Cave Springs Public School Dist. I-30, of Adair County v. Blair

Decision Date01 July 1980
Docket NumberI-30,No. 51470,OF,51470
Citation613 P.2d 1046,1980 OK 103
PartiesCAVE SPRINGS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTADAIR COUNTY, Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Ladana BLAIR, Appellee.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Appeal from the District Court, Adair County; William H. Bliss, District Judge.

Appellee school teacher sued the school district to require it to recognize the renewal of her teaching contract on the grounds that the school district did not timely notify her that her contract would not be renewed. The District Court rendered judgment for the school teacher and the school district appealed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Jack E. Rider, Stilwell, for appellant.

Bruce Green, Muskogee, for appellee.

IRWIN, Vice Chief Justice.

Plaintiff teacher commenced proceedings against the school district to require the school district to consider her teaching contract for the 1975-76 school year as renewed for the 1976-77 school year. Plaintiff proceeded on the theory that the school district did not notify her by certified mail prior to April 10, 1976, that her contract would not be renewed and under 70 O.S.1971, § 6-101(E), her contract was automatically renewed. The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff and the school district appeals.

The essential facts are: Plaintiff had been hired by the school district under a federal funding program which was essentially a reimbursement program that reimbursed the school district for moneys expended for qualified purposes. Plaintiff taught music for approximately two and one-half years; however, for the last seven months of her 1975-76 contract, the plaintiff was not paid pursuant to any federal program. It was stipulated that Plaintiff had not obtained tenure and that the school district did not notify Plaintiff prior to April 10, 1976 that her teaching contract for the school year 1976-77 would not be renewed. However, on April 19, 1976, Plaintiff was notified that her employment for the school year 1976-77 would depend upon the availability of federal funds and that she would be notified if those funds became available. The school district later discovered the federal funds would not be available. In the prior years that Plaintiff taught for school district she had always been given notice prior to April 10 that the renewal of the contract would depend upon the availability of federal funds. In August of 1976, Plaintiff appeared before the district's Board of Education demanding to be rehired, but was informed that there were no funds available to pay her and her employment was therefore refused. Plaintiff was one of the 23 teachers employed by the school district for the 1975-76 school year, and 23 teachers were employed for the next school year.

70 O.S.1971, § 6-101(E) 1 provides:

"A board of education shall have authority to enter into written contracts with teachers for the ensuing fiscal year prior to the beginning of such year. If, prior to April 10, a board of education has not entered into a written contract with a regularly employed teacher or notified him in writing by registered or certified mail that he will not be employed for the ensuing fiscal year, and if, by April 25, such teacher has not notified the board of education in writing by registered or certified mail that he does not desire to be reemployed in such school district for the ensuing year, such teacher shall be considered as employed on a continuing contract basis and on the same salary schedule used for other teachers in the school district for the ensuing fiscal year, and such employment and continuing contract shall be binding on the teacher and on the school district . . ."

Since Plaintiff was not properly notified prior to April 10 that her contract would not be renewed, Plaintiff contends her contract was automatically renewed for the 1976-77 school year, and she is entitled to her expectations under that contract.

Section 6-101(E) contains no ambiguities. It is written in explicit, mandatory language intended to preserve the rights of both the school district and the teacher. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and no occasion exists for the application of rules of construction, the statute will be accorded the meaning as expressed by the language therein employed. Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 422 P.2d 840 (1966); Forston v. Heisler, Okl., 363 P.2d 949 (1961).

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    ...by the language used. Berry v. Public Employees Retirement System, 768 P.2d 898, 899-900 (Okla.1989), quoting Caves Springs Public School District, 613 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Okla.1980). However, where a statute is ambiguous or its meaning uncertain it is to be given a reasonable construction, on......
  • Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hovis, CIV-92-2134-A.
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    ...with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words used); Cave Springs Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Blair, 613 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Okla.1980) ("Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning is clear ... the statute will be accor......
  • Zaloudek Grain Co. v. Compsource Okla.
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    ...used. Berry v. Public Employees Retirement System, 768 P.2d 898, 899–900 (Okla.1989), quoting Caves [ Cave] Springs Public School District [ v. Blair], 613 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Okla.1980). However, where a statute is ambiguous or its meaning uncertain it is to be given a reasonable construction......
  • McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 87119
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    ...is no room for judicial construction and the statute must be followed without further inquiry. Cave Springs Public School Dist. I-30, of Adair County v. Blair, 613 P.2d 1046 (Okl.1980). However, where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of a statute and the literal interpretation woul......
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