Centrix Mgmt. Co. v. Valencia

• Decision Date: 17 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 34697.,34697.
• Citation: 76 A.3d 694,145 Conn.App. 682
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: CENTRIX MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC v. Estephanie VALENCIA, et al.

145 Conn.App. 682

76 A.3d 694

CENTRIX MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC

v.Estephanie VALENCIA, et al.

No. 34697.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 2013.

Decided Sept. 17, 2013.

Robert Shluger, Glastonbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Ralph S. Keen III, Farmington, for the appellees (defendants).

Michael H. Clinton, Glastonbury, filed a brief for the Connecticut Coalition of Property Owners as amicus curiae.

Cecil J. Thomas and David A. Pels, Hartford, filed a brief for Greater Hartford Legal Aid, Inc., et al. as amicus curiae.

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and ALVORD and BISHOP, Js.

DiPENTIMA, C.J.

The threshold issue in this appeal arising out of a summary process action is whether the reciprocal attorney's fees in the consumer contracts statute, General Statutes § 42–150bb, applies to land-lord-tenant rental agreements. The plaintiff, Centrix Management Company, LLC, appeals from the trial court's orders awarding attorney's fees to the defendants, Estephanie Valencia and Jose Sanchez, and distributing the court-held use and occupancy payments. The plaintiff claims that (1) the court erred in awarding the defendants attorney's fees pursuant to § 42–150bb, (2) the award of attorney's fees was excessive, and (3) the court erred in releasing a portion of the use and occupancy payments to the defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 47a–35b. We agree with the plaintiff's third claim, but reject the plaintiff's first two claims. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney's fees, but reverse the court's distribution of the use and occupancy payments.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. In June, 2010, the plaintiff landlord commenced this summary process action against the defendant tenants, who lived together in an apartment in Newington. The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the defendants had entered into a one year lease agreement with the plaintiff in October, 2009, but that they had failed to pay their rent pursuant to the lease agreement and remained in possession of the apartment despite the fact that the time given in the notice to quit had passed. The parties agree that the lease had been entered into and contained the following provision: “LEGAL FEES: Upon violation of any term of this Lease, You are responsible for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by Us. If We incur legal fees to defend a suit as to Our obligations under this Lease, including security deposit disputes, and if We are the prevailing party, You will be responsible for payment of legal fees and costs.”

In July, 2010, Valencia moved to dismiss the summary process action due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that the plaintiff did not terminate the lease by unequivocal notice to quit as required by statute. On August, 19, 2010, following a hearing, the court, Gilligan, J., granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to this court from the trial court's dismissal of its summary process action.

The parties filed motions during the pendency of the appeal. On August 25, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for attorney's fees, reasoning that they had been successful in defending the summary process action and requesting $2430 in attorney's fees pursuant to § 42–150bb. On December 23, 2010, the trial court, Gilligan, J., issued a memorandum of decision in which it denied the motion for attorney's fees. Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. NBSP–053902, 2010 WL 6486972 (December 23, 2010). In May, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to General Statutes § 47a–35a (c) requesting an order directing the defendants to deposit use and occupancy payments with the court during the pendency of the appeal. The trial court, Oliver, J., granted the motion, requiring the defendants to pay $840 per month commencing on May 12, 2011, during the pendency of the appeal.

On December 20, 2011, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action, reasoning, inter alia, that it properly had determined that the actions of the plaintiff's property manager rendered the previously unequivocal notice equivocal. See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 586–91, 33 A.3d 802 (2011).

On December 28, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the use and occupancy moneys paid to the court by the defendants during the pendency of the appeal be released. On December 30, 2011, Valencia filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion arguing that “[a]ttorney's fees should be paid prior to release of payments to the court being paid over to the [plaintiff].” In January, 2012, Valencia filed a motion for attorney's fees requesting that the court order the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, pursuant to § 42–150bb, in the amount of $9375 to the defendants because they had been the prevailing party in the motion to dismiss and on appeal.

On May 24, 2012, the court, Oliver, J., issued two orders. The first concerned Valencia's motion for attorney's fees. In that order, the court determined that “all the prerequisites for recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to ... § 42–150bb” had been established and awarded the defendants attorney's fees in the amount of $9375 for the successful defense of the summary process action. The second order concerned the plaintiff's motion for distribution of the use and occupancy payments. In that order, the court ordered that the $9240 in use and occupancy payments be equally distributed between the parties in the amount of $4620 to each side, reasoning that the defendants had incurred $9375 in attorney's fees in the successful defense of the action and that the plaintiff had been awarded damages and costs in the amount of $9240 in a separate action for the defendants' use and occupancy of the premises.¹ This appeal followed. We granted the application of the Connecticut Coalition of Property Owners to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff, and the application of Greater Hartford Legal Aid, Inc., New Haven Legal Assistance Association, Inc., Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., Legal Assistance Resource Center of Connecticut, Inc., and Connecticut Legal Rights Project, Inc., to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants.

I

The plaintiff argues that as a matter of law the court erred in applying § 42–150bb to award attorney's fees to the defendants because the statute does not apply to rental agreements. It posits that both the language and the legislative history of the statute support its position. We disagree.

We employ a plenary standard of review for this claim of statutory interpretation. See Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 847, 937 A.2d 39 (2008) (issues of statutory construction raise questions of law subject to plenary review). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alvord Investment, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 401–402, 920 A.2d 1000 (2007).

Section 42–150bb provides: “Whenever any contract or lease entered into on or after October 1, 1979, to which a consumer is a party, provides for the attorney's fee of the commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorney's fee shall be awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim based upon the contract or lease. Except as hereinafter provided, the size of the attorney's fee awarded to the consumer shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party. No attorney's fee shall be awarded to a commercial party who is represented by its salaried employee. In any action in which the consumer is entitled to an attorney's fee under this section and in which the commercial party is represented by its salaried employee, the attorney's fee awarded to the consumer shall be in a reasonable amount regardless of the size of the fee provided in the contract or lease for either party. For the purposes of this section, ‘commercial party’ means the seller, creditor, lessor or assignee of any of them, and ‘consumer’ means the buyer, debtor, lessee or personal representative of any of them. The provisions of this section shall apply only to contracts or leases in which the money, property or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or house-hold purposes.”

It is not disputed that the defendants successfully defended this summary process action by obtaining a dismissal that was affirmed on appeal. Nor is it disputed that there was a written lease agreement between the parties that contained a provision for the plaintiff's recovery of attorney's fees. Relying on the Superior Court decision Plainville Housing Authority v. Galka, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. NBSP–053968, 2010 WL 6486971 (December 17, 2010), the plaintiff argues that the term “rental agreement” as used in General Statutes § 47a–1 (i),² does not appear in the language of § 42–150bb and that there is no mention of “landlord, tenant, rental agreement, dwelling unit or premises” in the legislative...