Conn. Hous. Fin. Auth. v. Alfaro

• Citation: 328 Conn. 134,176 A.3d 1146
• Decision Date: 26 January 2018
• Docket Number: SC 19720
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY v. Asdrubal ALFARO et al.

328 Conn. 134

176 A.3d 1146

CONNECTICUT HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY

v.Asdrubal ALFARO et al.

SC 19720

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 14, 2017

Officially released January 26, 2018^*

James Mandilk and Nathan Nash, certified legal interns, with whom were Jeffrey Gentes, Peter V. Lathouris, and, on the brief, Richard M. Breen, and Wesleigh Anderson, Rebecca Cao, and Vinita Singh, certified legal interns, for the appellant (named defendant).

Michael G. Tansley, with whom, on the brief, was Mary Barile Pierce, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Cecil J. Thomas, David A. Pels, and Giovanna Shay filed a brief for the Connecticut Fair Housing Center et al. as amici curiae.

Rogers, C.J., and Palmer, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson, D'Auria and Espinosa, Js.^**

EVELEIGH, J.

In this certified appeal, we are tasked with determining whether, pursuant to General Statutes § 42–150bb,¹ a defendant may be awarded attorney's fees when the plaintiff withdraws an action as a matter of right pursuant to General Statutes § 52–80.² The plaintiff, the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority, had obtained a promissory note guaranteeing the payment of $216,500 by the named defendant, Asdrubal Alfaro.³

After the defendant failed to make the required payments on the note, the plaintiff filed a foreclosure action. When the action had been pending for almost one year, the plaintiff withdrew its action as a matter of right under § 52–80 prior to any hearing on the merits. The defendant thereafter sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 42–150bb. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for attorney's fees, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alfaro , 163 Conn. App. 587, 589, 135 A.3d 1256 (2016). We conclude that, in certain circumstances, § 42–150bb permits an award of attorney's fees to a defendant when a plaintiff withdraws an action as of right prior to a hearing on the merits and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On May 24, 2004, the defendant executed a mortgage, which was secured by a parcel of residential property located at 465 Greenwood Street in the city of Bridgeport, and a promissory note in the amount of $216,500, which was made payable to Guaranty Residential Lending, Inc. On June 27, 2012, the plaintiff commenced the present foreclosure action alleging, inter alia, that the mortgage had been assigned to it and that the defendant had failed to make payments on the note. The plaintiff further alleged that, pursuant to an acceleration clause, it had demanded full payment of the note's balance.⁴

The defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, admitting only that he was in possession of the property. The defendant also asserted two special defenses, each contending that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to foreclose on the mortgage as a matter of law. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, contending that there were several unresolved genuine issues of material fact, including whether the plaintiff owned the note and was entitled to enforce it.

Before the trial court ruled, however, the plaintiff withdrew its motion for summaryjudgment. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew the present action as a matter of right pursuant to § 52–80. The plaintiff did not provide any reason for these withdrawals. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 42–150bb, claiming that he had "successfully defended" the present action as a result of the plaintiff's withdrawal of the underlying complaint. The plaintiff objected to the defendant's motion, asserting, among other things, that it had an absolute right to withdraw the action pursuant to § 52–80, and that such a withdrawal, prior to any hearing on the merits or the rendering of a judgment, does not constitute a successful defense.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion for an award of attorney's fees. The trial court agreed that the plaintiff's withdrawal of the action as a matter of right pursuant to § 52–80, prior to any hearing on the merits, did not mean that the defendant had "successfully defended" the action. According to the court, there were "a myriad of reasons that the plaintiff withdrew the action, including but not limited to the plaintiff deciding that it did not want to redeem the property."⁵ The trial court reasoned further that, "[i]f the defendant's claim were accepted, lenders would be unreasonably exposed to claims for attorney's fees every time a lender withdrew a foreclosure action."

The defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed. Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. Alfaro , supra, 163 Conn. App. at 594, 135 A.3d 1256. The Appellate Court reviewed the trial court's decision for clear error only, reasoning that the question of whether the defendant had "successfully defend[ed]" the action was a factual one to which deference should be afforded. Id., at 592, 135 A.3d 1256. The Appellate Court concluded that, because the plaintiff's withdrawal of the action could have been for any reason, and there was no evidence offered to prove that withdrawal resulted from the special defenses, the defendant had failed to meet his evidentiary burden of establishing an entitlement to attorney's fees. Id., at 593–94, 135 A.3d 1256. The Appellate Court did not engage in any statutory construction of § 42–150bb, although it observed that, "to successfully defend an action, a consumer party must prevail on the merits of [an] answer or special [defense]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 593, 135 A.3d 1256. Specifically, the Appellate Court declined to reach the question of whether a plaintiff's withdrawal of an action, as of right, in response to a special defense could ever constitute a successful defense as contemplated by § 42–150bb, because the defendant had not established the factual predicate for such a claim in the present case. Id., at 591, 135 A.3d 1256.⁶ This appeal followed.⁷

The defendant argues that, given the language used in § 42–150bb and that provision's legislative history, he was not required to prevail on the merits of his special defense, or to defeat the underlying obligation, in order to show that he had successfully defended the present foreclosure action. According to the defendant, a plaintiff's withdrawal of its action, as of right, can qualify as a successful defense. Specifically, the defendant contends that the withdrawal of the present action followed, and was prompted by, his contesting of the plaintiff's standing. Moreover, the defendant claims the Appellate Court improperly required him to provide further evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's withdrawal of the action, because this information was uniquely in control of the plaintiff and provides an unworkable standard that is inconsistent with the statute's remedial purpose.⁸ We agree that, in certain circumstances, a plaintiff's withdrawal of an action as of right under § 52–80 prior to a hearing on the merits may constitute a successful defense, entitling the defendant to attorney's fees pursuant to § 42–150bb. Consequently, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of establishing his right to attorney's fees.

We begin with the standard of review. Because the defendant's claim requires us to construe the meaning and scope of the phrase "successfully ... defends," in § 42–150bb, our review is de novo.⁹ See James v. Commissioner of Correction , 327 Conn. 24, 29, 170 A.3d 662 (2017) (questions of statutory construction present issues of law subject to plenary review). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter .... Importantly, ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.... In other words, statutory language does not become ambiguous merely because the parties contend for different meanings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elianah T.–T. , 326 Conn. 614, 620–21, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017).

The term "successfully ... defends" is not defined within § 42–150bb or elsewhere in the General Statutes.¹⁰ It is well established that "[w]here a statute does not define a term it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries." Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan , 183 Conn. 566, 570–71, 440 A.2d 767 (1981). The word "successful" is defined with substantial similarity in a number of dictionaries. The American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed. 2002) defines "successful" a...