VRM (Vendor Resource Management) v. Estate of Zackowski

• Decision Date: 13 September 2016
• Docket Number: MMXCV166015309
• Parties: VRM (Vendor Resource Management) v. The Estate of Peter P. Zackowski, III et al
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

VRM (Vendor Resource Management) v. The Estate of Peter P. Zackowski, III et al

No. MMXCV166015309

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex, Middletown

September 13, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S SPECIAL DEFENSES (#107)

Elpedio N. Vitale, J.

Pursuant to P.B. § 10-39(a)(5), the plaintiff VRM moves to Strike the Special Defenses filed by the defendants Peter P Zackowski IV, David Zackowski, and Jovana Zackowski. The present matter is a summary process action which follows a foreclosure action entitled Wells Fargo Bank v. Jovana D Zackowski, Administratrix of the Estate of Peter P Zackowski, III, MMX-CV-12-6007087. The plaintiff alleges that the Special Defenses " are void of legal sufficiency and should be stricken." The three defendants have filed almost identical Answers and Special Defenses. In the Complaint, VRM alleges that the defendant(s) originally had the right or privilege to occupy the premises at issue but such right or privilege has terminated. Judicial Notice has been taken of court records that reveal that in Docket Number MMX-CV-12-6007087 a judgment of Strict Foreclosure entered with regard to the subject premises upon the complaint of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The judgment of strict foreclosure entered in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown on October 13, 2015. The defendants herein were also named parties in said foreclosure action. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants nonetheless continue in possession although a notice to quit possession has been served. The plaintiff submitted a brief in support of its motion. In response, the self-represented litigant Peter P. Zackowski, IV filed a document entitled " Cross Motion to Remove Pleading from the Docket" which purports to address the plaintiff's Motion to Strike. The court will treat the defendant Peter P. Zackowski, IV's " crossmotion" as an objection to the plaintiff's Motion to Strike. The defendants David and Jovana Zackowski have not filed a responsive pleading with regard to the plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

Oral argument on the plaintiff's motion was heard September 12, 2016. Peter P. Zackowski, IV, appeared for argument along with David Zackowski. Jovana Zackowski did not appear for argument.

Discussion

" [W]henever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a). " A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 529, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). " In addition to challenging the legal sufficiency of a complaint or counterclaim, our rules of practice provide that a party may challenge by way of a motion to strike the legal sufficiency of an answer, 'including any special defenses contained therein . . .'" GMAC Mortgage, LLC. v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 179-80, 73 A.3d 742 (2013).

" In . . . ruling on [a] . . . motion to strike, the trial court [is obligated] to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). " [W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

Although the court reads the allegations of a pleading favorably to the nonmoving party, a motion to strike only " admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the [pleading] alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).

With regard to special defenses, our Supreme Court has stated that " the fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Almada v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 449, 456, 876 A.2d 535 (2005). Practice Book § 10-50 provides: " No facts may be proved under either a general or special denial except such as show that the plaintiff's statements of fact are untrue. Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specially alleged." " The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999).

Practice Book § 10-50 enumerates several particular special defenses. " [T]he list of special defenses in § 10-50 is illustrative rather than exhaustive." Kosinski v. Carr, 112 Conn.App. 203, 209 n.6, 962 A.2d 836 (2009).

Superior Court cases have held that a defendant's failure to specially allege facts in support of a special defense is a ground for that defense to be stricken. See Lamothe v. Midstate Medical Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV05-4002893, (April 10, 2006, Taylor, J.) (failing to plead specific facts in support of special defense is ground for special defense to be stricken); McRea v. Davis, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV02-0401037, (May 5, 2004, Dewey, J.) (holding allegation of mere legal conclusions without specifically pleaded facts is not a properly plead special defense).

In order to ensure that self-represented parties such as the defendants continue to have access to our courts, " it is the established practice of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party." Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 424, 969 A.2d 157 (2009); Markley v. DPUC, 301 Conn. 56, 74-75, 23 A.3d 668 (2011). (Emphasis added.)

" Summary Process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007). " A summary process action is aimed at deciding the simple question of who is entitled to possession." Yarbrough v. Demirjian, 17 Conn.App. 1, 3, 549 A.2d 283 (1988). " Because of the summary nature of [summary process], the statute granting it has been narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ossen v. Wanat, 217 Conn. 313, 317, 585 A.2d 685 (1991). " The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession . . . and the relief available in summary process action is possession of the premises." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Aguinaldo v. Warner, 140 Conn.App. 264, 270, 58 A.3d 373 (2013). " While in certain cases complex issues may necessarily be part of the action . . . the ordinary summary pace cannot be stalled by defendant's simply raising the spectre of a complexity which is not . . . rooted in the nature of the relationship between landlord and tenant and in the basis of the landlord's claim to possession; or simply by the defendant's threat to raise complex defenses which are not likely to be asserted in good faith . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ossen v. Wanat, supra , Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 145 Conn.App. 682, 691-92, 76 A.3d 694 (2013). In the present case, the plaintiff seeks only possession of the premises.

The defendants have each alleged ten " Special Defenses " raising nearly identical general claims. Their claims are not models of clarity. The overarching theme with respect to many of the claims, however, suggests an effort to re-litigate the aforementioned foreclosure action that was previously adjudicated. This effort is most apparent with respect to the allegations contained in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth " Special Defenses." Preliminarily, and problematically, most of the " Special Defenses" fail to plead sufficient facts in support of the claims asserted. These " Special Defenses" as asserted are mere legal conclusions without specifically pleaded facts. See Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, supra . Most significantly, however, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth " Special Defenses" are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel . The court concludes that in addition to alleging mere legal conclusions and omitting factual support in their " Special Defenses, " the defendants have attempted to interpose said " Special Defenses" as a mechanism by which to re-litigate perceived wrongs in the foreclosure action that related to the subject premises. The defendants were each parties to the foreclosure action according to the official court file. More succinctly, the defendants attempt to defend the instant summary process action by...