Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1969
• Citation: 210 Va. 11,168 S.E.2d 257
• Parties: Myrtle S. CAUDILL v. WISE RAMBLER, INC., and American Motors Corporation.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 257

168 S.E.2d 257

210 Va. 11

Myrtle S. CAUDILL v. WISE RAMBLER, INC., and American Motors Corporation.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 16, 1969.

Carl W. Newman, Appalachia (Shannon & Newman, Appalachia, on brief), for plaintiff in error.

Leslie M. Mullins, Norton, Jackson S. White, Jr., Abingdon (Greear, Bowen,

Carl W. Newman, Appalachia (Shannon & Miller, Abingdon, on brief), for defendants in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON, and HARRISON, JJ.

EGGLESTON, Chief Justice.

On April 5, 1967, Myrtle S. Caudill filed a motion for judgment against Wise Rambler, Inc., and American Motors Corporation to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by her on January 22, 1967 while she was a passenger in an automobile which had been sold to her by Wise Rambler on June 2, 1964 and had been previously manufactured by American Motors. She alleged that while the car was being driven by her adult son at a reasonable rate of speed, because of a defect in its steering mechanism, it suddenly became uncontrollable, veered off the highway and struck a barricade, causing serious and plaintul injuries to her. The motion further alleged that the accident and the by the breach of the defendant's implied by the breach of the defendant's implied warranty to her that the car was constructed of sound material and in a good workmanship manner and was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was designed.

Each defendant filed a plea of the statute of limitations. The lower court sustained the pleas and dismissed the action on the stated ground that it was barred by Code § 8--24 (Repl. Vol. 1957). The evidence taken on the pleas is not before us but it seems to be agreed that the facts are correctly stated in the motion for judgment.

The material portion of § 8--24, as amended by Acts of Assembly 1954, c. 589, p. 764, provides: 'Every action for personal injuries shall be brought within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued. * * *'

The plaintiff contended in the lower court, as she does before us, that her right to bring her action for personal injuries accrued at the time the injuries were received, on January 22, 1967; and that hence her suit, filed on April 5, 1967, was within the two-year limitation fixed by § 8--24.

The defendants contended in the lower court, as they do before us, that the plaintiff's right to bring the present action accrued at the time of the alleged breach of the implied warranty, that is, when the car was sold to her on June 2, 1964, and that he suit filed on April 5, 1967 was barred by the two-year limitation in § 8--24.

In Friedman v. People Service Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968), we held that since an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on a breach of warranty is essentially an action for personal injuries, the limitation thereon is governed by Code § 8--24, and not by § 18--13 applicable to an action based on contract.

The critical issue presented to us in the present case is whether the plaintiff's right to bring her action accrued at the time of the alleged breach of warranty--that is, when she purchased the automobile as the lower court held, or at the time she received her injuries.

We do not agree with the lower court's conclusion that such right accrued at the first instance. Obviously, since the plaintiff had not been injured at the time she purchased the car, she could not then maintain an action for her injuries. To say, then, that her right of action accrued before her injuries received is to say that she was without remedy to recover damages for her alleged injuries. Such an unjust and inequitable result is not the purpose of statutes of limitation. They are designed to compel the prompt assertion of an accrued right of action; not to bar such a right before it has accrued.

A right of action cannot accrue until there is a cause of action. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions § 58, p. 590. The essential elements of a good cause of action, whether based on an alleged breach of contract or on a tortious act, are a legal obligation of a defendant to the plaintiff, a violation or breach of that right or duty, and a consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff. In the absence of injury or damage to a plaintiff or his property, he has no cause of action and no right of action can accrue to him. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions § 58, p. 590. Or, to state the matter another way, a plaintiff's right of action for damages for personal injuries does not accrue until he is hurt. Such is the situation in the present case.

In Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 12, 52 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1949), we held that from a single wrongful act of the defendant two separate cause of action may arise: One for property damage and the other for personal injuries. This is in accord with the recognized principle that, 'There may be several rights of action and one cause of action and rights may accrue at different times from the same cause.' 1 Am.Jur.2d, Actions § 2, p. 541.

Consequently, in the present case, at the time the plaintiff purchased the automobile, when the alleged breach of the implied warranty of fitness occurred, she had a cause of action against the defendants for property damage and a potential cause of action for personal injuries. Her right to...