Cenac v. Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services

• Decision Date: 13 August 2018
• Docket Number: MMXCV186020531
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Roland CENAC v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES

Roland CENAC
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES

No. MMXCV186020531

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex, Middletown

August 13, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Aurigemma, J.

The defendant, State of Connecticut, Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services ("DMHAS"), has moved to dismiss this action on the grounds that 1) there is no private cause of action for damages under Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution, and 2) the plaintiff’s claim under Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution is barred by sovereign immunity.

Allegations of the Complaint and Background

In the complaint in this action the plaintiff, Roland Cenac, asserts that the defendant violated Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut State Constitution by wrongfully terminating the plaintiff’s employment. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 17.) Specifically, the plaintiff claims that although DMHAS substantiated that the plaintiff had assaulted a patient by kicking her in the face, his employment was instead terminated because of his race, color, or national origin. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17.) Plaintiff is seeking "a. Compensatory damages in the amount of no less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00); b. Attorneys fees and the reimbursement of costs of the instant action; and c. Reimbursement of back wages and re-establishment of any and all employee benefits to which plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled had he not been wrongfully terminated; and d. Such other relief as this court shall consider to be just, fair and equitable." (Compl. p. 4.)

On April 25, 2017, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against DMHAS in Federal District Court asserting the same substantive claims. (Cenac v. DMHAS, Docket No. 3:17-CV-00683-AWT). Count One of that case asserted a claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Count Two asserted a claim under the Connecticut State Constitution. On February 28, 2018, the District Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII claim with prejudice, and dismissed Plaintiff’s Connecticut Constitutional claim without prejudice.

On March 23, 2018, the plaintiff instituted the present action, asserting a single claim of wrongful termination in violation of the Connecticut State Constitution, Article First, § 1. The defendant argues that this claim is barred 1) because there is no private cause of action for damages under Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution, and 2) this claim is barred by sovereign immunity because Connecticut has not waived its immunity to suit and the plaintiff has not received permission to sue from the Connecticut Claims Commissioner.

Discussion of the Law and Ruling

"A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 627, 941 A.2d 266 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).

"When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Fillipi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005).

"Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Henderson v. State, 151 Conn.App. 246, 256, 95 A.3d 1 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted, quoting Filippi, 273 Conn. at 8. "It is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court." Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Peabody N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544-45, 590 A.2d 914 (1991); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn. 232, 245, 558 A.2d 986 (1989).

The complaint is brought pursuant to the Connecticut State Constitution, Article First, § 1, and alleges that "The acts of the defendant in terminating the defendant (sic) violated public policy as it deprived plaintiff of his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Connecticut State Constitution, Article First, Section 1 and, as such, constituted wrongful termination." (Compl. ¶ [17.) Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution provides, "All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community."

"[T]his constitutional provision prohibits the adoption of legislation that has no public purpose but operates to confer private gain on an individual or group." Beccia v. City of Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 134, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984). "To prevail under article first, § 1, of our constitution, the [plaintiff] must demonstrate that ‘the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual.’ " Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 257, 690 A.2d 368 (1997).

The plaintiff does not assert any claims pertaining to "the adoption of legislation that has no public purpose but operates to confer private gain on an individual or group." Instead, he is expressly asserting a claim of wrongful termination.

The plaintiff does not address Breccia or Chotkowski. Rather, he argues without reference to any caselaw, that Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution should be interpreted "to apply broader meaning ... given that the terms used are patently ambiguous and that their present construction reduces their meaning to mere surplusage." (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, pp. 7-8.) This argument ignores the Court’s existing interpretation of Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution, a portion of which the plaintiff acknowledges in his memorandum when he cites Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 212, 558 A.2d 977 (1989), which held that it pertained to "legislation preferring certain individuals over others when wholly unrelated to the public interest." (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, p. 8.)

The plaintiff argues that even though his claim is for "wrongful termination," he can still assert this claim through Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution because "the conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint does essentially pertain to the defendant’s own quasi legislative function as it propagated a system of rules that systematically factored (sic) Caucasian employees over minority workers." (Plaintiff’s Memorandum, pp. 8-9.)

In response to the foregoing argument, the defendant argues that it is a state agency, not the General Assembly. The employment practices of a state agency are not transformed into "quasi-legislative" acts. Its policies and rules do not constitute "legislation" within the meaning of Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution.

The defendant also argues that even if the plaintiff could asserted a valid Article First, § 1 claim, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s damages claims because "the constitution of Connecticut does not provide for a private right of action based on a violation of article first, § 1 ..." Sommers v. Klug, No. FSTCV 165015768S, 2017 WL 2466688, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. Apr. 25, 2017); see also Massey v. Town of Branford, No. X 10NNHCV04048778SCLD, 2006 WL 1000309, at *7 (Conn.Super.Ct. Mar. 28, 2006) (dismissing plaintiff’s Article First, § 1 claim because "[t]he plaintiffs have pled no facts consistent with a cause of action under either of these sections. Article First, § 1 generally prohibits legislative acts that are intended solely for the benefit or advantage of an individual" and the plaintiffs made no such claims); McKiernan v. Amento, No. CV 010453718S, 2003 WL 22333200, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 2, 2003) (citing Schlicht v. Royer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. X03 CV 99 0509270 (December 3, 2002, Aurigemma, J.) and Best v. D’Amario-Rossi, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 99 0334718 (January 2, 2003, White, J.), dismissing plaintiff’s article first, § 1 claim, holding that " ‘no appellate court or trial court in this state has recognized a cause of action for monetary damages under [article first, § 1] of the state constitution ... [and] [s]ince our Supreme Court has yet to recognize a cause of action for money damages for a deprivation of fundamental rights under article first, [§ § 1 or 8] of the state constitution, this court is without authority to do so"); Schlicht v. Royer, No. X 03CV990509270S, 2002 WL 31886706, at *4 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 4, 2002) ("Not only is there no authority to support the plaintiffs’ argument that Article First, Section 1 can apply where the plaintiff does not claim improper legislative action, no appellate court or trial court in this state has recognized a cause of action for monetary damages under this provision of the state constitution"); Boudreau v. City of Middletown, No. CV 970083396S, 1998 WL 321858, at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct. June 9, 1998) [22 Conn.L.Rptr. 236] (dismissing Article first, § 1 claim finding there is no direct cause of action); Outlaw v. City of Hartford, No. 3:07-CV-01769, 2015 WL 1538230, at *14...