, Peter Probach and J. H. Smith filed their liens for record and immediately instituted an action to foreclose them.

On October 8, 1914, by order of the court, the above cases were consolidated for trial. On October 16, 1914, the cases were tried before the court without a jury. An attorney fee of $ 50 was agreed upon in the Probach and Smith case. Proof was offered in the other cases for the purpose of establishing what would be a reasonable attorney fee; and the court found in the case of Harry Olson et al., $ 725, and in the case of Norris, $ 75, to be reasonable attorney fees. Appellant in the trial...