McNeill v. City of Tulsa, 87119

• Decision Date: 13 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 87119,87119
• Citation: 953 P.2d 329,1998 OK 2
• Parties: N.E. McNEILL, Jr., on his own behalf and as Class Representative, Respondent, v. CITY OF TULSA; Municipal Employees Retirement Plan Board of Trustees, and Larry Stovall, Employee Benefit Manager, Petitioners.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 329

953 P.2d 329

1998 OK 2

N.E. McNEILL, Jr., on his own behalf and as Class Representative, Respondent, v. CITY OF TULSA; Municipal Employees Retirement Plan Board of

Trustees, and Larry Stovall, Employee Benefit

Manager, Petitioners.

No. 87119.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Jan. 13, 1998.

David L. Pauling, Michael C. Romig, Tulsa, for Petitioners.

James R. Eagleton, Eagleton, Eagleton & Harrison, Inc., Tulsa, for Respondents.

SIMMS, Justice.

¶1 City of Tulsa and its Retirement Plan seek our review of the trial court's certified interlocutory order finding that 72 O.S.1991 § 67.13a, which grants war veterans a military service credit toward their retirement benefits, applies to Tulsa's Plan for its employees. We find that it does not and reverse the trial court.

¶2 We granted certiorari to address questions regarding the proper construction of § 67.13a and to determine the section's reach. The relevant portion of the statute, with the amendatory language at issue in italics, provides:

" * * * War veterans, as defined above, shall receive maximum benefits available for each year of creditable service, not to exceed five (5) years, for active military service for retirement benefits in the retirement systems within the State of Oklahoma; * * * The provisions of this act shall include military retirees, whose retirement was based only on active service, that have been rated as having twenty percent (20%) or greater service-connected disability by the Veterans Administration or the Armed Forces of the United States."

¶3 The City of Tulsa created the Tulsa Municipal Employees Retirement Plan (the Plan), by ordinance (Tulsa, Okl.Ordinances tit. 28, ch. 1, § 100), pursuant to the enabling legislation set forth at 11 O.S.1991, §§ 48-101 to 48-106, which empowers cities to create and fund their own retirement systems and establish the qualifications for their participants' eligibility for retirement benefits. The ordinance requires that both the City and the employees must make contributions to the Fund for the benefit of the participants. The City must contribute in such amounts as are necessary to provide the benefits set forth in the Plan, comply with applicable law and keep the Plan actuarially sound. Funds are not contributed to provide for increased benefits attributable to military service.

¶4 N.E. McNeill was employed by the City of Tulsa for many years. He retired in 1992, and began receiving benefits from the Plan at that time. Later, he sought to increase his benefits by claiming entitlement under § 67.13a to credit for his active military service during war time. As his benefits did not include the military credit, the City refused his request and McNeill filed this action against the City and the Plan on his own behalf and as representative for a class of other similarly situated veterans.

¶5 The defendants denied the application of the statute to the City's plan. They contended the provision included only the retirement systems of the State, i.e. those plans created and funded by the State of Oklahoma. The trial court, however, agreed with McNeill that the phrase "in the retirement systems within the State of Oklahoma" should be read to include all retirement systems, public and private, located within the boundaries of the state and decided the matter in McNeill's favor. Finding the meaning of the phrase was plain and unambiguous and afforded no opportunity for judicial interpretation, the court held, as a matter of law, that the statute is "broad enough" to encompass Tulsa's Plan for its employees.

¶6 The trial court certified its order for review by this Court pursuant to 12 O.S.1991 § 952(b)3, and defendants filed their petition for certiorari which this Court has previously granted. The trial court never reached the question of certification of a class and, therefore, the issues addressed here involve only McNeill individually.

¶7 The City and the Plan contend here, as they did below, that the legislature did not intend the military credit of § 67.13 to apply to this municipal Plan and that the statutory language cannot be construed to include all pension and retirement plans in the state, private as well as public. We agree. We are not persuaded by the reasoning and conclusion of the trial court and the view of the dissenters to the contrary which would impact every existing private retirement fund and all public retirement systems.

