Centinela Valley Secondary Teachers Assn. v. Centinela Valley Union High Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1974
• Citation: 37 Cal.App.3d 35,112 Cal.Rptr. 27
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CENTINELA VALLEY SECONDARY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, and Mary Ianni, Petitioners and Appellants, v. CENTINELA VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents and Respondents. Civ. 41799.

Page 27

112 Cal.Rptr. 27

37 Cal.App.3d 35

CENTINELA VALLEY SECONDARY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, and Mary Ianni, Petitioners and Appellants, v. CENTINELA VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Respondents and Respondents.

Civ. 41799.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 30, 1974.

Hearing Denied March 27, 1974.

Trygstad & Odell by Lawrence B. Trygstad, Los Angeles, for petitioners and appellants.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, by John J. Wagner, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents and respondents.

COMPTON, Associate Justice.

Mary Ianni (petitioner) ¹ who is certified to teach at the secondary school level, petitioned the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for a writ of mandate to compel the Centinela Valley Union High School District (the District) to classify her as a probationary teacher, and thus to require the District to grant her certain rights under Education Code, § 13447, and a hearing pursuant to Education Code, § 13443 to determine the District's right or lack thereof to refuse to rehire her for the 1972--73 school year. The petition was denied and petitioner appeals.

Petitioner's claim to the status of a probationary teacher and the rights attendant on such status flows from her contention that during the 1971--72 school year she fulfilled the requirements of Education Code, § 13336.5 which provides in pertinent part: 'Any employee classified as a substitute employee, who teaches during one school year for at least 75 percent of the number of days the regular schools of the district were maintained in such school year any class or classes which would have The resolution of this dispute turns on the interpretation of and the discerning of the legislative intent underlying the phrase 'classes which would have been taught by one person absent from service.' The District admits that petitioner met all requirements for invoking the statute with the single exception that she have taught classes which would have been taught by 'one person absent from service.' The petitioner admitted in her petition and the trial court found that petitioner substituted one semester each for two different regular teachers during the 1971--72 school year.

been taught by one person absent from service, shall be deemed to have been a probationary employee during the entire school year in which he so teachers, with the rights and duties of other probationary employees of the district, and shall be deemed to have served a complete school year as a probationary employee.'

This proceeding is governed by Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1085, 1086 and 1110. Hence our view is to determine if the judgment of the trial court is supported by the evidence and was a proper exercise of discretion. The trial court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute. That finding is well supported. The obvious purpose of the statute is to prevent school boards and administrators from abusing their discretion in hiring substitute teachers so as to circumvent the tenure rights of teachers. Since this is a proceeding by way of prerogative writ, that abuse must clearly by demonstrated and the motives of the District may be considered.

'It has been repeatedly recognized that unless statutory mandate compels otherwise, the position of the teacher is created and fixed by the terms of the contract of employment.' (Matthews v. Board of Education, 198 Cal.App.2d 748, at 752, 18 Cal.Rptr. 101, at 104.)

In order to abrogate the contract the statutory mandate must be clear.

FACTS

For convenience we consider the first semester of the 1971--72 school year to run from September 1971 to February 1972 and the second semester from February 1972 to June 1972.

In March of 1971, Wendy Brooks, a permanent member of the faculty at Hawthorne High School requested and was granted maternity leave for the first semester of the coming school year and in June of that year petitioner signed a contract to teach on a substitute basis for Wendy Brooks for that one semester.

In July of 1971 another permanent teacher at Hawthorne High School, Mrs. Edith Harris, requested and was granted an opportunity leave for the entire 1971--72 school year. By contract dated December 15, 1972, petitioner was engaged to substitute for Mrs. Harris during the second semester of the school year beginning in February 1972.

Pursuant to these contracts petitioner taught as a substitute for Mrs. Brooks for the first semester and for Mrs. Harris for the second semester of the 1971--72 school year. During the 1971--72 school year petitioner occupied the same classroom. She taught five courses in English, three of which were year-long courses.

