Center Bldg. Co. v. City of St. Joseph

Decision Date22 February 1892
PartiesThe Center Building Company v. The City of St. Joseph et al., Appellants
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. -- Hon. Henry M. Ramey, Judge.

Affirmed.

Huston & Parrish for appellants.

(1) Section 11, article 10, constitution of Missouri, does not deal with the individual assessments of each piece of property, real or personal, but is only aimed at keeping the gross assessment of property in the city, made by the city assessor, down to the same amount as that made by the county assessor on property within the city, so as to make the limitation on the levy effectual. (2) If it be true that the constitution contemplates individual valuations then there is no method provided by which the county assessment can be certified to the city assessor, and, as the valuations are made at different times six months apart, then the valuation by the city assessor would be a mere blind guess, of no value whatever. The provision of the constitution invoked in this case, not providing for its own enforcement, requires some provision of law to enforce it; otherwise no valid assessment of real or personal property could be made by the city assessor. (3) One of the chief objects of our constitution is to prevent tax evasion, and to compel all property, not exempt, to bear its due proportion of the burdens of the government.

Porter & Woodson for respondent.

(1) Section 11, article 10, of the constitution is self-enforcing. Board v. Patton, 62 Mo. 44; State ex rel. v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 537; Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 572. (2) The city had no power to add to the valuation of the plaintiff's lots, as fixed for state and county taxation, the value of improvements placed thereon after such valuation by the county assessor. Richards v. Wapello Co., 48 Iowa 507; Cooley on Taxation [2 Ed.] pp. 356, 368, cases cited; Snell v City, 45 Iowa 564; Goold v. Lyon Co., 36 N.W 906; 74 Iowa 95; R. S. 1879, sec. 6705. (3) There is no authority conferred on the city to levy taxes on a separate valuation of buildings erected on real estate; such buildings become a part of the land. R. S. 1879, sec. 6705; R. S. 1889 sec. 7552; R. S. 1879, sec. 6664; R. S. 1889, sec. 7510; McGee v. Salem, 149 Mass. 238. (4) The term real estate, when used in the city charter, must be taken to mean all that is included in the statutory definition of that term. The statute declares that real estate shall be deemed to be coextensive with land tenements and hereditaments. Revised Statutes, 1889, section 6570, subdivision 9, carried through all the revisions from Revised Statutes, 1855, page 1026, section 22; Revised Statutes, 1889, section 7510, continued from Wagner's Statutes, 1872, page 1159, section 8, construing lot to include not only the land itself but also buildings, etc.

OPINION

Brace, J.

This is a proceeding by injunction to restrain the collection of certain city taxes. The plaintiff is a business corporation, and the defendants, a city of the second class, its treasurer, collector and auditor.

The case was tried upon the following agreed statement of facts: "That the lots or parcels of ground described in the petition were assessed by the county assessor in the year 1887 for state and county purposes for the years 1888-9, and the value thereof by such assessment was placed at twenty-one thousand dollars ($ 21,000). That after such assessment for state and county purposes was made, and before the first day of January, 1889, the plaintiff herein began the erection of a large building on sad lots or parcel of ground and had expended thereon fifty thousand dollars ($ 50,000) before the first day of January, 1889.

"That at the annual city assessment for 1889 the city assessor assessed the value of said parcel of land, aside from the aforesaid improvements, at the same sum as it had been assessed by the county assessor in the year 1887, to-wit, the sum of twenty-one thousand dollars ($ 21,000), and that said city assessor also assessed at his annual assessment, for the year 1889, the building or improvements so placed on said lots as aforesaid at the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars ($ 25,000); that such assessment was so made under and in accordance with chapter 3, general ordinances of the city of St. Joseph, as found on page 193, revised ordinances of said city; that section 3 of said ordinance is hereby made a part of this stipulation. It is further stipulated that the tax levy for city purposes for the year 1889 was as stated in the petition, and that the plaintiff has paid to the city collector the tax upon such levy for said year upon an assessed valuation of twenty-one thousand dollars ($ 21,000). That the taxes enjoined in this case, and in contest here, are taxes extended at the rates fixed for city taxes for the year 1889, upon the assessed value of the improvements as above set out and stated and extended against said lot or parcel of ground.

"Section 3 of the ordinance referred to in the above agreement, and made a part thereof, is as follows:

"'In assessing real property, no lot, tract or parcel of land shall have a higher valuation placed on it than the valuation placed thereon at the last assessment made for county and state purposes; but to such valuation there shall be added by the assessor the value of all improvements made on each lot, tract or parcel of ground since the date of last assessment made for state and county purposes; which added valuation shall be by the assessor placed in a separate column on the city land tax book. And, to determine the value of such improvement, the assessor may examine under oath the owner thereof, and such other competent persons as he may deem proper.'"

The court found for the plaintiff and made the temporary injunction perpetual. The defendant appeals.

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  • The State ex rel. Dickason v. County Court of Marion County
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 21, 1895
    ...an annual tax, but an every "six months" levy. R. S. 1889, sec. 4575. State, etc., v. Columbia, 111 Mo. 365, p. 376; Center, etc., v. St. Joseph, 108 Mo. 304; Barnard v. Knox Co., 105 Mo. 304. Appellants the sharpest possible issue that this section 12 of article 10 governs these funding bo......

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