¶8 Proper construction of the provision is determinative of the matter as it requires finding that Tulsa's Plan is not within the reach of the statute. We, therefore, find it unnecessary to address defendants' other arguments advanced regarding constitutional and statutory considerations which would preclude application of § 67.13a to the Plan if it were held within the scope of the statute. These arguments include: (1) impairment of contractual rights of vested Plan participants guaranteed by Article 2, sec. 15 of the Oklahoma Constitution; and (2) encroachment of the City's control of its fiscal matters in violation of the Municipal Budget Act, 11 O.S.1991, §§ 17-201 through 216.

¶9 It is axiomatic that legislative intent is to be first sought in the language of the statute and when that intent is plainly expressed so that the meaning of the statute is clear and the statute is uncontrolled by other parts of the statute or other statutes upon the same subject, there is no room for judicial construction and the statute must be followed without further inquiry. Cave Springs Public School Dist. I-30, of Adair County v. Blair, 613 P.2d 1046 (Okl.1980). However, where adherence is urged to the "strict letter" of a statute and the literal interpretation would lead to an inconsistency or incongruity between different parts of the enactment as they bear on each other and would produce consequences clearly beyond legislative contemplation, judicial interpretation becomes necessary to avoid such incongruity and to ascertain the true meaning of the particular words in accord with the legislative intent. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 380 P.2d 260 (Okl.1963). The goal of the court is always to construe apparently conflicting legislative enactments dealing with the same subject together as a harmonious whole so as to give effect to each provision. Abbott v. Board of Trustees of Oscar Rose, Etc., 586 P.2d 1098 (Okl.1978). To accomplish this goal it is proper to consider the history and consistent purpose of the legislation on the subject and to discover the policy of the Legislature as disclosed by the course of the legislation. State, ex rel., Rucker, supra.

¶10 The meaning of the phrase "in the retirement systems within the State of Oklahoma" is not plain and certain. It is ambiguous and its ambiguity is demonstrated by these strikingly opposing views of its meaning. The literal application of these words in their ordinary sense as determined by the trial court, would be contrary to the purpose of this legislation and place the statute in conflict with other legislative provisions. It is apparent to us that the trial court confined the scope of its inquiry as to the meaning of the phrase far too narrowly.

¶11 In the interpretation of statutes, courts do not limit their consideration to a single word or phrase in isolation to attempt to determine their meaning, but construe together the various provisions of relevant legislative enactments to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention and will, and attempt to avoid unnatural and absurd consequences. Words and phrases of a statute are to be understood and used not in an abstract sense, but with due regard for context and they must harmonize with other sections of the act to determine the purpose and intent of the legislature. Groendyke Transport Inc. v. Gardner, 353 P.2d 695 (1960). The subject matter and purpose of a statute are material to ascertaining the meaning of a word or phrase used and that language should be construed to be harmonious with the purpose of the act, rather than in a way which will defeat it. Simpson v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 409 P.2d 364 (1965).

¶12 Title 72 is the Soldiers and Sailors Act. Since statehood the purpose of the act has been to provide benevolent services by the state for the care and protection of "ex-service persons", including rehabilitation, education and training, financial aid and loans, hospitalization, long-term care and burial. The Act also creates the War Veterans Commission and the Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs. Until the 1981 amendment at issue here, § 67.13a had been virtually unchanged since 1968 when it was amended to provide "war veterans" with entitlement for special benefits from the state: "tax exemptions, ... special permits and veterans' preferences for state employment". (Okl.Sess.L., ch. 102, § 1).

¶13When the legislature amended § 67.13a in 1981, (Okl.Sess.L.1981, Ch. 288 § 1), by adding that war veterans "shall receive maximum benefits available for each year of creditable service, not to exceed five (5) years for active military service for retirement systems within the State of Oklahoma", there was no indication that the change was intended to reach any further than retirement systems of and for employees of the State of Oklahoma. Since that statute already concerned war veterans and preferences for their employment by the State of Oklahoma, this amendment granting those veterans credit for their military service in their retirement benefits received from that state employment is not an unexpected change. The amendment is unquestionably limited to the existing topic and it is consistent with the history and purpose of the statute and the act.

¶14 The defendants correctly argue that the trial court's decision finding prior military service is a qualifying factor applicable to Tulsa's plan under § 67.13a, places that section in direct conflict with 11 O.S.1991, § 48-102, which provides in relevant part:...