Cent. W. Va. Reg'l Airport Auth., Inc. v. Triad Eng'g, Inc., Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-11818
| Decision Date | 18 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-11818 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | CENTRAL WEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, INC., Plaintiff v. TRIAD ENGINEERING, INC.; CAST & BAKER CORPORATION; MICHAEL BAKER INTERNATIONAL, INC.; WEST VIRGINIA PAVING, INC.; SENEX EXPLOSIVES INC.; AFFORDABLE ASPHALT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION; ENGINEERED ARRESTING SYSTEMS CORPORATION; ROYAL TEN CATE (USA), INC.; NOVEL GEO-ENVIROMENTAL, LLC; JMD COMPANY, INC.; ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS INSURANCE COMPANY; ERIE INSURANCE GROUP; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; HDI-GERLING AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY; LANCER INSURANCE COMPANY; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; OHIO FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY; WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY; XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC.; NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; AIG AEROSPACE INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.; CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY; TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY; ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY 1; JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY 2; JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY 3; JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANIES 4-20; JOHN DOES NOS 1 THROUGH 20, Defendants |
Pending is plaintiff's motion to remand, filed September 4, 2015.
This action arises from a landslide at Yeager Airport in Charleston, West Virginia on March 12, 2015. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 45; Not. of Removal ¶ 5. Plaintiff, Central West Virginia Regional Airport Authority, Inc. ("the Authority"), is the owner and operator of Yeager Airport.
In 2003, the Authority "decided to provide a Runway Safety Area . . . for its runways," including Runway 5-23, which is the subject of this action. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 33. The new runway safety area involved two additions. First, Runway 5-23 was to be extended by five hundred feet, and second, the Authority wished to add an engineered material arresting system ("arresting system"). Id. at ¶ 34. The arresting system was "a series of 4,200 . . . blocks . . . designed to arrest an overrunning aircraft." Resp. in Opp. to Pl. Mot. to Remand at *5; see also Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 34.
Because Yeager Airport is situated "on top of a ridge," the Authority needed to "construct a . . . manmade slope" to make room for the extended runway and the arresting blocks. Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 35-36. Creation of the manmade slope was an extensive project that "involved disturbing at least 42.5 acres of vegetated and forested land, including at least 13.75 acres of clear-cutting," and "the movement of approximately 750,000 cubic yards of earth." Id. at ¶ 36.
On March 12, 2015, part of the manmade slope collapsed, "sending hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of fill and other material cascading down . . . onto the Keystone Drive area of Charleston destroying homes, a church, public roads and damming a stream." Id. at ¶ 45; see also Resp. in Opp. to Pl. Mot. to Remand at *3. The Authority asserts that the "damages suffered by the residents of Keystone Drive and the Authority total in the millions of dollars." Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 45.
The Authority filed this case in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, on May 22, 2015. Notice of Removal ¶ 1. The Authority brought claims against a number of contractors that designed, built, or otherwise assisted with parts of the runway safety area and the manmade slope, and alsobrought claims against the insurers of those contractors. See Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 2-27. The Authority's complaint includes assertions of negligence, id. ¶¶ 49-55, 90-93, breaches of warranties, id. ¶¶ 56-59, 75-89, breach of contract, id. ¶¶ 60-64, breach of quasi-contract, id. ¶¶ 65-68, and products liability, id. ¶¶ 69-74. The Authority also seeks declaratory judgments relating to the liability of various insurers, id. ¶¶ 94-109, as well as punitive damages, id. ¶¶ 110-15.
On August 5, 2015, defendant Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation, doing business as Zodiac Arresting Systems America ("Zodiac"), removed the action to this court, contending that "[f]ederal statutes and regulations in the field of airline and aviation safety . . . render th[e] case removable under the doctrine of complete preemption." Id. ¶ 11.1 Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case, contending that complete preemption does not apply to this action.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)(internal citations omitted). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) governs federal removal jurisdiction and provides as follows:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the . . . defendants . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
The burden of establishing removal falls upon the removing party. Mulcahey v. Colum. Organic Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Our court of appeals has observed that it is obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly:
We have noted our obligation "to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the 'significant federalism concerns' implicated" by it. Maryland Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). . . . Consistent with these principles, we have recognized that state law complaints usually must stay in state court when they assert what appear to bestate law claims. See, e.g., Harless v. CSX Hotels, Inc., 389 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 2004); King, 337 F.3d at 424; Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2002); Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1274 (4th Cir. 1985).
Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2005). Congress has intended that the federal courts " resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction." Marshall v. Manville Sales, Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).
One source of federal jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The well-pleaded complaint rule states that removal under this provision is generally appropriate only "if the face of the complaint raises a federal question." Lontz, 413 F.3d at 439. Our court of appeals has elaborated on the well-pleaded complaint rule:
In determining whether a plaintiff's claim arises under federal law, we apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, which holds that courts "ordinarily . . . look no further than the plaintiff's [properly pleaded] complaint in determining whether a lawsuit raises issues of federal law capable of creating federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331." Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus, in examining the complaint, our first step is to"discern whether federal or state law creates the cause of action." Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151; seealsoDixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) () (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S. Ct. 585, 60 L. Ed. 987 (1916).). If federal law creates a plaintiff's claim, then removal is proper. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151. The general rule, of course, is that a plaintiff is the "master of the claim," and he may "avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law" in drafting his complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed.2d 318 (1987).
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005).
In this case, no federal cause of action appears on the face of the complaint, and to effect removal, defendants rely on the doctrine of complete preemption. Complete preemption is "a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule." Lontz, 413 F.3d at 439; see also Johnson v. American Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 2015)("[W]e note that complete preemption only applies in a 'very narrow' range of cases.")(citation omitted).
"Complete preemption," a "term of art," "refers to that small category of statutes that [. . .] authorize removalof actions that sought relief only under state law." Lontz, 413 F.3d at 438. Under the doctrine of complete preemption, removal is appropriate "if the subject matter of a putative state law claim has been totally subsumed by federal law - such that state law cannot even treat on the subject matter." Id. at 439-40.
Complete preemption applies only where Congress creates an exclusive federal cause of action covering the plaintiff's claim. In Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, for example, the Supreme Court held that remedial provisions of the National Bank Act created an exclusive cause of action for usury claims against a national bank, thus completely preempting state-law usury claims and allowing removal. 539 U.S. 1 (2003). The Court framed the issue of complete preemption as follows:
Does the National Bank Act provide the exclusive cause of action against national banks? If so, then the cause of action necessarily arises under federal law and the case is removable. If not, then the complaint does not arise under federal law and is not removable.
539 U.S. at 9; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)( that Taylor's claim "falls directly under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, which provides an exclusive federal cause of action for resolution of such disputes"); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557(1968) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial