Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1948
• Docket Number: 16079.
• Citation: 47 S.E.2d 788,212 S.C. 337
• Parties: CAUGHMAN v. COLUMBIA Y. M. C. A.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

47 S.E.2d 788

212 S.C. 337

CAUGHMAN v. COLUMBIA Y. M. C. A.

No. 16079.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 13, 1948

Heyward Brockinton, of Columbia, for appellant.

Robinson & Robinson, of Columbia, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

The only question which we find it necessary to determine on this appeal is whether a charitable organization or institution is liable for compensation as an employer under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of South Carolina. This question was answered in the affirmative by the Industrial Commission and in the negative by the Circuit Court. This appeal by the employee followed.

Appellant Curtis Caughman, was employed by respondent, the Columbia Y.M.C.A., on October 1, 1946, and on the following day, while washing the walls of the Y.M.C.A. building, a scaffold upon which he and some other Negro employees were standing fell resulting in an injury to appellant's left heel.

Respondent's status as a charitable institution is not questioned. It is a non-profit, character building institution, having for its aim the mental, physical and religious development of boys and young men. Our Workmen's Compensation Act does not specifically include charitable institutions, nor does it expressly exempt them. The definitions of employers and employees who are subject to the provisions of the Act (Section 7035-2 of the 1942 Code) are very broad and comprehensive and are entirely sufficient to include charitable institutions. Under the terms of this section and Section 7035-16, certain employers and employees are specifically exempted unless they voluntarily elect to be bound, but charitable institutions are not among those enumerated in the exceptions. If they do not come within the provisions of the Act, their exclusion must be by implication. In determining whether they are excepted in this manner, we must consider the intention of the Legislature as manifested by other parts of the Act and also the general purpose and design of this legislation.

'In determining what classes of employers come under a compensation act, recourse must be had to the whole scope and scheme of the act, or to its whole scope and purpose, rather than to technical definitions of particular words or to a literal construction of particular phrases therein.' 71 C.J., page 394. 'Courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute; the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over the literal import of the words. * * * A statute as a whole must receive a practical reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers.' Greenville Baseball, Inc. v. Bearden, Sheriff, et al., 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815; Ashley v Ware Shoals Mfg. Co. et al., 210 S.C. 273, 42 S.E.2d 390. Equally well settled is the rule that 'the definitions of 'employer' contained in the compensation acts, or statements as to who shall be deemed employers, should be broadly or liberally construed, in order to effectuate the purpose of the legislation.' 71 C.J., page 395. We have held that the basic purpose of the Act 'is the inclusion of employers and employees, and not their exclusion; and * * * that doubts of jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of inclusion rather than exclusion.' Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 198 S.C. 65, 15 S.E.2d 833, 835, 136 A.L.R. 894; Alewine et al. v. Tobin Quarries, Inc. et al., 206 S.C. 103, 33 S.E.2d 81.

Having stated the foregoing general rules of construction, we now turn to the purpose sought to be accomplished by this legislation. It was stated in Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co. et al., 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825, 836, that workmen's compensation acts 'are in derogation of, or departures from, the common law, and are not amendatory, cumulative or supplemental thereto, nor declaratory thereof, but wholly substitutional in character.' In Tedars et al. v. Savannah River Veneer Co. et al., 202 S.C. 363, 25 S.E.2d 235, 243, 147 A.L.R. 914, the Court said: 'To great extent the whole scheme of workmen's compensation is to place the economic burden of industrial accidents upon industry rather than upon the workers and their dependents, and as to the latter thereby rendered indigent, upon the State.' It was said in Cokeley et al. v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889, 893, that compensation laws 'were enacted primarily for the benefit, protection and welfare of working men and their dependents, to relieve them of the uncertainties of a trial in a suit for damages, to cast upon the industry in which they are employed a share of the burden resulting from industrial accidents, and to prevent the burden of injured employees and their dependents becoming charges on society.' These statements of the purposes of compensation acts are largely in accord with those given in other jurisdictions. See 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts, Section 15.

In determining whether the Legislature intended that the Act should apply to charitable institutions, it is also necessary to consider the status of such institutions with reference to tort liability prior to the enactment of this legislation. The question of the liability of a charitable institution to respond in damages for the negligence of its managers, agents and servants has been before the courts on numerous occasions. It is one upon which there has been, and is, a conflict of decisions not only upon the question of liability but under what circumstances it exists; and among those courts adhering to the rule of non-liability, there has also been a remarkable diversity of opinion as to the correct reason or ground for so deciding. Some courts hold that there is no liability to those who avail themselves of the bonefits of the charity, but impose liability where the injured person is a stranger to the institution or to its charity, or is an employee or servant, or is on the premises by express or implied invitation. An exhaustive review of the decisions of all the states and a learned discussion of the subject will be found in Andrews v. Young Men's Christian Association, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, and President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810. The writer is strongly impressed with the view adopted in a number of jurisdictions that such institutions should unqualifiedly be held responsible for their negligence. However, the question has been settled in this jurisdiction by adoption of the rule of full immunity of such institutions from the torts of their agents and servants. It first came before this Court in Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512, which was an action by a patient of the hospital to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negligence of a nurse employed therein. A majority of the Court, sitting en banc, held that it is against public policy to hold a charitable institution responsible for the negligence of its servants. In Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649, 650, one who attended a musical entertainment given in the college auditorium, for which an admission fee was charged, died as a result of injuries sustained by the falling of a balcony caused by negligence in its construction. An action was brought for alleged wrongful death. It was held that if the college was operated as a charitable institution, there could be no recovery. The Court said: '* * * The exemption of public charities...