Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad

• Decision Date: 26 October 2020
• Docket Number: B299031
• Citation: 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 521,56 Cal.App.5th 565
• Parties: Bernie CHACON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

56 Cal.App.5th 565

270 Cal.Rptr.3d 521

Bernie CHACON, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, Defendant and Respondent.

B299031

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed October 26, 2020

Marc J. Bern & Partners, D. Shawn Burkley and James West for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Berkes Crane Robinson & Seal, Viiu Spangler Khare, Steven M. Crane, Barbara S. Hodous, Los Angeles, and Rebecca A. Bellow for Defendant and Respondent.

LUI, P.J.

Bernie Chacon appeals from a judgment against him following a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings by respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). Chacon brought this action against Union Pacific in March 2018 under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), title 45 United States Code section 51 et seq. Chacon alleges that he developed a sarcoma as a result of his exposure to diesel fumes and other carcinogenic substances while working as a diesel mechanic for Union Pacific (and for a predecessor, Southern Pacific) for 31 years.

Chacon previously sued Union Pacific for damages arising from an unrelated 2007 accident. The parties settled that case in 2010. As part of the settlement, Chacon executed a release of all claims arising from his employment, including any claims concerning exposure to toxic chemicals or fumes. That release was the basis for Union Pacific's successful motion for judgment on the pleadings in this case.

The issue in this appeal is whether Chacon could validly release future claims unrelated to the particular injury that was the subject of his prior lawsuit and settlement. Section 5 of FELA ( 45 U.S.C. § 55 ) invalidates any contractual provision "the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this act [FELA]."¹ The United States Supreme Court long ago concluded that this provision does not apply to a release provided in settlement of a specific liability claim. (See Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1948) 332 U.S. 625, 631, 68 S.Ct. 296, 92 L.Ed. 242 ( Callen ).) However, federal law, which governs here, is unsettled as to whether such a release may properly extend to known risks that have not yet caused any injury.

No California case has yet considered this issue. We conclude that the "bright line" rule described in Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. (6th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 89 ( Babbitt ) best conforms to the governing statute and to the United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting it. Under that rule, which we partially adopt (with a limitation on the scope of our decision explained below), a release of a FELA claim is valid only to the extent that it applies to a "bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury." ( Id. at p. 93.)

The release at issue here purported to extend to future claims unrelated to the particular injury that Chacon previously settled. To that extent it is invalid. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings on Chacon's complaint.

BACKGROUND

1. The Release

Chacon worked for Union Pacific² as a diesel mechanic from 1976 to 2007. In 2009, Chacon sued Union Pacific in Los Angeles Superior Court for injuries arising from an accident that occurred in 2007.

The parties settled that action in 2010. As part of the settlement, Union Pacific paid Chacon $203,843.81, and Chacon agreed to resign permanently from Union Pacific.

Chacon also provided a broadly worded release (Release). Chacon agreed to release all claims arising from the 2007 accident. In addition, he agreed to release "any and all liabilities, causes of action, claims, actions, or rights, known or unknown, arising from [Chacon's] employment." The Release stated that "[i]t is [Chacon's] intent and the intent of Union Pacific to completely and irrevocably settle by this Release and Settlement Agreement, all claims of any kind or nature, arising out of [Chacon's] employment with Union Pacific, including all claims and/or causes of action and/or liability of any kind or nature, for any medical condition or injury arising out of any exposure at any time during [Chacon's] employment to any toxic chemical, and/or environmental substance, condition and/or fumes."

2. Chacon's Complaint

Chacon filed his complaint in this action in March 2018. The complaint asserted a single cause of action for a violation of FELA. Chacon alleged that, while employed at Union Pacific, he was "exposed to various toxic substances and carcinogens, including but not limited to diesel fuel/exhaust, benzene, creosote, and rock/mineral dust and fibers." Chacon claimed that this exposure "caused or contributed to his development of sarcoma of the right thigh." He alleged that Union Pacific was negligent in its use of known carcinogenic materials in its operation.

3. Proceedings in the Trial Court

In April 2019, Union Pacific moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Chacon had released his claims in the Release. In connection with its motion, Union Pacific requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the Release and the related settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement). Chacon did not oppose the request.

The trial court granted the motion. The court concluded that Chacon had the burden to establish that the Release was invalid, but that Chacon had not "provided his declaration, or any other proffered evidence" to show fraud, mutual mistake, or inadequate consideration. The court rejected Chacon's argument that the validity of the Release was a jury question, noting that Chacon had waived jury by failing to deposit jury fees and that, in any event, "it is a judicial function to determine the plain meaning of the language of a written instrument, such as a settlement agreement." The court also rejected Chacon's argument that Union Pacific's answer failed to assert release as an affirmative defense.

The trial court concluded that "the plain meaning of the 2010 release is to bar plaintiff from proceeding against this defendant on a claim of personal injury (cancer ) due to his exposure to toxic chemicals. As of the date he signed the settlement agreement and release, plaintiff had not worked for defendant for three years. Nevertheless, he agreed to ‘completely and irrevocably settle ... all claims of any kind or nature arising out of [his] employment ... including all claims ... for any medical condition or injury arising out of any exposure at any time during his employment to any toxic chemical.’ This language could not be more clear." Citing Wicker v. CONRAIL (3d Cir.1998) 142 F.3d 690 ( Wicker ) (discussed further below), the trial court also found that, "in the absence of any facts to the contrary, this agreement evinces an awareness by plaintiff that there was a known risk of toxic chemical exposure during the course of his employment."

DISCUSSION

1. Judicial Notice and the Standard of Review

We review an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law, applying the same standard that governs review of an order sustaining a demurrer. ( Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 548, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 646.) The grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the complaint or be based on matters that may be judicially noticed. ( Ibid. ) We accept the material allegations of the complaint as true. ( Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 205, 271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524.)

The basis for Union Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings was the Settlement Agreement and the Release. The trial court took judicial notice of those documents at Union Pacific's request, without objection by Chacon. However, Chacon now argues that judicial notice of those documents was improper because there are disputed extrinsic facts "as to the Release's contents."³

Under Evidence Code section 452, a court may take judicial notice of "[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy." ( Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) And, under Evidence Code section 453, a trial court "shall" take judicial notice of matters specified in section 452 upon request if the requesting party provides sufficient notice and information. The existence and contents of a written agreement may be the proper subject of judicial notice if there is no factual dispute that the document is genuine and accurate. (See Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 666, fn. 2, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 537 [taking judicial notice of settlement agreements on demurrer "as there is and can be no factual dispute concerning the contents of the agreements"].)

Although Chacon asserts that the "contents" of the Settlement Agreement and Release are disputed, he did not contend in the trial court, and does not argue on appeal, that those documents are fraudulent or that their contents are different from the documents that he signed. He does not deny that he entered into the Settlement Agreement and executed the Release. Thus, Chacon's actual dispute is not with the contents of the documents that Union Pacific offered in support of its motion, but rather with the legal effect and proper interpretation of those documents.

Taking judicial notice of a written agreement's contents is not the same as taking judicial notice of a particular interpretation of the agreement. Cases that Chacon cites make this point. As the court explained in Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, "Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of the statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable." ( Id. at p. 113, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, italics added; see also Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374, 228 Cal.Rptr. 878 ["Taking...