Chotkowski v. State, 15399

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Citation: 240 Conn. 246,690 A.2d 368
• Decision Date: 18 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15399,15399
• Parties: Ludmil A. CHOTKOWSKI v. STATE of Connecticut.

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690 A.2d 368 240 Conn. 246 Ludmil A. CHOTKOWSKI
v.
STATE of Connecticut. No. 15399. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued Nov. 1, 1996.
Decided March 18, 1997.

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Harold J. Geragosian, New Britain, for appellant (plaintiff).

[240 Conn. 248] Gregory T. D'Auria, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Carolyn K. Querijero, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee (defendant).

Before BERDON, KATZ, PALMER, McDONALD and PETERS, JJ.

PALMER, Judge.

This appeal marks the parties' third visit to this court in connection with litigation spanning three decades and arising out of a claim by the plaintiff, Ludmil A. Chotkowski, that the defendant, the state of Connecticut, improperly reduced his salary while he was employed at the state Veterans' Home and Hospital over twenty years ago. The principal issues raised by this appeal are: (1) whether a special act of the legislature; Spec. Acts 1991, No. 91-8; ¹ authorizing the

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plaintiff to [240 Conn. 249] present a claim to the claims commissioner requesting permission to bring an action against the state after the expiration of the limitation period applicable to his claim, constitutes an "exclusive public emolument" prohibited by article first, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution; ² and (2) if not, whether the trial court properly rejected the plaintiff's claims for breach of express contract, breach of implied contract and promissory estoppel. The plaintiff commenced this action after the claims commissioner, acting pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by No. 91-8 of the 1991 Special Acts (S.A.91-8), granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state. At trial, the state claimed that S.A. 91-8 violates article first, § 1, of the state constitution and, consequently, that the claims commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's request for permission to sue the state. The state further maintained that even if S.A. 91-8 satisfies constitutional requirements, the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was entitled to relief under any of his claims. The trial court rejected the state's constitutional argument, but rendered judgment for the state on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove his claims. The plaintiff appealed from [240 Conn. 250] the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In November, 1969, the plaintiff, a physician, left his private medical practice to accept an appointment as a "special assistant" at the state Veterans' Home and Hospital in Rocky Hill. In February, 1975, the position of special assistant was eliminated, and the plaintiff was reclassified as a "professional specialist" with no reduction in pay. The plaintiff then received notice of his proposed reclassification to "chief of medicine." Through correspondence with various state administrators, the plaintiff protested his reclassification and corresponding salary reduction. On May 20, 1975, he forwarded a letter to the state department of personnel and administration requesting the "opportunity of appealing this decision before it should become final." The commissioner of personnel and administration, Frederic Rossomando, responded by letter dated June 3, 1975 (Rossomando letter), in which, contrary to applicable law, he stated: "I am advised that there is no existing statute or regulation which would permit such an appeal, either to me or any other appropriate body." Thereafter, on June 6, 1975, the plaintiff was reclassified to the

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position of "chief of medicine," and his salary was reduced by $303.64 biweekly.

On April 8, 1976, nearly one year later, the plaintiff's employment was terminated as a result of his continued conflicts with administration officials over his salary reduction. ³ The plaintiff appealed the termination to the state personnel appeal board (board), which dismissed [240 Conn. 251] the appeal, concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to review of his claims because he was not a "permanent employee holding a position in the classified service" within the meaning of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 5-202(a). ⁴ The plaintiff's administrative appeal of the board's decision was sustained by the trial court, Pickett, J., on the ground that the plaintiff was a permanent employee in the classified state service for purposes of § 5-202(a). The board appealed to this court, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Chotkowski v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board, 176 Conn. 1, 404 A.2d 868 (1978). The parties eventually agreed to a settlement of the plaintiff's employment termination claim.

After settling his employment termination claim, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner under General Statutes § 4-147 ⁵ requesting permission to sue the state for lost wages based upon the allegedly improper reclassification and salary reduction. The claims commissioner rejected the plaintiff's claim, concluding that it was barred by the one year [240 Conn. 252] limitation for presenting claims against the state prescribed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 4-148(a). ⁶

Thereafter, the legislature, at the plaintiff's urging, passed No. 85-24 of the 1985 Special Acts (S.A.85-24), ⁷ which authorized the plaintiff to prosecute his claim against the state despite his failure to comply with the requirements of § 4-148(a). The plaintiff then renewed his claim to the claims commissioner, who granted the plaintiff permission

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to sue the state in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 4-160(a). ⁸

[240 Conn. 253] The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the state alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The trial court, O'Neill, J., granted the state's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff, as a permanent employee in the classified state service, enjoyed only statutory, and not contractual, employment rights. The plaintiff appealed to this court and we held that S.A. 85-24 constituted an "exclusive public emolument" prohibited by article first, § 1, of the state constitution. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the trial court with direction to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction. ⁹ Chotkowski v. State, 213 Conn. 13, 566 A.2d 419 (1989) (Chotkowski II ).

The legislature then enacted No. 90-284 of the 1990 Public Acts (P.A. 90-284), now codified at § 4-148(b), ¹⁰ which provides that the legislature, by special act, may excuse a claimant's failure to file a timely notice with the claims commissioner provided that the legislature "deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose." Section 4-148(b) also purports to ensure that the legislature's "finding shall not be subject to review by the superior court." ¹¹

[240 Conn. 254] Acting under the aegis of § 4-148(b), the legislature, again at the request of the plaintiff, enacted S.A. 91-8, which, like S.A. 85-24, authorizes the plaintiff to present his claim to the claims commissioner notwithstanding his lack of compliance with § 4-148(a). Unlike S.A. 85-24, however, S.A. 91-8 is predicated upon an express legislative finding that the plaintiff "failed to timely file a notice of a claim against the state with the claims commissioner because he was misinformed by a state official and was misled by such official into believing that he had no right of redress against the state for the damages he allegedly suffered," and, further, "that there are compelling equitable circumstances to support such authorization and that such authorization would serve a public purpose." See footnote 1. The plaintiff, upon passage of S.A. 91-8, renewed his claim with the claims commissioner, who again granted him permission to bring an action against the state.

The plaintiff then commenced this suit alleging breach of express contract, breach of

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implied contract and promissory estoppel. ¹² The state moved to dismiss [240 Conn. 255] the action for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that S.A. 91-8 violates article first, § 1, of the state constitution. The trial court, Stengel, J., denied the state's motion. The state thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment in which it renewed its constitutional challenge to S.A. 91-8 and, in addition, claimed that (1) the plaintiff's request for permission to sue the state was barred by § 4-148(c), and (2) the plaintiff had failed to state a legally sufficient cause of action because his employment rights were statutory, rather than contractual, in nature. The trial court, Fineberg, J., denied the state's motion on the ground that there were disputed factual issues material to the plaintiff's claims; see Practice Book § 378 et seq.; see also Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 805, 679 A.2d 945 (1996); and a trial to the court ensued. At the conclusion of the trial, the court, Fineberg, J., rendered judgment for the state, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employment with the state gave rise to any contractual rights and, further, that he had failed to prove the elements of his promissory estoppel claim. ¹³

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that he had failed to establish [240 Conn. 256] that he was entitled to relief under each of his claims. ¹⁴ The state contends that the trial court improperly rejected its claim that S.A. 91-8 violates article first, § 1, of the state constitution and that the claims commissioner did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's claim requesting permission to sue the state. The...