By the beginning of the next school year both Mrs. Brooks and Mrs. Harris were available for duty and petitioner was advised that her services would not be needed during the 1972--73 school year.

DISCUSSION

It is the contention of petitioner that since she taught the same classes for the full year, classes which were what one regular teacher would normally have taught, she satisfied the statute and should not be required to identify that one teacher. Thus, she contends that the actual teaching assignment is the controlling factor and not how the District administratively accounted for the permanent and substitute teachers.

It appears from the evidence that Mrs. Harris, who had initially been granted a year's leave of absence, returned early and was actually assigned to teaching duties during the second semester. However, her status was that of substitute for yet another teacher who had been granted sick leave. Petitioner points to this fact as supporting her position, contending that she could not be classified as a substitute for a teacher who was not absent.

In our view, however, the evidence as to the method employed in making teaching assignments, including the particular handling of Mrs. Harris' assignment, points to the correctness of the trial court's decision and interpretation of the statute in question.

At the beginning of the year it is clear that both the District and petitioner anticipated that petitioner would substitute for Wendy Brooks for one semester and it is reasonable to infer that petitioner was assigned the classes which Mrs. Brooks would have taught. It was also to be anticipated that at the end of that semester Mrs. Brooks would return and take over the second semester of the year-long courses.

When petitioner executed the second contract to substitute for Mrs. Harris it is reasonable to infer that petitioner would have been assigned to those classes which Mrs. Harris would normally have taught. Further petitioner could not at this point have anticipated being employed beyond the end of the school year.

If at the end of the first semester the District had assigned petitioner to different classes and assigned Mrs. Brooks to the classes petitioner had been teaching, this controversy would not have arisen, since petitioner must concede that she would then have taught the classes of two different teachers whoever they might be.

The latter procedure was not followed here. Instead petitioner was assigned to continue through the year with the same classes and both Mrs. Brooks and Mrs. Harris were, on their return, given other class assignments.

Education Code, § 939 provides in pertinent part:

'Powers and Duties of Superintendent.

'The superintendent of each school district shall, in addition to any other powers and duties granted to or imposed upon him: (a) Be the chief executive officer of the governing board of the district. . . . (c) Subject to the approval of the governing board, assign all employees of the district employed in positions requiring certification qualifications, to the positions in which they are to serve.'

This statute provides for the well recognized prerogative of the school administrator to control class assignments. That prerogative is to be exercised for the best interests of the students.

The administrative decision to have petitioner continue with the same classes rather than shift her to another assignment after one semester and then introduce a different teacher to complete the second half of year-long courses was calculated to benefit the students in those courses. The district should not be penalized for that decision.

'The assignment of teachers to classes for which a teacher is certificated is entirely within the discretion of the governing board. A teacher (doesn't) acquire tenure in a particular class or room.' (Matthews v. Board of Education, 198 Cal.App.2d 748, 754, 18 Cal.Rptr. 101, 104.)

Petitioner was a substitute teacher. 'The substitute teacher is employed from day to day to serve at the option of the school district in the absence of the regular teacher.' (Wood v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 6 Cal.App.2d 400, 402, 44 P.2d 644, 645.)

Education Code section 13336 as it read at the time in question provided:

'Governing Boards of school districts shall classify as substitute employees those persons employed in positions requiring certification qualifications, to fill positions of regularly employed persons absent from service.'

Finally as was stated in Ham v. Los Angeles City High Sch. Dist., 74 Cal.App.2d 773, at 775, 169 P.2d 646, at 648:

'There is a wide distinction between the status of probationary and permanent employees on the one hand, and substitute employees on the other; the former, as the classification indicates, have positions of their own from which they cannot be removed except for cause and after a hearing; the latter have no positions of their own but occupy, temporarily, positions belonging to probationary or permanent teachers. Furthermore, teaching as a substitute does not qualify one to become a permanent teacher.'

The District could have avoided any problem such as created by the present litigation by simply filling the vacancies on a day-to-day basis with various...