Chabad Lubavitch of the Quad Cities, Inc. v. City of Bettendorf

• Decision Date: 02 July 2019
• Docket Number: 3:18-cv-00071
• Citation: 389 F.Supp.3d 590
• Parties: CHABAD LUBAVITCH OF THE QUAD CITIES, INC., and Schneur Cadaner, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF BETTENDORF, IOWA, John Soenksen, Individually and in his Official Capacity, and Decker P. Ploehn, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

389 F.Supp.3d 590

CHABAD LUBAVITCH OF THE QUAD CITIES, INC., and Schneur Cadaner, Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF BETTENDORF, IOWA, John Soenksen, Individually and in his Official Capacity, and Decker P. Ploehn, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Defendants.

3:18-cv-00071

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

Signed July 2, 2019

Michael J. Meloy, Meloy Law Firm, Bettendorf, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Skylar J. Limkemann, Smith Mills Schrock Blades Monthei PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed on March 21, 2019. ECF No. 32. Plaintiffs filed a response on April 11, 2019. ECF No. 38. The matter is fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Schneur Cadaner is an Orthodox Jewish Rabbi and a member of Chabad Lubavitch, an Orthodox Jewish Hasidic movement. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 11–13. He and his wife live in a house in Bettendorf, Iowa, where the Rabbi conducts various personal and public religious activities, including shabbat services, prayer, and bible studies. Id. ¶ 22–25. Chabad Lubavitch of Bettendorf advertises these services to the public with a website. Id. Ex. D-2.

Defendant City of Bettendorf has zoning ordinances in place that restrict what land may be used for in certain areas of the city, Id. ¶ 20, and Plaintiffs' house is located in an R-1 Single-Family Residence District that requires a special use permit for houses of worship, Bettendorf City Code §§ 11-6A-1; 11-6A-3.² The Board of Adjustment also has broad authority to issue variances apart from special use permits. Id. § 11-2B-4(c). The City, through its employees, has sent three letters to Rabbi Cadaner regarding the Chabad and the use of the house for religious services. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 27–29. The first two letters indicate that Plaintiffs need a special use permit or variance from the Board of Adjustment in order to use the property as a house of worship. Id. 20 ¶¶ 27, 29. The third states that Plaintiffs might need a business license for home occupation. Id. ¶ 28. Rabbi Cadaner does not allege he ever responded to these inquiries or applied to the Board of Adjustment for a special use permit or variance. After the first two letters were sent, the Bettendorf City Council approved a new zoning scheme that allows houses of worship in R-1 districts as of right. See id. Ex. B ("This section has been affected by a recently passed ordinance, 35-17 – ZONING AMENDMENTS."); Bettendorf, Iowa Ordinance 35-17, §§ 11-4-5, 11-5-4 n.1 (Oct. 17, 2017).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

" ‘Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,’ the same standard used to address a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)." Ashley Cty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc. , 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). While not a "probability requirement," the plausibility standard requires a showing of more than just the "sheer possibility" of relief. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). To determine whether a complaint has stated a claim for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), "the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and viewed most favorably to the plaintiff." Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health , 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). "[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Braden , 588 F.3d at 594. "Determining whether a claim is plausible is a ‘context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ " Hamilton v. Palm , 621 F.3d 816, 817–18 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges nine causes of action. First, for violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution; second, for violations of Plaintiffs' free exercise rights under article I, section 3 of the Iowa Constitution ; third, for violations of the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. ; fourth, for violations of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; fifth, for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; sixth, for violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; seventh, for violations of equal protection and non-discrimination guarantees under article I, section 3 of the Iowa Constitution ; eighth, for violations of due process under article 1, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution ; and ninth, for injunctive relief.

A. Ripeness

The heart of Plaintiffs' claims arises out of Bettendorf's local ordinances, and primarily the zoning code, which Plaintiffs contend is unconstitutionally limiting them from using their property as a house of worship to host religious services. See generally ECF No. 23. Defendants have previously raised the issue of ripeness, see ECF No. 24-1 at 8–11, and the Court finds it appropriate to address it at this time. "The issue of ripeness, which has both Article III and prudential components, is one of subject matter jurisdiction." Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. S.D. , 362 F.3d 512, 520 (8th Cir. 2004). This Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, has a duty to assure itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction in every case. Id. ; see Barclay Square Props. v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis , 893 F.2d 968, 969 (8th Cir. 1990). "The ripeness doctrine flows both from the Article III ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ limitations and also from prudential considerations for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co. , 234 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000). "The touchstone of a ripeness inquiry is whether the harm asserted has ‘matured enough to warrant judicial intervention.’ " Vogel v. Foth & Van Dyke Assocs., Inc. , 266 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 2001). The general ripeness inquiry is one into "the ‘fitness of the issues for a judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ " Neb. Pub. Power Dist. , 234 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) ).

For land-use challenges like Plaintiffs, however, the Supreme Court has articulated a more specific ripeness inquiry. In addressing the ripeness of a takings claim to a zoning law, the Supreme Court held that "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue."³

Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), overruled in part by Knick v. Twp. of Scott , No. 17-647, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558, 2019 WL 2552486 (June 21, 2019). The Supreme Court explained that a claim is not ripe when the government entity has the power to grant a variance but the applicant has not applied for one because the claim is not yet final. Id. at 193–94, 105 S.Ct. 3108. The Supreme Court also noted this was true of a claim "whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or as a taking under ... the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 200, 105 S.Ct. 3108.

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether Williamson County 's finality requirement is specifically applicable to RLUIPA. The Eighth Circuit has, however, imposed a finality requirement on due process and equal protections claims relating to land use. McKenzie v. City of White Hall , 112 F.3d 313, 317 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Because the City's decisions to deny zoning and building permits absent surrender of the privacy buffer were final, the [plaintiffs'] due process and equal protection claims based on those decisions are ripe."); Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis Cty. , 35 F.3d 1269, 1273 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the finality requirement to equal protection and due process claims); see also Missouri ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Cuffley , 112 F.3d 1332, 1337–38 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying as unripe state's action for declaratory judgment before the state approved or denied a permit application). And two other district courts in this Circuit have applied the finality requirement to RLUIPA. See New Life Evangelistic Ctr., Inc. v. City of St. Louis , No. 4:15-cv-00395, 2015 WL 6509338, at *4–*5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2015) ; Woodridge Church v. City of Medina , No. 11-cv-00275, 2012 WL 2395195, at *3–*5 (D. Minn. June 25, 2012).

To the Court's knowledge, every other circuit to have considered this issue has also applied the finality requirement to RLUIPA claims and related land use and zoning challenges. See Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego , 670 F.3d 957, 979 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied , 568 U.S. 940, 133 S.Ct. 423, 184 L.Ed.2d 255 (2012) ; Miles Christi Religious Order v. Twp. of Northville , 629 F.3d 533, 537–38 (6th Cir. 2010) ; Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox Twp. , 544 F.3d 609, 617–18, (6th Cir. 2008) ; Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n , 402 F.3d 342, 351–52 (2d Cir. 2005) ; Congregation Anshei Roosevelt v. Planning & Zoning Bd. , 338 F. App'x 214, 216–19 (3d Cir. 2009). As "land use...